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ABSTRACT

Pervasive Nonarbitrariness: Meaning from Form in Natural Language
by
David J. Neely

Advisor: Eric Mandelbaum

It is generally assumed that the expressions of a natural language are largely arbitrary.
That is, any expressions that display a nonarbitrary connection between what their utterances
sound like and what they mean are small in number and of no real theoretical importance.
This thesis challenges such a position. I argue that nonarbitrariness is a pervasive feature
of natural language and that understanding the sound/meaning connections that exist in
language is necessary if to appreciate how languages work.
I begin, in Chapter 1, by showing that many theorists are committed to the idea that
nonarbitrary sound/meaning connections are of little theoretical importance and considering
what a commitment to this position entails. I then lay out a principle of Pervasive
NonArbitrariness that stands in opposition to the widely held view and serves as that for which
the subsequent chapters argue.
In Chapter 2, I consider the nature of what words sound like by considering speech
perception in general and the contents of speech perception in particular. I argue that the
contents of speech perceptions are phonological forms, i.e., strings of complex, computational
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symbols that play a specialized role in the speech articulation and speech comprehension.
Demonstrating that these symbols are complex entities and intrinsically linked to articulatory
actions is a necessary step towards appreciating the nonarbitrary connections that exist.
In Chapter 3, I consider the types of expressions that empirically minded theorists have
suggested are nonarbitrary. I begin with a general taxonomy of such expressions. Then, I assess
whether members of these subclasses display a connection between their perceptual content and
their meaning. I argue that there are, in fact, three mechanisms by which a perceptual
content and meaning can be linked, one involving iconic representation, a second involving
analogical processing, and a third involving associative connections that arise during the word
learning process. I discuss the nature of each mechanism as well as the empirical evidence for its
existence.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I consider whether any of the connections discussed in Chapter 3
can be classified as nonarbitrary. To do this, I compare expressions associated with each of the
three mechanisms to paradigmatically arbitrary and nonarbitrary relationships. My conclusion is
that iconic and analogical expressions are genuinely nonarbitrary while associative expressions
are arbitrary in a nonparadigmatic way. I then argue that the nonarbitrary expressions that exist
are sufficient to say that nonarbitrariness is a pervasive feature of natural language. I conclude
the thesis by discussing the implications that pervasive nonarbitrariness has for discussions about
what language is for and for our understanding of what the intuitive judgments we form when
presented with linguistic expressions actually track. In so doing, I show that pervasive
nonarbitrariness has wider implications for linguistic theorizing.
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Chapter 1: Arbitrariness and Naturalness

1. Introduction
It’s seen as a truism that linguistic expressions are arbitrary in some important sense. On
the face of it, it seems that while the sound component of “cat” is used to express cat, it could just
as easily have meant dog, or rabbit, or to sing in falsetto. Furthermore, there are millions of people
who refer to cats by making the sounds characteristic of the Spanish word “gato” or the
Mandarin word “猫.”1 So how could there be anything but an arbitrary connection between the
sound of “cat” and a cat?
This “truism” is closely linked to another: “cat” only means cat because English speakers
produce utterances of “cat” when they wish to refer to a cat. In other words, meanings are, in
some sense, conventional—if we all started producing utterances that sounded like our current
utterances of “cat” when we were referring to a dog, something that sounds like our word “cat”
would mean dog, not cat.2 On the face of it, while this change would mean that we made different
sounds, it would in no way diminish our communicative power—we’d still be able to express all
the same things about dogs and cats that we say today.
Claims that seem to express this same view have a long history within the theoretical
literature. Perhaps the most famous statement to this effect comes from Saussure 1916, who
stated that, “The linguistic sign is arbitrary.” (Saussure 1916, 67) By this he meant that the
sound-image signifier brought about by an utterance of the sign bears no “inner” or “natural”
connection to the signified concept. A similar claim is put forward by Hermogenes in Plato’s

The Mandarin pronunciation of “猫” is Māo.
I am using the roundabout, and somewhat unwieldly phrases like “the sound characteristic of the word “dog,” in
the hopes of avoiding thorny issues related to the metaphysics of words and of word individuation. These matters
will come up again below, but for a thorough investigation of the complexities, see Bromberger 2011.
1
2
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Cratylus. Hermogenes claims that “Any name you give a thing is its correct name. If you change
its name and give it another, the new one is as correct as the old.” He also asserts that “No one is
able to persuade me that the correctness of names is determined by anything besides convention
and agreement.” (Plato, Cratylus 383c-d) Thus, while Hermogenes does not use the word
“arbitrary,” we will soon see that a comparison of his view and Saussure’s make it clear that the
two are aligned.
Philosophy of language textbooks also make claims about the arbitrary nature of language
that seem to align with commonsense. For instance, Devitt and Sterelny 1985 write:
In general, linguistic symbols have no intrinsic or necessary connection with their
referents. The inscription, ‘Ronald Reagan’, happens to refer to a certain president
of the USA, it is in an important sense arbitrary that it does so. (Devitt and Sterelny
1985, 5)
Similarly, Blackburn 1985 uses Arabic numeral notation to illustrate the nature of languages
in general in order to illustrate of how languages work. He writes:
There could clearly be numerical codes in which the written Arabic digits, or their
audible counterparts in spoken English have different interpretations. The
connection between those signs and their meanings is arbitrary, and as we shall see,
conventional. The conventions could change. (Blackburn 1985, 18)
Within cognitive science, it is often taken for granted that the relationship between a
word’s sound and its meaning is entirely arbitrary and that there is no natural or intrinsic
connection between the two. For instance, Greenberg 2013 writes:
Today there is near consensus about how sentences of public languages encode
representational content, at least in broad outline: arbitrary conventions associate
individual words with meanings; then compositional rules determine the meanings
of sentences from word meanings, the way these words are combined, and the
contexts in which they are employed. (Greenberg 2013, 216)
Similarly, Craine 1990 asks us to:
Consider the much-discussed claim that the attachment of meaning to our words is
arbitrary. Since the semantic relations between words and things are not, on the face
of it, fixed by any natural relations between them (such as resemblance), it is often
2

proposed that the only way these relations can be fixed is by conventions holding
among users of the language. (Crane 1990, 192)
Finally, Dingemanse et al. 2015, in their attack on the orthodox position within cognitive science,
characterize their target as committed to arbitrariness, which they define as follows
Arbitrariness: The unpredictable mapping of form and meaning such that, apart from
a social convention to use word A for meaning B, there is no connection between the sound
of a word and aspects of its meaning (Dingemanse et al. 2015, 603, my emphasis)
In short, there is a commonly accepted idea according to which linguistic expressions
display a purely arbitrary connection between what they sound like and what they mean, and
versions of this idea makes appearances in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science. This is
not to say that theorists who make these claims fail to recognize exceptions to this general rule.
All theorists are familiar with onomatopoeias, like “boom” and “moo,” which both refer to a type
of noise and seem to sounds like the noise to which they refer. Many are also familiar with
mimetics, which are words that, common in non-Indo-European languages, which denote a
characteristic manner of action or state of being and are said to sound like what they denote.3
However, these expressions are generally treated as of little theoretical importance; they are the
exceptions that prove the arbitrary rule. For instance, Jackendoff 2002 remarks that “The
standard line on onomatopoeia is that it is illusory,” (251) and Pinker 1999 states that
onomatopoeias are “asterisks to the far more important principle of the arbitrary sign.” (2)
There is, however, a second, less-influential current within the theoretical literature.
According to theorists in this tradition, the relation between a word’s sound and its meaning
often is natural and intrinsic. Furthermore, these intrinsic connections are thought to play central
roles within language and must, therefore, be given considerable attention in linguistic theorizing.

For instance, the Japanese word “suta-suta” means the manner of walking briskly and purposefully, and Japanese
speakers report that utterances of “suta-suta” sound like the act of walking in this manner.
3
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That is, nonarbitrary connections cannot simply be dismissed as mere asterisks to the arbitrary
rule; in order to gain a proper understanding of how languages work, we must pay attention to
these sorts of connections.
One of the earliest statements in this tradition also comes from Plato’s Cratylus. When
discussing the correctness of a name, Socrates puts forward the idea that names are correct, not
merely when there is some convention but when the “being or essence of the thing is in control
and is expressed in its name” (393d). He also states that correctness of a name consists “in its
expressing the nature of one of the things that are.” (422d) An example he gives to illustrate this
point is the fact that Greek names for things associated with motion tended to contain the Greek
letter rho which, in ancient times, was produced by rolling the tongue. In this way, the motion of
the thing named is reflected in the amount of mouth movement needed to produce that name.
The idea that the correctness of a name is a matter of nature and that the natural
connections between sounds and meanings must be given a central place within theorizing is also
found in the work of the Stoics. For instance, the 2nd to 3rd century scholar Origen of Alexandria
attributed to the Stoics the belief that “names are by nature, as the first verbal sounds imitate the
things of which they are names.” (Allen 2005, 16) While there is good reason to think that the
Stoic conception of “by nature” is not quite the same as that employed by Socrates in the
Cratylus,4 the Stoics both include onomatopoeias as examples of naturalness and treat naturalness
as of central importance when understanding how language works. Thus, the Stoics, like

Allen 2005 persuasively argues that Socrates’s notion of natural is entirely a matter of resemblance; whenever a
name qualifies as being a natural signifier for a bearer it is because there is some resemblance between sound and
meaning that is akin to the connection seen between movement related meanings and rho. By contrast, the Stoics had
a more inclusive understanding of “by nature.” While this notion did include cases of resemblance, it was also taken
to include cases of expansion from an imitative original so long as such expansions assist in the communicative
process. Thus, for the Stoics, the fact that the harsh sound of the word for cross, “crux”, matched the pain of being
put upon the cross, and the fact that the word for legs, “crura”, could be derived from “crux” because both legs and
crosses are long and hard, means that “crura” also qualifies as natural in the Stoic sense. By contrast, “crura” would
not qualify as natural, on Socrates’ definition.
4
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Socrates, treated natural sound/meaning connections as of crucial importance when
understanding how language works.
More recently, the idea that nonarbitrary sound/meaning connections are a central
feature of language has been given empirical support. For instance, Sapir 1929 observed that
subjects tended to choose names containing sounds like /i/ when asked to come up with names
for small objects and those containing sounds like /u/ for large objects. In the same year, Köhler
1929, observed that subjects presented with a rounded drawing and a spikey one and asked to
assign either “maluma” or “takate” to each, consistently assigned maluma to the rounded
drawing and “takate” to the spikey one. In isolation, these two experiments prove little, but
similar experiments have now been conducted numerous times. For instance, the phenomenon
identified by Köhler, now known as the bouba/kiki paradigm, has been replicated for subjects of
various ages (Maurer et al 2006, Otzturk et al. 2013 ) and for speakers of numerous languages
(Davis 1961, Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001, Ahlner & Zlatev, 2010, Bremner et al. 2013,
Fort et al 2015). Evidence for his sensitivity has even been found for names and face shape.
(Barton and Halberstadt 2017)
To go along with these experimental findings, cognitive scientists have been able to
identify correlations between speech sounds and meanings that hold across many of the world’s
languages. For instance, Blasi et. al 2016 analyzed vocabulary items from 4298 languages, and
found, amongst other things, that in many unrelated languages, words with nose-related
meanings tend to contain /n/. It has also been observed that within a single language, or set of
closely related languages, it is common for words with similar meanings to contain the same
sequence of sounds in the same place in the sound of the word. For instance, English words that
begin with /gl/ tend to have meanings related to light or shininess, e.g., “glimmer”, “glow”,
“glint”. Also, words like “sneer,” “jeer,” and “leer” all end with the sounds /ir/ and express that
5

something was done with a derisive attitude. The wide spread of these correlations makes it
unlikely that they are coincidental; it seems more likely that that there is some mechanism, or
mechanisms, that brings them about. If this is correct, then it seems natural to say that
nonarbitrary connections between sound and meaning are a common feature within natural
language.
Thus, there are two, seemingly-contradictory traditions within linguistic theorizing. On
the one hand, there is the common view according to which language is by and large arbitrary
and all nonarbitrary or natural sound/meaning connections are of little theoretical importance.
On the other, there is the rather less common view according to which natural connections
between sound and meaning are a central feature of any language and must be given an
important place within theorizing.
This thesis seeks to assess the degree to which this latter tradition is correct. In particular,
it will argue that nonarbitrary, sound/meaning connections must be given a central role in
linguistic theorizing. This is because these connections play an important role in both language
processing and word learning, and these, in turn, shape the natural language lexicon at the public
language level. Indeed, connections of these sorts are both widespread and come in several
different varieties.
To illustrate the importance of sound/meaning connections, I will argue that there are
three distinct mechanisms by which a word’s sound can be linked to its meaning. The first
mechanism is iconic, the second mechanism is analogical, and the third mechanism is associative.
Each mechanism is responsible for some of the empirical data that has been used to argue
language is less arbitrary than typically thought. I will also argue that expressions processed
iconically and analogically are genuinely nonarbitrary. By contrast, those that display an
associative connection are strictly speaking arbitrary, but in an interestingly nonparadigmatic
6

way. In particular, while associative expressions display a level of systematicity not displayed by a
paradigmatically arbitrary sign, it is inappropriate to say that they display an inner connection
between sound and meaning.
My argument will be structured as follows.
In the remainder of Chapter 1, I will take a closer look at the particular notion of
arbitrariness that I will be concerned with throughout this thesis. This is the notion that is found,
amongst other places, in Saussure and that is treated as the orthodox view within cognitive
science. Thus, I will first take a close look at how Saussure defines the arbitrariness of the sign
and then show that this same notion of arbitrariness has a role in other theorizing. I will also
show that this notion is not to be confused with some of the other ways in which “arbitrary” gets
used in the philosophical literature. Finally, I will present a principle of Pervasive
NonArbitrariness, which will serve as what I am arguing for in the rest of the dissertation.
In Chapter 2, I will discuss the theoretical background needed to understand the
mechanisms by which sound/meaning connections come about. In particular, I will give an
overview of linguistic perception and argue that what we perceive are phonological forms. I will
also discuss what phonological forms are like and highlight the relevance that such considerations
have for discussions of arbitrariness and nonarbitrariness.
In Chapter 3, I will draw on empirical data in order to characterized the iconic,
analogical, and associative mechanisms by which sounds and meanings can be linked. I will both
explain how these mechanisms work and highlight their centrality to language use.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I will assess the degree to which the expressions arising from each
mechanism can be classified as non-arbitrary given the characterization from Chapter 1. I will
argue that nonarbitrariness is a pervasive feature of natural language because expressions that
display a nonarbitrary connection are common, can be perfectly normal in all other way, and
7

play crucial roles in explaining how language works. I conclude by considering some of the
implications that these findings have for theorizing more generally.
But before doing any of this, I wish to briefly discuss words.

2. A Brief Note on “Word”s
From a pretheoretic perspective, it seems natural to say that theorists who talk about
arbitrariness are concerned with the arbitrariness of individual words; indeed, the word “word”
appears in several of the quotations presented above. Using “word” seems natural because, in
ordinary conversation, we naturally to say things like the word “cat” could have meant what
“dog” means. However, my plan is to avoid using the word “word” as much as possible. This is
because in a discussion of arbitrariness and naturalness, “word” is likely to cause considerable
confusion.
The reason for this is that “word” is a terminological nightmare. In our everyday lives we
speak of first words, last words, mispronounced words, misspelled words, favorite words, and
words that score high in Scrabble; this sheer variety of uses makes it wholly implausible that there
is any one thing answering to them all. Things are no clearer with regards to how “word” gets
used in theoretical contexts. Within philosophy, the most common understanding of a word is as
an atomic carrier of meaning that can be combined with other such atomic carriers to form
larger expressions whose meanings are a function of the meanings of these atomic parts and how
those parts are combined. On this view, words are akin to the symbols of a formal language.
However, this is by no means the only use of “word” in the literature. Philosophers sometimes
use “word” in a way similar to that employed by phonologists, for whom “word” denotes the
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smallest, independent prosodic unit of human speech.5 Philosophers employ this notion when
describing homonymy, such as when they say that the word “bat” is ambiguous between two
meanings. On other occasions, philosophers employ something like the etymologist’s notion of a
word, according to which words are things that persist and change through time. For instance,
Evans 1973’s discussions of how “Madagascar” changed referent assumes that there’s a single
temporally persistent word “Madagascar.”
There isn’t even consistency with respect to word identification; theorists working on
names often debate whether there is a single word “John” with many different bearers or many
distinct words spelled J-O-H-N each of which has a distinct referent. This is relevant because
certain answers to the individuation question make discussions of arbitrariness completely
irrelevant. For instance, if one is a Millian about names (e.g., Salmon 1986, Soames 2002) then
one believes that each word spelled J-O-H-N is partly individuated by its bearer. As such, there is
therefore no sense in which a certain “John” could have been different than it is, and, as such,
the connection between word and meaning is necessary.
Thus, framing an investigation of arbitrariness and naturalness in terms of words will only
muddy the waters. My plan is, therefore, to take a closer look at the notion of arbitrariness laid
out in Saussure and then consider some other places in the literature where this same notion
appears. This approach will allow me to largely avoid the difficulties surrounding “word”s due to
the fact that Saussure uses his own technical terminology.
In the next section, I will take a closer look at what Saussure means by the arbitrariness of
the sign and identify several other places where this notion appears in the literature.

By this, phonologists mean the smallest unit of perceived, human speech that is capable of standing on its own
within a syntactic structure and being moved independently of other sounds.
5
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3. Arbitrariness and Nonarbitrariness
3.1 Saussure
As we saw above, Saussure’s notion of arbitrariness concerns the linguistic sign. For him,
this is a technical notion. As Saussure defines it, a sign is a composite entity consisting of a concept
and a sound-image.
Roughly speaking, the concept is the meaning associated with the sign. For Saussure, this
is psychological in nature; in his own example of the Swiss French “arbor,” the concept in
question is that of a tree, which serves as the sign’s meaning. The sound-image is also
psychological, though it is something heard, not thought. Specifically, the sound-image is “the
psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses.” (Saussure 1916,
66) Note that the sound-image must be understood to denote a type of experience, not a token.
This is made clear by the fact that Saussure’s notion of a sign was intended, at least in part, to
explain how humans communicate. In this process, it is the fact that tokens produced on different
occasions are recognized as of the same type—and thus as expressing the same meaning—that is
important. Thus, the case of “arbor,” the sound-image is the type of perceptual experience one
has whenever someone produces an utterance of the word “arbor.” And, on Saussure’s view, a
sign is simply the combination of these two parts. For instance, the sign “arbor,” is simply the
perceptual sound-image that results when “arbor” is uttered combined with the concept tree.
While Saussure introduces his discussion with talk of sound-images and concepts, he
commonly finds it useful to speak more generally in terms of signifiers and signifieds. He introduces
these as follows:
I propose to retain the word sign to designate the whole and to replace concept and
sound-image respectively by signified and signifier; the last two terms of the advantage
of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the
whole of which they are parts. (67)
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Thus, in the case of “arbor,” the signified is the concept tree, the signifier is the type of perceptual
sound-image brought about by utterances of this word, and the sign, “arbor,” is these two put
together.
With this terminology in hand, we can now appreciate how Saussure characterizes
arbitrariness. For him, to say a sign is arbitrary is simply to say that the relationship between the
signifier and signified is a wholly arbitrary one. He makes this point in various ways:
The idea of “sister” is not linked by any inner relationship to the succession of
sounds s-ö-r which serves as its signifier in French (67).
The term [“arbitrary”] should not imply that the choice of the signifier is left
entirely to the speaker…; I mean that it is unmotivated, i.e. arbitrary in that it
actually has no natural connection with the signified (67)
Saussure’s notion of arbitrariness, therefore, has a negative character; to be arbitrary is simply for
there not to be any natural or inner connection between sound-image signifier and signified
concept. This means that the signifier serves as a mere indicator; it signifies that a particular sign
has been produced but does not carry information about the nature of the signified concept itself.
It is only by drawing on one’s independent knowledge of the conventions about which signified
goes with which signifier that one can gain any information about the meaning of a particular
word.
This notion of arbitrariness can be clarified even more by considering the contrast
Saussure draws between linguistic signs, which are arbitrary, and non-linguistic symbols, which
are not. For Saussure, symbols include things like the scales of justice that do involve an inner
connection between signifier and the signified. He writes:
One characteristic of the symbol is that it is never wholly arbitrary; it is not empty,
for there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier and the signified.
The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not be replaced by just any other
symbol, such as a chariot. (68)
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Thus, what differentiates a symbol from a sign is that the signifier component of a symbol does
more than merely indicate that the symbol has been produced; with symbols, the signifier plays a
direct role in our being able to understand the nature of the signified. For example, the reason
that the scales of justice cannot be replaced by a chariot is that the scales carry information about
the nature justice itself, namely, that achieving justice requires balance.
These discussions show that Saussure’s bar for arbitrariness is actually quite high. It is not
merely that arbitrariness occurs when there fails to be a one-to one correspondence between the
signifier and signified such that knowledge of one is insufficient for full knowledge of the other—
symbols also lack this degree of correspondence. For instance, while the scales of justice couldn’t
be replaced by a chariot, they could be replaced by a headsman’s axe, since this image also
carries the information that justice is sometimes brutal. Furthermore, the image of scales could
just as well serve to signify a different concept, like commerce, since commerce also requires
balance. Thus, the arbitrariness of the sign does not consist in there being only being a loose
connection between signifier and signified, but in there being no connection whatsoever. Thus,
for something to count as nonarbitrary, the signifier needn’t individuate the associated signified
completely; there merely has to be some degree of natural connection that enables the signifier to
carry information about the signified.
At this point, Saussure’s general understanding of the arbitrariness of the sign should be
clear: for a sign to be arbitrary is for there to be no connection like that between the image of
scales and the concept of justice. However, before considering how this notion fits with other
discussions, I want to address one other passage from Saussure that seems at odds with the
conception of arbitrariness just laid out.
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After describing arbitrariness in the way just discussed, Saussure briefly discusses
onomatopoeias. In this passage, Saussure argues that despite appearances, onomatopoeias are
not really nonarbitrary. The key points of this argument are contained in the following passage:
As for authentic onomatopoeia, not only are they limited in number, but they are
chosen somewhat arbitrarily, for they are only approximate and more or less
conventional imitations of certain sounds…In addition, once these words have been
introduced into the language, they are to a certain extent subjected to the same
evolution—phonetic, morphological, etc.—that other words undergo…obvious
proof that they lose something of their original character in order to assume that of
the linguistic sign in general, which is unmotivated. (69)
Here, Saussure seems to be suggesting that onomatopoeias count as arbitrary because there isn’t
a perfect one-to-one correspondence between signifier and signified; being “chosen somewhat
arbitrarily” is sufficient to qualify as arbitrary. Furthermore, he seems to be indicating that
onomatopoeias are arbitrary because their forms evolve for reasons other than to reflect the inner
nature of the signified meaning.
This definition is distinct from—and indeed at odds with—the definition of arbitrariness
already discussed. The passages above suggest that to be arbitrary requires there to be not even
the “rudiment” of a natural connection between signifier and signified. However, the discussion
of onomatopoeias seems to be setting the bar for arbitrariness much lower—something qualifies
as arbitrary so long as there is some level of arbitrariness between signifier and signified, and the
nature of the signifier is sensitive to considerations other than the aim of reflecting the nature of
the signified.
How might these passages be reconciled?
While one may be tempted to modify our initial understanding of arbitrariness in light of
this latter discussion, it seems to me that it is better to treat Saussure’s discussion of
onomatopoeia as an ultimately misguided attempt to address a potential counterexample. The
reason for this stems from the fact that the same observations that Saussure uses to motivate the
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claim that onomatopoeias are arbitrary hold for paradigmatically nonarbitrary symbols.
Consider the scales of justice. As was said, while a chariot wouldn’t have worked as well as a
signifier, there are plenty of other images that would have. As such, the sense in which an
onomatopoeia is “arbitrarily chosen” seems to apply just as much to a paradigmatically
nonarbitrary sign.
It’s also true that the signifier component of a symbol can evolve for reasons that have
nothing to do with their natural connection to the signified; indeed, the evolution of a symbol can
lead to a reduction in the naturalness of the connection between the signifier and signified. For
instance, when the WALK signals in East Berlin reverted back to the beloved, Soviet-era
Ampelmännchen, as opposed to the West Berliner alternative, they did so for sociological
reasons. East Berliners were fond of their Ampelmännchen, and everyone agreed that the
Ampelmännchen were cuter. Thus, the return to the Ampelmännchen was driven by concerns
other than a similarity between form and symbol in the same way onomatopoeias are.
In short, were one to attempt to incorporate Saussure’s discussion of onomatopoeia into
his definition of arbitrariness, one would be forced to dismiss the main contrast he uses to
illustrate his notion of arbitrariness in the first place. For this reason, it is better to maintain the
understanding of arbitrariness that is found elsewhere in his discussions. If one takes this
approach, then onomatopoeias can simply be treated as a small, and largely unimportant, set of
expressions that are not arbitrary in the way discussed by Saussure. Not only is this in line with
the typical approach taken today, it also comports with some things that Saussure says about
onomatopoeias elsewhere in his discussions; Saussure writes both that “Onomatopoeic
formulations are never organic elements of a linguistic system” and that “their number is much
smaller than is generally supposed.” (69)
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For these reasons, Saussure’s understanding of arbitrariness should be understood as
entailing no connection between a perceptual signifier and a meaningful signified. It is because
there is no connection whatsoever between signifier and signified that differentiates an arbitrary
sign from a nonarbitrary symbol.

3.2 Arbitrariness Beyond Saussure
Having shown what Saussure means by the arbitrariness of the sign, I will now
demonstrate that the same notion of arbitrariness can be found elsewhere in the literature. In
particular, I will demonstrate that theorists in both cognitive science and philosophy share
Saussure’s conviction that nonarbitrary connections are of little theoretical importance when
understanding natural language.
The first thing I wish to note is that Saussure’s notions of arbitrariness and
nonarbitrariness align with the positions put forth by Hermogenes and Socrates in Plato’s
Cratylus. In particular, Socrates’ claim that the correctness of a name lies in its natural connection
to its meaning stands in opposition to the view endorsed by Saussure.
The clearest indication of this comes from the way in which Socrates expands on his idea
that “essence of the thing” is “expressed in its name.” As we saw, Plato’s example of this idea is
that Greek words for motion often contain the rolled sound of the letter rho. This is significant
because a motion-related concept corresponds to a rolled rho in much the same way that concept
signified by a nonarbitrary symbol corresponds to its signifier. For example, the scales of justice
are nonarbitrary for Saussure because an element of the essence of justice—namely that it
requires balance—is reflected in the image of scales. This shows that Socrates’ position is
concerned with the same matters as Saussure’s and, in fact, stands in direct opposition to it.
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The fact that Socrates presents his own account as standing in opposition to Hermogenes’
view, therefore, indicates that Hermogenes’ view is akin to that of Saussure; if Socrates’ view
stands in opposition to both Hermogenes’ and Saussure’s views, one can conclude that the latter
two views are largely the same. This means that both Hermogenes and Saussure believe that a
thorough understanding of how language works can be gained without any real attention to the
types of nonarbitrary connections that are of interest to Socrates. This conclusion also supported
by some of the phrasing employed by Hermogenes. As we saw above, Hermogenes maintains
that if you were to change the name of an entity the new name would “as correct as the old.”
(384d) This entails that even if one were to replace a name that is natural in Socrates’ sense with
one that is less so, this new name would be just as correct in whatever sense of correct is relevant
to understanding how language works. In short, Hermogenes, like Saussure, believes that to
understand how language works one need not pay attention to any natural or nonarbitrary
connections that hold between signifier sounds and signified meanings.
The fact that Hermogenes’ position in the Cratylus aligns with Saussure’s is relevant for
several reasons. First, it neatly demonstrates that the same matters that were of interest to
Saussure were brought up millennia earlier. But just as importantly, contemporary theorists have
been known to endorse the view that language is arbitrary by citing the view that is shared by
Hermogenes and Saussure. Nowhere is this more explicit than in Pinker 1999. Pinker
categorically asserts both that the debate in the Cratylus has “been resolved in favor of
Hermogenes’ conventional pairing” and, in the next sentence, that Saussure made the
arbitrariness of the sign a “cornerstone of the study of language.” (2) Thus, not only is Pinker
tying these two positions together in the way described above, he is also using them in tandem to
state what he takes to be a fundamental feature of how language works. Indeed, it is this
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conviction that leads him to the conclusion that onomatopoeias and similar expressions are mere
asterisks within our theorizing.
Pinker’s endorsement of the view shared by Hermogenes and Saussure is indicative of a
general position within cognitive science. As we saw already, many cognitive scientists explicitly
speak of a general agreement according to which “there is no connection between the sound of a
word and aspects of its meaning.” (Dingemanse et al 2015) Other, similar statements include
Blasi et al. 2016’s assertion that “Although there is substantial debate in the language sciences
over how to best characterize the features of spoken language, there is nonetheless a general
consensus that the relationship between sound and meaning is largely arbitrary” (10818) and
Lewis and Frank 2016’s claims that “The arbitrariness of the linguistic sign has long been
observed as a fundamental and universal property of natural language.” (182) The phrasing of
these statements makes clear that the position that is taken to be widely agreed upon is one
according to which any nonarbitrary connections that exist in natural language are of little
theoretical importance. For instance, by mirroring Saussure’s talk of the arbitrariness of the sign,
Lewis and Frank make clear that the consensus of which they speak is akin to that shared by
Hermogenes and Saussure.
The degree to which the belief that nonarbitrary connections are of little theoretical
interest to our understanding of language is also reflected in the recent literature on types of
representation. Within the past decade, cognitive scientists have grown increasingly interested in
the different ways in which things get represented in the mind and how hese types of
representation can be characterized (Greenberg 2016, forthcoming; Quilty-Dunn 2020a, b; Lee,
Myers, & Rabin forthcoming). This literature is relevant because language is taken as the
paradigm example of representation in which the connection between the vehicle of
representation and represented content is not “mediated by a natural dependency.” (Greenberg
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forthcoming, 1) This manner of representing is generally juxtaposed with that displayed by
pictures, for which there is natural mapping between vehicle and content. Thus, by treating
languages as the paradigmatic instances of representation in which the intrinsic properties of the
vehicle fail to stand in a systematic relationship to the signified content, cognitive scientists are
effectively demonstrating the conviction that any nonarbitrary connections that linguistic
expressions display as of minimal importance for understanding how a language works.
Thus far, my discussions of arbitrariness in the contemporary literature have focused
largely on cognitive science. However, the conviction that nonarbitrary connections are
ultimately of little importance is also found within the philosophy of language. One indicator of
this is that some of the statements about arbitrariness found within the philosophical literature
appear to align with Saussure’s notion of the arbitrariness of the sign. For instance, Devitt and
Sterelny’s claim that there is “no intrinsic” connection between a linguistic symbol and referent
can be interpreted as expressing the same view held by Saussure. However, relying on explicit
statements about arbitrariness to demonstrate a general commitment to Saussure’s understanding
of the notion is more difficult in philosophy than in cognitive science. This is because there are
several distinct notions to which the label “arbitrary” is applied within philosophy.6 Thus, within
philosophy, a better way to illustrate a general commitment to the arbitrariness of the sign—at
least of an implicit variety—is to consider what philosophers do not discuss.
As Bromberger and Halle 2000 astutely point out, philosophers are largely uninterested
in phonology. As they write, “anthologies and books on the philosophy of language either do not
mention phonology at all, or at best perfunctorily restate crude and outdated notions of the
subject.” (20) This is significant because, within linguistics, it is almost universally agreed that
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I will return to this point below, in Section 3.3.
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phonology provides the best account of what speech sounds actually are.7 Thus, by being
uninterested in phonology, philosophers are ipso facto uninterested in any nonarbitrary
connections that hold between speech sounds and meanings; an appreciation of the connection
between speech sounds and meanings is impossible without an understanding of how speech
sounds as characterized in phonology. Therefore, philosophers lack of interest in phonology
entails an implicit commitment to the idea that any sound/meaning connections that exist within
natural language are of little theoretical interest.
This point can be made appreciated even more clearly by considering Bromberger and
Halle’s diagnosis for why philosophers are so uninterested in phonology. As they write:
philosophers of language generally belong to an intellectual tradition that admits no
essential difference between natural languages and some of their contrived
extensions… Philosophic discussions thus generally abstract not only from
differences between English, German, Japanese, and other natural languages, but
also from differences between these real languages and notational systems used in
mathematics, logic, physics, chemistry, biology, linguistics, etc. Such notational
systems do have a syntax (albeit usually one that has very little in common with the
syntax of natural languages), a semantics, and a pragmatics, but happen to have no
phonology. (19)
In other words, philosophers of language are not interested in phonology because they approach
natural language by way of systems for which nothing akin to phonology exists. In a formal
language, the closest equivalent to what is studied by phonologists are the shapes of a particular
formal expressions and, as Bromberger and Halle rhetorically ask, “How could there be anything
of philosophic interest about the shape of simple numerals, or about the horizontal segment in an
inverted " in a quantifier”? (20) Thus, philosophers’ tendency to treat formal and natural
languages as on a par causes them to be uninterested in phonology, and this lack of interest in
phonology entails a commitment to the idea that any nonarbitrary sound/meaning connections
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What this actually entails will be the main focus of Chapter 2.
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that exist in natural language are of no real theoretical interest. For this reason, one can conclude
that philosophers share the general conception of language endorsed by Saussure.
I have now argued that a general commitment to Saussure’s idea of the arbitrariness of
the sign pervades both cognitive science and the philosophy of language. Again, this is not to say
that theorists within these disciplines are unaware of things like onomatopoeia; they simply think
that phenomena are of little theoretical interest when it comes to understanding how language
works. Thus, the considerations in this section make it is safe to conclude that most theorists
within cognitive science and philosophy share Pinker’s conviction that phenomena like
onomatopoeia are mere asterisks within linguistic theorizing.
It is this consensus that I wish to challenge in this thesis. Therefore, it would be useful to
have a particular characterization of precisely what I wish to show. However, before doing so, I
wish to briefly discuss a different use of “arbitrary” within the philosophical literature. Not only
will doing so allow me to avoid potential confusions, it will also serve to further clarify Saussure’s
notion of the arbitrariness of the sign by specifying what Saussure’s view is not.

3.3 A Brief Note on “Arbitrary”
Within philosophy, the word of “arbitrary” is often used in the context of conventions.
For instance, Lewis 1969’s influential account of conventions asserts that conventions are
arbitrary in a sense that makes it “redundant to speak of an arbitrary convention.” (70) However,
it is important to note that when Lewis uses “arbitrary,” the notion he has in mind is distinct
from that employed by Saussure.
Lewis’ conception of being arbitrary is a technical notion that falls out of his account of
how conventions work. For Lewis, conventions arise as resolutions to a particular type of
situation, called a coordination problem. A coordination problem is a situation in which there are
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multiple actors, each of whom is seeking to maximize the payoffs of their actions, but in which
the action that will achieve the best results depends upon the actions taken by others. For
instance, if you and I are approaching each other on the sidewalk, we both wish to choose an
action that will prevent us from walking into each other. However, which action will accomplish
this goal depends on the other’s choice—it is only best for me to move to my left if you move to
your own left, as well.
Lewis characterizes this feature of coordination problems by saying that they always
possess multiple, pure coordination equilibria. On his account, a pure coordination equilibrium is a
set of choices by actors within a situation in which someone would be worse off if any one person
were to have behaved differently, assuming all others maintain their current behavior. Thus, in a
sidewalk case, everyone walking to their own respective right and everyone walking to their own
respective left both qualify as pure coordination equilibria. This is because anyone who doesn’t
wish to walk straight into someone else would be worse off in a world where some people moved
in a direction different from everyone else. Therefore, the reason that approaching each other on
a sidewalk qualifies as a coordination problem is that there are multiple states of affairs that
qualify as pure coordination equilibria.
Lewis defines a convention against this background. For him, a convention is simply a
type of behavioral regularity that holds across some population because members of that
population expect others to follow that regularity, and that regularity constitutes a pure
coordination equilibrium to some coordination problem. Thus, a society where everyone stays to
their right on the sidewalk because they expect others to and behaving in this way minimizes
head on collisions is a society in which there is a convention to stay to the right on the sidewalk.
And for Lewis, this fact is sufficient for walking to the right to be arbitrary. That is, walking to the
right qualifies as arbitrary because there is a counterfactual in which everyone stays to the left
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and staying to the left is also a pure coordination equilibrium. Thus, to say a practice is arbitrary
is simply to say that it is a regularity that centers on one particular coordination equilibrium in a
situation for which there are several such equilibria.
Amongst other things, Lewis uses his account of convention to account for the fact that
language is conventional. It is within this context that one can appreciate the ways in which
Lewis’ conception of arbitrariness is distinct from Saussure’s.
According to Lewis, language counts as conventional because there are always multiple
different sounds, or signals, that could, in theory, be used to denote some particular thing.
However, since everyone in a society benefits from the ability to exchange true information, there
is a benefit to having everyone employ the same signals when expressing some particular
meaning. Therefore, using a particular sound or expression to denote a certain thing counts as a
pure coordination equilibrium; a situation in which everyone uses “moo” to talk about moos
leads to better payoffs than one in which different people use different sounds to talk about moos
because the latter situation does not enable effective communication. This means that if Lewis is
right about how conventions work, the English word “moo” qualifies as arbitrary on Lewis’
account because it is a behavioral regularity that holds because of mutual expectations and
constitutes a pure coordination equilibrium to a particular coordination problem.
But as we saw above, “moo” does not seem to count as arbitrary in Saussure’s sense. This
is because there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the sound of “moo” and a cow’s moo,
thereby making this expression a counterexample to the arbitrariness of the sign. The reason that
these two notions of arbitrary can come apart stems from the fact that Lewis does not require the
overall payoffs of two pure coordination equilibria to be equivalent. For instance, imagine a
world in which everyone carries a sword on their left hip. In this society, were everyone to move
to the right on the sidewalk, there is a chance that swords might tangle. This means that the
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payoffs of moving to the left would be higher than those of moving to the right for all members of
the society. However, moving to the right still counts as a pure coordination equilibrium because,
even in this society, everyone moving to the right is superior to only some people moving to their
right. Likewise, it is reasonable to think that “moo” is an especially good word for moos due to
the natural connection between the sound of “moo” and a moo—indeed, I will argue that this is
the case below. However, “moo” still counts as arbitrary for Lewis because using a word that
sounds like “beep” to talk about moos would also count as a pure coordination equilibrium; it is
better for everyone to use this alternative “beep” in this way than for only some to do so. Indeed,
as has been pointed out to me by Stephen Neale and Saul Kripke (p.c.), if Lewis’ account of
conventions is correct, expressions that are nonarbitrary in Saussure’s sense are always arbitrary
in Lewis’. This is because any word, no matter how nonarbitrary in Saussure’s sense, only counts
as a word of a language when there is a convention to use it a certain way amongst some
population of speakers. Thus, because Lewis uses “arbitrary” simply to mean the product of
convention, all words—Saussure-arbitrary or not—count as Lewis-arbitrary.
The main reason I wished to bring up these points about Lewis is to avoid confusions in
the discussions that follow. In particular, I wish to specify that when I use “arbitrary”, I mean it
in Saussure’s sense. I am centrally concerned with the degree to which language displays natural
connections between sound and meaning, not the mechanisms of convention. This is not to say
there are no interactions between the two; as we saw above, Socrates puts forward his notion of a
natural connection in opposition to Hermogenes’ account and Hermogenes puts considerable
emphasis on the role of convention. However, an investigation of these connections lies beyond
the scope of this thesis. Thus, what follows will focus on arbitrariness in Saussure’s sense and
remain largely silent about arbitrariness in Lewis’.
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4. The Principle of Pervasive NonArbitrariness
Thus far, I have shown that there is a general consensus both in cognitive science and
philosophy according to which nonarbitrary connections between the sound and meaning of
word-sized expressions are of little theoretical importance. The remainder of this thesis will seek
to show that this consensus is mistaken. Thus, to streamline the discussions that follow, I wish to
put forward the following principle which will serve as the main claim for which this thesis will
argue:
Pervasive NonArbitrariness (PNA): Word-sized expressions for which there is a nonarbitrary
connection between the perceptual signifier one
experiences when such an expression is uttered and
what that expression means are a pervasive feature of
natural language.
There are several elements of this principle that I wish to highlight.
The first concerns the term “nonarbitrary.” As I stressed at the end of the previous
section, the notion of arbitrariness that is of interest in this thesis is that found in Saussure. Thus,
the expressions that I am claiming are a pervasive feature of natural language are those that
display what Saussure calls an inner connection, or the rudiment of a natural bond, between
perceptual signifier and meaningful signified. Thus, my claim is that nonarbitrary
sound/meaning connections akin to those displayed by nonarbitrary symbols are a pervasive
feature of natural language.
Note that this talk of inner connections and natural bonds is vague. While there is a clear,
intuitive sense in which the scales of justice display a certain natural connection between signifier
and signified and an equally clear sense in which a formal language expression that is assigned its
meaning at random does not, there are cases that seem to fall in-between. For instance, imagine
that a semanticist assigns the symbol O to the set of round things in part because O is itself
round. There is a certain sense in which this expression displays a natural bond between signifier
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and signified. However, this connection plays no role in one’s interpretation of any formulae that
contain this expression; to interpret what a formula containing “O,” means, one looks to
whatever assignment functions the semanticist provides. This shows that it is not always clear
whether a certain expression qualifies as nonarbitrary.
One might worry that this lack of clarity makes it impossible to assess whether PNA is
correct. However, this is not the case. As I will argue in Chapter 4, one can get around these
worries by comparing potentially nonarbitrary expressions to paradigmatic examples of arbitrary
signs and nonarbitrary symbols. By determining that some set of expressions is quite like a
nonarbitrary symbol—or quite unlike a paradigmatically arbitrary sign—one can identify cases
of nonarbitrariness regardless of the penumbral cases that exist. Thus, the vagueness of
nonarbitrary does not prevent one from demonstrating the truth or falsity of PNA.
Another vague notion within PNA that is worth discussing is that of pervasiveness. As I am
thinking of it, the claim that nonarbitrariness is pervasive stands in direct opposition to Pinker’s
sentiment that instances of nonarbitrariness are nothing more than theoretical asterisks. Thus, it
is not that I have some particular notion of pervasiveness in mind, but rather, that I am intending
to denote a notion that is a denial of another. Therefore, the reason that the vague notion of
pervasiveness that I am using is vague is that it stands in opposition to a conception of
arbitrariness that is, itself, vague.
Once again, this level of vagueness might seem to preclude an accurate assessment of
PNA. However, while giving a definition of pervasiveness would be largely hopeless, it is possible
to identify how pervasiveness might be demonstrated in practice. This can be done by
considering what motivates the claim that nonarbitrary connections are of little theoretical value.
One of the main reasons that many theorists are so quick to dismiss nonarbitrary
sound/meaning connections is that the number of expressions that display such connections is
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taken to be not very large; as we saw above, Saussure categorically states that the number of
genuine onomatopoeias “is much smaller than is generally supposed.” (69) This means that, one
way to show that nonarbitrariness is pervasive is simply to show that the number of expressions
for which there is a nonarbitrary connection is far larger than most theorists realize.
Another motivation that lies behind the dismissal of nonarbitrariness is that the clearest
examples of nonarbitrary expressions are abnormal in ways other than their nonarbitrariness.
For instance, onomatopoeias can occur in syntactic constructions that other words cannot. To
give a concrete example, “The gun went bang bang” can be used to express that the gun made
two firing sounds. By contrast, “the cat went out out” cannot express that the cat went out twice
and “Jill went running running” cannot express that Jill went on two runs. For this reason, it can
seem easy to dismiss instances of nonarbitrary language as an odd subclass within the lexicon and
to conclude that nothing of theoretical value can be gleaned from a consideration of them.
Therefore, a second way to demonstrate that nonarbitrariness is pervasive would be to
demonstrate that the set of expressions for which these connections exist includes many
expressions that are perfectly normal in all other ways.
A final way to demonstrate that nonarbitrariness is pervasive would be to show that
nonarbitrary connections play theoretically significant roles within language use. Because
nonarbitrary expressions are generally taken to be both small in number and abnormal in other
ways, theorists generally assume that nonarbitrary connections are mere curiosities within the
lexicon. That is, it is generally assumed that if no nonarbitrary words existed, language would be
much the same as it actually is. Therefore, were one able to show that nonarbitrary connections
are crucial to how language works or how it is, then this would also serve to show that
nonarbitrariness is pervasive.
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In short, while the notion of pervasiveness is vague, there are nonetheless various ways to
show that nonarbitrariness is pervasive. In Chapter 4, I will show that PNA is true by showing
that each of the conditions just considered does hold true. Thus, as above, vagueness within PNA
is in no ways a hindrance to theoretical investigation.
The final point I wish to discuss concerns the relationship between PNA and syntactic
types. Thus far, I have been following Saussure’s lead and talking only of perceptual signifiers
and meaningful signifieds. However, it is generally accepted that word-sized expressions also
have syntactic properties in virtue of which they are of a particular syntactic type. These types
include things like intransitive verb and proper noun and determine the other linguistic expressions
with which a word can be concatenated to form larger expressions. Syntactic types are also
closely tied to the semantic type, that a word can have. For instance, in an extensional semantics,
an intransitive verb like “sleeps” must have a meaning that is a function of type <e,t>, because it
is able to concatenate with a type e name like “John” to express something true or false.
I bring up syntactic types because it might seem that the existence of syntactic types is
sufficient to demonstrate PNA. For instance, when one is doing compositional semantics and
deciding what meaning to assign to a certain expression, one must first consider the expression’s
syntactic type since this constrains what meanings this expression can have. There is, therefore, a
sense in which an expression’s meaning is linked to its syntactic type in an intrinsic way; that a
word is a count noun seems intrinsically linked to the fact it is used to denote countable entities.
Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that PNA is trivially true because there is always a sort
of natural connection between a words syntactic type and its meaning.
However, this conclusion is not warranted. Remember, Saussure’s notion of arbitrariness
holds between a perceptual signifier and a meaningful signified. Therefore, the fact that there is a
connection between syntactic type and semantic type only constitutes an instance of the relevant
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type of nonarbitrariness if a word’s syntactic type is part of what constitutes the perceptual
signifier. And it is by no means clear that this is the case. For instance, it seems possible to
perceive an utterance of “bowl,” without knowing whether I am perceiving a noun or a verb.
Furthermore, even if one were to argue that a syntactic type is part of what constitutes a word’s
signifier component, the considerations I will be using to defend PNA will make no mention of
syntactic types. Thus, if our ultimate goal is to gain an understanding of how natural language
works, my arguments in favor of PNA will be of interest even if other, alternative arguments
might also be given.
At this point, it should be clear what PNA entails and what a defense of PNA might look
like. Thus, to conclude this chapter, I wish to give a characterization of what is to come and an
explanation of how PNA will be employed in this process.

5. What is to Come
As we saw above in the context of Bromberger and Halle, one cannot hope to assess
whether nonarbitrary connections are pervasive without a clear understanding of the nature of
speech sounds. This is because speech sounds constitute the perceptual signifier component of an
expression, and the perceptual signifier is one half of the relationship between a sound and a
meaning. Thus, in Chapter 2, I will consider the nature of speech perception and phonology
because this background is necessary to appreciate the sound/meaning connections that exist
within natural language. Chapter 3 will, then, utilize this background to consider the various
natural language expressions that have been purported to be nonarbitrary. In particular, I will
consider the empirical data associated with these various types of expressions and identify the
types of sound/meaning connections these expressions actually display. Then, in Chapter 4, I
will assess whether PNA is true. I will do this by first assessing whether any of the connections
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discussed in Chapter 3 can be characterized as nonarbitrary, and then by considering whether
the set of nonarbitrary expressions can be accurately characterized as a pervasive feature of
natural language.
With this plan in mind, I will now turn to considerations about speech perception and
phonology.
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Chapter 2: The Contents of Speech Perception
1. Aims and Caveats
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the truth of
Pervasive NonArbitrariness (PNA). This means showing that there are many natural language
expressions that display a non-arbitrary connection between what they mean and what an
audience hears when they are uttered.
This chapter constitutes the first step towards this conclusion. In particular, it provides the
background necessary to appreciate the nonarbitrary, sound/meaning connections that exist in
natural language. The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 2 will provide a general discussion
of perception and explain why the phrase “the experience brought about when a word is uttered”
must be understood as referring to the type of perceptual content that arises when a speaker
produces a certain word. Section 3 will examine our commonsense understanding of the contents
of speech perception and show that this view is wrong. Section 4 will argue for an alternative
according to which the objects of speech perception are phonological forms and explain what this
entails. Section 5 will say more about what the individual phonemes that comprise phonological
forms are like and briefly explain how the nature of phonemes opens the path to demonstrating
PNA. Thus, by the end of the chapter, we will have all the tools needed to examine the
purportedly nonarbitrary expressions discussed in the empirical literature and identify the
sound/meaning connections that such expressions possess.
However, before proceeding, there is one point of order that I wish to address.
This chapter—and indeed the entire thesis—will only consider spoken language. That is, I
will be ignoring both signed languages and writing. This puts me at odds with many
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philosophical theorists who treat spoken, signed, and written language as on a par.1 However,
there is good reason to limit my discussions in the way I do.
I have two reasons for ignoring signed languages.
The first is practical. My discussions in this chapter will draw heavily on considerations
from phonology, and while the theoretical understanding of signed language phonology has
increased markedly in recent years, it still lags behind the understanding of spoken language
phonology. As such, it would be impossible to discuss arbitrariness in the context of signed
language without getting bogged down in various technical matters.
The second reason for ignoring signed languages is theoretical. Simply put, the intuition
that motivates the arbitrariness of the sign is largely lacking for signed languages. As will be
discussed below, one of the reasons that the arbitrariness of the sign is so widely accepted is that
it’s difficult to see how something that one hears could be linked to a non-acoustic meaning in a
non-arbitrary way—how could an utterance of “cat” be linked to a cat? But, for a language like
American Sign Language (ASL), the sign for a certain referent often seems to resemble that
referent. For instance, the ASL the sign for baby involves cradling one’s arms, and the sign for
telephone involves holding one’s hand to one’s ear. As such discussing arbitrariness for signed
language would lack motivation.
My reason for ignoring writing is entirely theoretical. While reading and writing clearly
involve language, there’s good reason to think they are not language use in the purest sense. For
instance, no one has ever become literate without first knowing a signed or spoken language, and
while every normally-abled child exposed to adult speech during a critical period learns a first

For instance, Devitt and Sterelny 1985 talk of the medium independence of language and say that “there seems to
be no limit to the media we could use for, say, English.” (4) Similarly, Hawthorne and Lepore 2011 write “the same
word can be written, uttered, signed, Brailled, or semaphored.” (451)
1
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language, reading must be explicitly taught. Indeed, widespread literacy is a decidedly modern
phenomenon. These considerations suggest that writing is language use plus something else.
Consequently, since the focus of this this thesis is arbitrariness with respect to human language, I
will be ignoring writing.
With these caveats out of the way, I will now turn to my discussion of speech perception.

2. Perception and Perceptual Contents
As we saw in Chapter 1, a core component of Saussure’s understanding of arbitrariness is
the notion of the signifier component of a sign. As we saw, the signifier can be characterized as
what one experiences when a word is uttered. But what does this actually mean?
Intuitively, the things we hear are akin to the things we see; in both cases, something is
presented to conscious experience and this experience is made possible by the stimulation of one
of our sensory organs. That is, hearing “cat” seems much like seeing a cat—in both cases there is
something experienced by a sensory system. Indeed, the parallel between hearing and vision is
implicit in Saussure’s own use of the term “sound-image,” which, as we saw, is his term for the
signifier component of a linguistic sign. (Saussure 1916, 66)
Thus, it is best to conceive of the notion of what is experience when a word is uttered as
something that is perceptual in nature. But what exactly does this entail?
Within the theoretical literature, to say something is perceptual is simply to say that it is
associated with the process of perception and the computational, mental systems involved in this
process. Consequently, if one is to get a clear grasp on the notion of what we experience when a
word is uttered, one must possess a general understanding of perception and situation this notion
into the more general framework.
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While much about perception is up for debate, there are certain things upon which most
theorists agree. The first is that perception is the result of a mental system whose task is to
provide an organism with an awareness of its surroundings. In particular, it involves a series of
individual, computational subsystems, each of which is linked to a sensory organ, such as the eyes
or the ears. These systems are responsible for processing information gained from the relevant
organ and for presenting an organism with information about some aspect of external reality.
Another universally accepted fact concerns the reason that such systems exist in the first
place. Put simply, perceptual systems developed because it was evolutionarily beneficial for
organisms to possess systems that could provide information about the immediate surroundings.
To survive and reproduce, an organism must be aware of any potential dangers and sources of
sustenance; perceptual systems supply information about these things. For instance, the eye and
its neurological underpinnings provide an organism with information about what is in front of it
whenever there is sufficient illumination. If there’s a hungry bear 30 meters away, my visual
system can usually provide me with this information, allowing me to run away.
These considerations tie in with another generally agreed upon fact about perception: our
perceptual experiences present themselves to us as if they were direct experiences of things in the
external world. That is, my awareness strikes me as of mind-independent, physical entities, not of
an unorganized mass of sensory data or an awareness of the inner workings of my own mind;2
when I open my eyes, my experience strikes me as an experience of red spheres and brown
cubes, not merely a “blooming, buzzing confusion” 3 of sensory impressions. This makes sense
from an evolutionary perspective. If a system developed to provide an organism with information

The only theorists who are likely to disagree with the claim are sense-data theorists like Robinson 1994, who
believe that our experiences are to be understood in terms of patches of basic properties such as color.
3 This phrase comes from James 1890.
2
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about the external world, then we should expect the things presented to an organism’s conscious
awareness to correspond to those external world objects. In other words, our understanding of
the evolutionary purpose of perception dovetails nicely with the way that our perceptual
experiences present themselves to awareness.
It's important to note, however, that such experiences aren’t always veridical. For
instance, I might experience an object as brown when it is really green or hallucinate a bear that
isn’t really there. However, even in these cases, my experience strikes me as being of something
in the world. For this reason, some theorists speak of a perceptual experience’s being as of some
object, where this locution leaves open whether the thing I seem to be experiencing really exists.
While this locution is not universal, I will be employing it throughout this thesis.
Another thing I will be assuming throughout this thesis is that perceptual systems can be
understood as giving rise to perceptual states with certain contents. This view is widely, though
not universally, accepted within the theoretical literature.4 To say that perceptions have contents
is to say that perceiving something is structurally akin to believing something; in both cases, an
individual stands in a particular mental relation to a particular mental content and that content
makes the state about whatever it is about. For instance, just as I believe that the thing in front of
me is a red spherical object when I stand in the believing relation to the content that thing in front of
me is a red spherical, I have a visual perception as of a red spherical object when I stand in a visual
perceiving relation to the content red spherical object. Furthermore, in both believing and
perceiving, tokens of these respective states can be classified together into types on the basis of
their contents. Thus, you and I can be said to be having the same visual perception when we

Theorists who accept that perceptions have contents include Block 2014, Burge 2010, Peacocke 1994, and Siegel
2010. Those who dispute this include Chisholm 1957 and Tye 1984, both of whom take an adverbial approach to
characterizing contents.
4
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both stand in the visually perceiving relation to the content red spherical object. Such contents can
also be said to makes our experiences feel the way they do—I experience myself as looking at a
red sphere when I am in a perceptual state with the content red spherical object.
While these contents are experienced as immediate and direct, another fact about
perception upon which theorists agree is that they are really the products of complex,
unconscious, computational calculations. The existence of such calculations is inferred from the
nature of physical reality. The things an organism must perceive to survive are usually some
distance away—were you only able to become aware of bears that were literally on top of you,
you wouldn’t live long. However, strictly speaking, the only things with which an organism
interacts are those that impinge upon its body directly. This means that a perceptual system faces
a basic problem: it needs to present organisms with an awareness of distal objects, but it only has
access to the proximal stimulation of some sensory organ.
Theorists believe that perceptual systems resolve this issue by exploiting the lawlike
relations that hold between proximal stimulation and the distal objects that likely caused that
stimulation here on earth. In particular, each perceptual system is programmed, by evolution, to
factor certain physical laws and common environmental conditions into its computational
calculations. By employing this pre-programmed information, a perceptual system is able to
compute what the distal cause of some proximal stimuli is likely to have been, given the current
environmental conditions. For example, while a bear at 30 meters cannot directly impinge upon
me, it’s brown fur will reflect certain light waves into my eyes. This will cause a certain pattern of
sensory stimulation upon my retina, and a visual system that is to programmed to treat such light
patterns as having reflecting off the surface of a 3D object with certain properties will be able to
take this input and calculate that its cause was a bear-shaped entity that’s 30 meters away. This
information can then be presented to awareness as a visual perception whose content is as of a
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bear. In this way, I can become aware of an object in my environment without its coming into
direct contact with my body.
Because the calculations required to turn proximal stimulation into perceptual experience
are necessarily complex and occur beyond the reach of conscious awareness, many theorists
believe that the mental systems responsible for perception must be distinct from those involved in
general-purpose cognition.5 In other words, there is a joint in nature between perception and
cognition. Though this position is not universally accepted6—and even amongst those theorists
who accept it, there is disagreement about how the perception/cognition border is to be
drawn7—throughout this thesis, I will be assuming the existence of the perception/cognition
border. There are two reasons for this. First, while I cannot hope to address the empirical
evidence here—it would lead us too far astray—it seems to me that our inability to consciously
alter the contents of our perceptual awareness strongly suggests that perception is carried out by
a set of independently operating perceptual systems. Second, assuming the existence of a
perception/cognition border will make the discussions of speech perception below much clearer
and easier to follow. For these reasons, I believe I am justified in assuming the existence of a
border between perception and cognition.8
When all these considerations about perception are taken together, the picture that
emerges is as follows. When an organism interacts with the world, its sensory organs receive
certain stimuli, e.g., a certain pattern of light on the retina. These stimuli serve as input to one of

See Block 2014, Burge 2010, Carey 2009, Firestone and Scholl 2016, and Fodor 1983, Green 2020, Phillips 2019.
See Churchland 1988 and Prinz 2006.
7 Theorists like Carey 2009 and Block 2014 suggest that the distinction is to be drawn in terms of the formats in
which the two systems operate. Others, most notably Fodor 1983 believe that the distinction should be drawn
architecturally—perception is carried out by a number of informationally-encapsulated modules while cognition is
carried out by a central cognitive processor.
8 For more substantive defenses of the perception/cognition border, see Fodor 1983 and Pylyshyn 1999.
5
6
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a number of specialized perceptual systems, distinct from general-purpose cognition. This
perceptual system turns the pattern of proximal stimulation into a perceptual content by
calculating the distal cause of that stimulation pattern. This content makes the resulting
perceptual state about something in the external world and makes it a state that is of a certain
type. This content is also what’s makes my perceptual experience feel the way it does; I seem to
become aware of red spherical object when the content red spherical object is outputted by my visual
system and presented to central cognition.
With this general understanding of perception in hand, it is possible to slot the notion of
what is experienced when a word is uttered into the broader, perceptual framework. This can be
done by comparing the process of speech perception to the visual examples discussed thus far.
First, note that what one experiences when a word is uttered presents itself to awareness
in the much the same way that visual experience does. In both cases, an experience seems to be
of some mind-independent entity in the physical world; hearing a particular utterance of “cat”
seems much like seeing a cat. Moreover, in both cases, my perceptual experience is linked to the
stimulation of a particular sensory organ; just as I can prevent visual experience by closing my
eyes, I can block my experience of your speech by putting my fingers in my ears. For these
reasons, therefore, it is best to think of notion what we hear when a word is uttered as a type of
perceptual content. That is, what we hear when a word is uttered corresponds to what is
outputted by the perceptual subsystem that’s responsible for turning sensory stimulation of the
ears into an experience of human speech. This means that to experience someone uttering “cat”
is simply for the perceptual system responsible for speech to produce an output with a particular
content to my conscious awareness. Furthermore, it is because my perceptual state has this
content, that I have the conscious experience that I do.
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Now that we have a clearer understanding of the notion what we hear when a word is
uttered, it’s worth tying things back to arbitrariness and nonarbitrariness. In particular, we can
be a bit more precise about what the principle of PNA entails. Someone who accepts PNA is
committed to the claim that there are many words that display a nonarbitrary relationship
between their meaning and the perceptual content that is brought about by their utterance. As
such, assessing the truth of PNA requires an in-depth look at the nature of speech perception;
without a grasp of speech perception, one does not know enough about the associated perceptual
contents that properly assess whether there are any natural language expressions that display a
non-arbitrary connection between a perceptual content and a meaning.
With this in mind, I will now turn to the matter of what the perceptual contents of speech
perception are actually like.

3. The Commonsense View of Speech Perception (and Why it’s Wrong)
The focus of this section will be on our commonsense understanding of the contents of
speech perception. In particular, I will first lay out the commonsense view, according to which
the contents of speech perception are physical sounds, then I will explain why this view must be
wrong. This will put us in a position to appreciate a theoretically viable, phonology-based
alternative in Section 4.

3.1 The Commonsense View
When considering the contents of speech perception, a certain commonsense picture
quickly presents itself. According to this picture, the contents of speech perception are physical
sounds that exist in the mind-independent world and can be classified on the basis of their
physical properties. In other words, the contents of speech perception are much akin to the
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contents of visual perception. Just as our visual perceptions are as of 3D objects in physical space,
our speech perceptions are as of physical sounds that unfold in time. Of course, the properties
possessed by these two types of physical entity must differ somewhat—the things we see have
properties like size and shape, while the things we hear have those like pitch and volume—but
the general, mind-independent nature of the contents seems the same in both cases. Note that
endorsements of this commonsense view can also be found in the theoretical literature; for
instance, Devitt and Sterelny 1985 speak of individual token utterances being able to be classified
into “physical types” on the basis of their shared physical properties. (Devitt and Sterelny 1985,
72)
At first glance, this view seems to have a lot going for it. Not only does it allow one to
treat speech perception as akin to vision, it comports incredibly well with our commonsense
intuitions. When I hear a word being spoken, it really does seem to me that I have been made
aware of something that exists in the mind-independent world—if it didn’t then how could you
and I both be appalled by the same utterance of a racial slur? It can also seem intuitively obvious
that what makes an utterance sound like an utterance of certain word is its intrinsic, mindindependent properties. For instance, there seems little intuitive difference between whatever
makes a certain utterance of “cat” sound like an utterance of “cat” and what makes it sound
exceptionally loud. And since the loudness of the utterance seems clearly to have something to
with facts in the physical world, it seems that what makes “cat” sound like an utterance of “cat” is
also a matter of the properties of some mind-independent physical entity.
Note, however, that the commonsense view entails certain theoretical commitments. For
instance, if the view is correct, then there must be some set of physical properties that make a
certain physical sound the way it does and there must be lawlike correspondences between our
perceptual experiences as of a certain sound and the elements of the physical world that serve as
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the content of that experience. This, is what we see in the case of vision; vision scientists have
been able to give mathematical models that capture how each element of a visual experience can
be calculated from the pattern of retinal stimulation that is brought about by light being reflected
from a certain distance.9 Indeed, one of the main reasons that vision theorists characterize the
contents of vision in terms of 3D, physical objects is that the relationship between our visual
experience and 3D objects can be characterized in highly lawlike ways. Thus, if one wants to say
that the contents of speech perception are physical sounds, one must say which elements of the
physical world correspond to our perceptual experiences, and one must show that there lawlike
relationships between our experiences and those physical sounds.
What, then, are the elements of the physical world that correspond to this notion of a
physical sound, and what are the characteristic features of our speech experience that must
related to these physical sounds in lawlike ways?
With respect to the former, the obvious answer is that physical sounds must correspond to
soundwaves, i.e., waveform patterns of vibrations in the air. The reasoning for this is
straightforward. Whenever we have an experience as of a speech sound, there are air vibrations
that helped bring this experience about, and it is these vibrations that impinge upon our
eardrums and cause us to have a perceptual experience. Thinking of the contents of speech
perception as soundwaves also explains why putting your fingers in your ears blocks out my
words. Finally, it’s unclear what physical sounds could be if they were not soundwaves. Because
we experience sounds as different in kind from both ordinary, physical objects and from other
perceptual contents, like tastes and smells, physical sounds must be associated with a unique type

9

See Erlhagen 2003 and Kersten 1999, illustrative discussions of how aspects of vision are modelled.
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of physical entity; soundwaves fit the bill. For all these reasons, therefore, the notion of a physical
sound must be understood in terms of physical soundwaves.
With respect to those aspects of our experience that must correspond to properties of
these physical soundwaves, there are several things worth highlighting. The first is that when we
experience speech, we experience distinct, word-sized units that are neatly delineated from one
another. For instance, “The cat is gigantic” is experienced as containing four, distinct units,
perhaps with little pauses in between. The second thing worth highlighting is that these wordsized units are, themselves, experienced as comprised of smaller parts. There seem to be two
different types of part. The smallest of these parts are individual speech sounds. For instance, my
experience of “cat” is comprised of the three component sounds, KUH, AHH, and TUH. Each
of these sounds strikes me as a token of a particular type that might also be instantiated in other
utterances—the first sound of “cat” is of the same type as the last sound of “gigantic.” There are
also medium sized units, i.e., syllables, and longer words are comprised of several. For instance,
“gigantic” contains three syllables. Each syllables seems comprised of several individual speech
sounds, and the number of syllables in a word is always something that can be counted.
With these considerations in mind, we can now be more precise about what a
commitment to the commonsense understanding of the contents of speech perception actually
entails. To accept the commonsense view is to accept that each element of our perceptual
experience of speech corresponds, in a lawlike way, to some property of the physical soundwave
that brought that experience about. For instance, my experience of the initial d-sound of “duck”
should relate, in a mathematically precise way, to the initial part of the corresponding
soundwave. One should also be able to give a purely physical explanation for why I can
experience the same d-sound on two separate occasions. Word breaks and syllables should also
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correspond to elements of the physical soundwaves in lawlike ways, and these, too, should be able
to be given a mathematical formulation, at least in principle.
With all this in mind, I will I will now explain why the commonsense view cannot be
correct by showing that these various commitments are untenable.

3.2. Why the Commonsense View is Wrong
There are three reasons that the commonsense view of speech perception must be wrong.
The first two are empirical. First, none of the physical correspondences we would expect if the
view were correct have actually been found. Second, the commonsense view treats speech
perception and ordinary acoustic perception as the same in kind, but the empirical evidence
shows they are distinct. The third reason is theoretical: the commonsense view assigns the wrong
theoretical role to physical soundwaves.
I consider each of these in turn.

No Lawlike Correlations
Even though empirical work on speech perception began in the 1950s, no lawlike
correspondences between elements of our speech experience and properties of physical
soundwaves have been found. Indeed, the initial lack of evidence was so overwhelming that
attempts to identify the physical correlates of individual speech sounds have not even been
attempted in recent years. In short, when one considers the data closely, it becomes clear that we
do not have the perceptual experiences we do because there are certain lawlike regularities in the
physical soundwaves but, rather, despite the fact that there are not.
We experience speech as comprised of strings of neatly delineated word-sized
components, perhaps with gaps in between. However, when one actually looks at the waveform
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patterns associated with the experience of speech, one finds no delineations and no gaps. In
English, about the only place where physical pauses are common are at breaks between
sentences, and it is not possible for the only pause within a sentence to occur within a particular
word, e.g., as is the Cockney pronunciation of “butter.” (Jusczyk and Luce 2002) In fact, the very
same point in the soundwave often corresponds to experiences as of two distinct sounds. When
one hears “cats smell,” one perceives two distinct s-sounds, but there is a single point in the
associated soundwave pattern that corresponds to both. This poses a significant problem for the
commonsense view—if my experience tracks physical facts, then a single physical entity should
never give rise to a perception as of two distinct things.
Considerations about syllables also tell against the commonsense picture. Our experience
of syllables seems just as objective as our experience of entire words. Thus, if our experience
tracks physical facts, there should be some part of the physical soundwave that corresponds to
each syllable. At the very least, there should be an objective fact about how many syllables are
experienced when one is presented with a particular pattern of air vibrations. But even the latter
fails to hold. When a native English speaker is presented with an utterance of the word “bean,”
they invariably hear a single syllable. However, when the same utterance is presented to a native
Japanese speaker—not an utterance of the same type, literally the exact same token—they will
have an experience as of a word with three syllables. (Odden 2012) Were the commonsense view
correct, this wouldn’t be possible.
However, the largest body of empirical evidence against the commonsense view comes
from work on the physical correlates of individual speech sounds. It’s worth considering some of
the landmark studies on this topic.
Delattre, Lieberman, & Cooper 1955 found that subjects experience of a d-sound as the
same regardless of the vowel sound it precedes. However, they also found that the waveform
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patterns correlated with an experienced d-sound is fundamentally different depending on the
subsequent vowel. Indeed, the patterns associated with /du/, /di/, and /da/ are so distinct that
it is inappropriate to speak of some physical correlate of /d/ that is common to all three. These
findings comport with work by Lieberman, Delattre, & Cooper 1952, who found that the same
token element of a soundwave can be perceived as distinct sounds by being placed in different
acoustic contexts. For instance, when a particular acoustic burst is artificially spliced into
different speech recordings, subjects perceive speech sounds as different as /p/ and /k/. A
similar study was conducted by Ladefoged and Broadbent 1957. They found that if one first
splices a recording of a particular sound burst in between recordings of a speaker producing a bsound and a t-sound, and one then alters the physical properties of just those parts of recording
that corresponds to the surrounding b-sound and t-sound, whether subjects perceive “bit,” “bet,”
“bat,” or “but” depends entirely on the alterations to the surrounding consonants. In other
words, one’s experience of the vowel sound can change even when the physical correlate of that
experience remains constant. All this suggests that one’s experience is not tracking the physical
features of the soundwave but is rather tracking something else.
Further evidence that an experience as of a certain speech sound doesn’t track the
physical properties of a soundwave comes from considerations about how the physical correlates
of individual speech sounds change relative to the speaker and the audience. For instance,
Peterson and Barney 1952 found that it’s not uncommon for the physical correlates of a
particular vowel produced by one speaker, e.g., the i-sound of “guy,” to more closely resemble
the physical correlates of a different speaker’s production of a different vowel, e.g., the e-sound of
“free,” than that second speaker’s production of the original sound. The physical correlates of
speech also vary win accordance with the intended audience. Fernald et al 1989 found that while
one’s experience of a sound is the same regardless of audience, the waveform pattern correlated
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with that experience changes markedly depending on whether speech is child-directed speech. In
particular, the difference in frequency needed to give rise to an experience as of two distinct
sounds is greater for child-directed speech than adult-directed speech. Something similar is true
with respect changes in speaking rate; while, I experience “bow” and “wow” as distinct regardless
of how fast a speaker is speaking, when a speaker speaks rapidly enough, the physical correlates
of these two words will be exactly the same. (Miller and Eimas 1977) 10
In short, our experiences of speech sounds do not correspond to the properties of
physical soundwaves in the lawlike ways demanded by the commonsense picture.11

Wrong Mental Architecture
A second way in which the empirical data tells against the commonsense view concerns
the relationship between speech perception and ordinary acoustic perception.
One entailment of the commonsense view that I have not yet mentioned is that there
mustn’t be a fundamental distinction between speech perception and ordinary acoustic
perception. This is because, on the commonsense view, the objects of speech perception are
physical sounds that just so happen to have been produced by a human. Proponents of this view
presumably accept that the particular properties of speech sounds set them apart from nonlinguistic, physical sounds, but because the objects of perception are physical sounds in both
cases, this doesn’t constitute a difference in kind. If this is correct, then it follows that speech
perception and ordinary acoustic perception should be carried out by the same computational,
mental systems. That is, because speech and acoustic perception produce the same types of

Summerfield 1975 found that the difference between voiced stops, e.g., /b/, and unvoiced stops, e.g., /p/ can also
disappear during rapid speech.
11 For a more in-depth discussion of all these empirical issues with the commonsense picture, see Jusczyk and Luce
2002.
10
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outputs as a result of the same types of proximal stimulation, one can conclude that these
computations are the result of a single, computational system.
This commitment is empirically problematic because there is evidence that speech
perception and acoustic perception employ different mental subsystems. For one thing,
neurological studies suggest that speech and non-speech perception are carried out by different
parts of the brain. For instance, Vouloumanos et al. 2001 employed an fMRI technique and
discovered that speech and non-speech lead to different patterns of activation. Vouloumanos and
Werker 2004 observed infants as young as two months prefer speech sounds to non-speech
sounds, which suggests that the human mind is preprogrammed to process speech differently
from other sounds. Furthermore, while there are numerous models of speech perception in the
literature,12 nearly all such models agree that there are certain areas of the brain that are devoted
to parts of speech perception and which play no role in ordinary acoustic perception. For
instance, the region of the superior posterior temporal cortex, which is the part of the brain that
has historically been called Wernicke’s area, is crucially involved in processing the phonological
representations of individual words but plays no role whatsoever in non-linguistic perception.
(Ben Shalom and Poeppel 2007, 124)
That speech perception and ordinary acoustic perception are carried out by distinct
systems is also indicated by the fact that speech production can break down when ordinary
acoustic perception remains unimpaired. Perhaps the most striking example of this is pure word
deafness. Word deaf individuals are unable to understand the words that are spoken to them
even though they show no impairment at all when it comes to identifying non-speech sounds. For

12

See Ben Shalom and Poeppell 2007 and Hickok and Poepell, 2004 & 2007 for discussions of some such models.
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instance, they have no issues whatsoever when listening to music—other than understanding the
lyrics, of course.13 (Poeppel 2001)
These various findings constitute a considerable problem for the commonsense view
because they clearly indicate that speech perception and acoustic perception are carried out by
different parts of the mind, and, if the commonsense view were correct, this wouldn’t be the case.

Wrong Theoretical Role
The third reason to reject the commonsense view is theoretical.
As was said above, it is widely agreed that perceptual systems exist to provide organisms
with accurate information about the external world and that, to do this, they compute a distal
cause on the basis of some proximal stimulation. However, because it is the distal objects that are
ultimately relevant to survival, it is these objects that are presented to awareness as the contents
of perceptual experience—information about the proximal stimuli itself remains locked away
within the perceptual system itself, unavailable to conscious awareness. Consequently, in the case
of speech perception, we should expect the perceptual contents to correspond, not to the patterns
within the stimuli that enter our ears, but rather the distal causes of those proximal stimuli.
When one considers the role of soundwaves within the process of speech perception, it’s
clear that they serve the role of proximal stimulation, not that of a distal cause. That is,
soundwaves cause a particular pattern of stimulation to the eardrum, just as light waves cause a
certain pattern of stimulation to the retina. Consequently, if one’s understanding of the
evolutionary purpose of perception is to be respected, one should expect the content of one’s
experience to correspond, not to physical soundwaves, but to the events that caused those

13

See Poeppel 2001 for more on word deafness and other types of linguistic impairments.
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soundwaves. That means that, in the case of speech, we should expect our experience to reflect
facts about speakers not physical soundwaves.
I recognize that this flies directly in the face of intuition—my experience of speech strikes
me as of some thing in the world, not some property of a speaker. However, such intuitions are
not necessarily accurate. It’s common for an experience to strike us as of an entity in the world
even when such an entity does not exist. Consider the phi phenomenon, which is the
phenomenon in which an array of lightbulbs, flashing one after another, is experienced as a
single light moving back and forth. When one has this experience, it really does look like there is
just one light; one can even speak of that light speeding up or slowing down. As such, phi
phenomenon can be characterized as a perception as of a single light moving back and forth,
even though no such light actually exists. What this demonstrates, is that an experience as of
some thing is not necessarily proof of the existence of a corresponding, mind-independent entity.
Thus, the fact that our experience of speech sounds seems to correspond to something in the world
doesn’t mean that it does; it’s perfectly plausible that our experience corresponds to something
else that is merely presented to us as if it were a thing in the external world.
When these theoretical considerations about the evolutionary purpose of perception are
combined with the empirical facts it’s clear that the contents of speech perception cannot be
understood in terms of physical sounds.

3.3. Taking Stock
Where does this leave us?
The first thing to note is that simply recognizing that the commonsense view of the
contents of speech perception is incorrect has implications for PNA. One reason that theorists are
so quick to dismiss PNA is that they often think of the perceptual contents of speech in terms of
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physical sounds and physical sounds are different in kind from other physical objects. As such, it
feels intuitively obvious that what we hear cannot share properties with the sorts of things that
typically serve as the referents of our words; if our experience of “cat” is of a physical sound, it
can’t share properties with a cat. However, as soon as one recognizes that the contents of speech
perception can’t be understood in physical terms, this line of reasoning no longer goes through—
if my experience of “cat” isn’t as of a physical sound, then perhaps it can share properties with a
cat. Thus, by rejecting the commonsense picture we have also removed one of the obstacles to
accepting PNA.
But, of course, if one is to ultimately demonstrate PNA one must do more than merely
remove obstacles to its acceptance; one must also demonstrate that there are many words that
display a genuine, non-arbitrary connection between their perceptual content and meaning. And
this is only possible if one knows what the contents of speech perception are actually like.
I turn to this now.

4. Phonology and Speech Perception
My main aim in this section is to show that the contents of speech perception are
phonological forms. This is significant to considerations of arbitrariness because, the fact that we
perceive phonological forms opens the way to the possibility that what we hear when a word is
uttered is linked to what that word means in a nonarbitrary manner. However, in order to
appreciate such considerations, one must have an understanding of certain key elements of
phonological theory.
Put simply, phonology is the study of speech sounds. However, the notion of sound here is
a mental one. Thus, it is better to think of phonology as the study of “An abstract cognitive
system dealing with rules in a mental grammar,” specifically those rules that govern a particular
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type of mental symbol. (Odden 2013, 2) In particular, phonological forms are best understood as
strings of computational symbols, each of which corresponds to the production and experience of
an individual speech sound. Such symbols are generally called phonemes and are of a format that
allows them to serve as the means by which certain mental subsystems interface. Consequently,
to say that the contents of speech perception are phonological forms is to say that what is brought
to awareness by one’s perceptual experience are strings of phonemes. In particular, one’s
experience is as of the particular string of phonemes that was in the mind of the speaker and
caused them to perform the act of speaking that caused proximal stimulation to one’s own
eardrums. Thus, to have an experience of a “duck” is simply to have an experience as of a
sequence of three phonemes—that corresponding to the d-sound, that corresponding to the uhsound, and that corresponding to the uh-sound—and have this presented to conscious awareness.
But why should one believe the contents of speech perception to be this type of mental
symbols? The best way to answer this question is to take a detour through the related subfield of
phonetics.
In order to speak, one’s lips and tongue must perform a complex sequence of maneuvers.
Such movements are the subject of phonetics. In particular, phoneticists are interested in such
matters as where the tongue is placed when a speaker attempts to produce a lone d-sound and
whether the folds of the larynx vibrate when producing a k-sound. The core theoretical notion of
phonetics is the phone, which is best understood as the overall orientation taken up by each aspect
of articulatory system whenever it engages in an action that causes an audience to have a
perception as of a single speech sound produced in isolation. For instance, to produce an
experience as of a single d-sound is to perform the phone d. Phonetics is of theoretical interest
because it has been observed that there are correlations between one’s mouth movements and
the speech sounds that others perceive one as having produced.
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As this d-example demonstrates, phones are generally denoted using a single symbol from
International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA). However, such symbols are shorthand for a complex
conjunction of articulatory positionings and movements. For instance, d is the voiced alveolar
plosive, where each of these terms corresponds to one component of the overall articulatory
action: “voiced” indicates that the vocal folds of the larynx were made to flap, “alveolar”
indicates that the tongue was placed on the hard bump behind the teeth, and “plosive” indicates
that the act involves with a complete blockage of airflow out of the lungs. Note that each of these
components is present in multiple different phones. For instance, that act that gives rise to the psound is also alveolar and plosive, it is simply unvoiced. Thus, each phone can be understood as a
conjunction of possible articulatory components.
As I’ve said, phones are of theoretical interest because performing one causes an
experience as of an individual speech sound. However, it’s important to note that phones cannot,
themselves, be the contents of speech perception. This is due to the nature of fluent speech.
A key characteristic of our linguistic experience is that the same sounds that arise from
phones are also experienced as parts of larger words. Consequently, there must be some content
that is common to both experiences. However, it is only when sounds are produced in isolation
that can be characterized in terms of phones. This is because performing a sequence of
articulatory actions one after another causes one action to bleed into the next. For instance, if
one is going to move one’s tongue backwards immediately after moving it forward, one’s tongue
won’t move as far forward as it otherwise would have. Consequently, many of the defining
elements of a particular phone won’t occur in fluent speech, even in cases where the speaker is
perceived as having made the same sound as they did when performed a phone. For example, a
speaker who is experienced as having produced a d-sound as part of “clapped” will not vibrate
their vocal folds, but will, nonetheless, be perceived as having produced a d-sound to the same
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degree as someone who produced the phone d. Thus, because our experiences can be the same in
cases in which there are behavioral variations, the contents of speech perception must be
something other than the articulatory actions themselves.
It is here that phonology enters the picture. According to phonologists, what is common
to both fluent speech and phone production are the computational symbols, i.e., phonemes, that
underlie a speaker’s actions. The reason that a performance of the phone d and an utterance of
“clapped” are experienced as containing the same d-sound is that there is a token of the
phoneme /d/underlying both actions. In short, the inability to capture the patterns within our
experience of human speech in terms of phonetics is accounted for by positing another layer that
accounts for the patterns that we experience.
At first glance, positing an additional layer to account for patterns in our behavior might
seem ad hoc. However, such a maneuver is well-motivated. The main motivation comes from
considerations about mental architecture. Following Chomsky, phonologists believe that the
complexity of natural language requires there to be a specialized language faculty, i.e., a mental
subsystem that is responsible for our linguistic competence. However, because this system is so
specialized, it lacks the computational resources needed to turn well-formed linguistic formulas
into articulatory actions. That is, the language faculty is not the right type of system to properly
control the muscular movements required to articulate speech. As such, there must be some
separate mental subsystem, namely some part of the motor system, that is responsible for turning
linguistic structures into bodily actions. Thus, speech actually results from a complex interaction
between two mental subsystems. The language faculty first produces a well-formed linguistic
structure. This structure is, then, fed into the motor system, which treats that structure as a set of
broad instructions that must be supplemented by its own computations about bodily movement
in order to be turned into actual articulatory actions. Such additional computations are necessary
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in order to taken into account physical factors, such as force and momentum, which lie outside
the computational purview of the language faculty.
If this arrangement is to work, however, the computational output of the language faculty
must be in a format that is also interpretable to the motor system. Indeed, since this interfacing
task is highly specific, it is likely to involve a specialized type of computational format that
developed simply to play this interfacing role. This is the role that phonologists take phonemes to
play.
Once one accepts that there are specialized symbols that serve as a means of interfacing
between the language faculty and the motor system, it is wholly reasonable to think that distinct
articulatory actions might result from a single type of underlying, computational symbol. This is
because the circumstances in which the motor system operates can differ drastically. Thus, just as
the motor system must alter one’s normal throwing motion when one is running away from one’s
target, it has change whether the vocal folds vibrate or how much the tongue moves in order to
compensate for the circumstances in which an articulatory action is performed, circumstances
that include what the prior articulatory actions were. With both throwing and articulation, a
failure to account for the physical circumstances that result from one’s other movements might
lead to muscular injury. Thus, it’s not simply that one can imagine a single phoneme being
implemented in different behaviors, one should expect these behavioral differences to arise
whenever the circumstances of articulation are different.
It should now be clear that the claim that a single underlying, mental symbol can yield
distinct articulatory actions is well-founded. And if this is right, then we can explain consistencies
in our perceptual experience in terms of consistencies in the computational symbols that underlie
speech. However, this claim poses a problem: if the objects of our perception are computational
symbols produced by the speaker’s language faculty, then those symbols are, by their very nature,
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locked away in the speaker’s own mind. As such, they seem the wrong type of thing to be the
objects of an audience’s perception; try as they might, an audience cannot take something that’s
in a speaker’s mind and put it in their own head. How, then, is a phonological view of speech
perception at all tenable?
The key is to recognize that when I have a perception as of a computational symbol that
was in your mind, I do not need to have that very same token in my own head. Rather, I simply
need to become aware of a token that is of the same type of symbol as was in your mind. For
instance, if a token of the phoneme /d/ is passed from your language faculty to your motor
system, then so long as a token of /d/ is presented to my awareness as if it were a direct
representation of something in your mind, this would also account for my experience. In other
words, the question is not how I can get something from your head into mine but rather, how
can my computational subsystems successfully identify the type of computational symbol that was
in your mind and present a token of that type to my awareness.
The key to answering this latter question is to recognize that when two people speak the
same language, they have the computational resources needed to reverse engineer the
phonological form that caused the other speak. This is because when people speak the same
language, they have language faculties that are calibrated in essentially the same way. As such,
their systems will utilize the same phonemes because one of the defining features of a language is
the phonemes it possesses.14 Additionally, because both speakers are human, they will have
roughly the same articulatory capabilities and limitations—if it’s difficult for me to move my
tongue in a certain way, it will be difficult for you as well. Consequently, so long as both have

The number of phonemes a language contains can vary quite remarkably. For instance, Abkhaz, a language of
Georgia, has only two vowel sounds (Chirikba 1996) while Thai—which employs five tones, stiff/creaky voice, and
numerous diphthongs—contains over 30 distinct vowel sounds. (Smyth 2002)
14

54

properly functioning motor systems that are familiar with these limitations, the speaker and
audience’s respective motor systems should output the same behaviors when they are presented
with the same phoneme in the same set of circumstances. If, for instance, there is some
circumstance in which my motor moves my tongue a shorter distance than usual, your system is
likely to perform the same modified behavior in this same circumstance.
With this in mind, we can now see how an audience is able to reconstruct what’s in the
mind of the speaker. The overall process goes something like this.
When a speaker decides to express some meaning, their language faculty constructs a
linguistic structure that gets that meaning across. This structure includes a phonological form.
This phonological form can then be inputted into the speaker’s motor system, which will treat the
form as a set of general instructions about the articulatory behavior that is to be performed.
However, this form will fail to specify the precise behavioral output because it cannot account for
articulatory context in which the action must be performed. Thus, the motor system will
supplement its input with information about the articulatory circumstances in order to compute
what the behavioral output should actually be. Note that while such behaviors will differ from
what was inputted, they will nonetheless be rule governed. This is because a properly functioning
motor system will have implicit knowledge of the laws of physics and the limitations of the body,
and with thus output behaviors that best respect these physical laws. As such, it should be
possible to predict what behavior will arise from a particular symbol in a particular context.
Once the speaker’s motor system has calculated the proper articulatory behavior to
perform, it will send signals to the muscles that cause the corresponding actions. These actions
will, then, cause air vibrations of a certain waveform pattern, some of which will enter the
audience’s ears and vibrate their eardrums in a certain way. These vibrations can then serve as
the sensory stimulation for the audience’s speech perception process.
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The first task of the audience’s perceptual process will be to identify the articulatory
actions that caused the waveform pattern sensed by the ears. While this task is likely complex, it is
computationally tractable, so long as the perceptual system works in tandem with the audience’s
own motor system. This is due to the fact that whenever a speaker speaks, some of the air
vibrations they bring about will enter their own ears. Consequently, an individual will have a life
time’s worth of correlations between their own articulatory movements and auditory stimulation
to use as a basis for calculating the articulatory actions that the speaker must have performed.
Once the system has identified the speaker’s articulatory behaviors, it can reverse
engineer the phonological form that must have given rise to those behaviors. All it has to do is to
use a representation of the speaker’s articulatory actions as input and run its own speech
production process in reverse. Because the audience’s motor system can compute the best
articulatory action to perform when a certain phoneme occurs in a certain context, if it is given a
certain context and the behavior that the speaker performed, it should be able to compute what
the underlying symbol must have been. If, for instance, it can calculate that it is best way to
implement the phoneme /d/ in context C is as a behavior B, then if it recognizes that the
speaker is performing B in C, it will be able to compute that the phoneme that brought about
that behavior must have been /d/. In so doing, the system is able to identify what was in the
mind of the speaker without having to literally get inside their mind.
This, then, is how our speech perceptions can be as of phonological forms that were in
the minds of a speaker even though we have no access to the token symbols that were in the
speaker’s mind. Note that this picture is perfectly compatible with the human ability to
communicate. Because two speakers of the same language will be familiar with a similar set of
lexical items and follow roughly the same syntactic rules, an audience that has reproduced the
phonological form in the speaker’s head should also be able to calculate the speaker’s meaning.
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And since communication is nothing more than a speaker’s getting an audience to grasp their
meaning, thinking of the contents of speech perception as phonological forms is sufficient to
allow for communication. In short, even though the phonology-based picture flies the face of the
commonsense, it provides us with everything we need from an account of the perceptual contents
of speech.
I recognize that this discussion has strayed somewhat from the initial topic of
arbitrariness; I will return to the matter of arbitrariness shortly and explain why these
phonological considerations are relevant to whether the question of whether the relationship
between a word’s sound and meaning is arbitrary. However, before doing so I wish to briefly
highlight the ways in which the phonology-based account of the contents of speech perception
improves upon the commonsense picture.
As we saw above, one of the major flaws of the commonsense view is that theorists were
unable to find direct correlations between our experience of speech and the physical soundwaves
to which that experience is supposed to correspond. This isn’t a problem for the phonological
picture; it’s a stipulation of the theory that we perceive a certain sound when a certain phoneme
is present. What’s more, we’ve seen that the idea that a single computational symbol might give
rise to different articulatory actions on different occasions is well-motivated—indeed, it is what
we should expect give that speech is best understood as resulting from two subsystems.
Another benefit of the phonological view is that it’s more in line with the evolutionary
purpose of perceptual systems. As was said above, perceptual systems evolved to provide
organisms with an awareness of the things in the external world that have the power to benefit or
harm them. In the case of speech, it is the individual producing that speech, not the soundwaves
they produce, that have the potential to do such things; when someone says “I’m going to kill
you” it is a person, not soundwaves, that you should worry about. And this is exactly what the
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phonology-based view takes to be the case; because phonological forms are strings of a certain
type of mental symbols, to have a perception as of a certain phonological form just is to have a
perception whose content reflects facts about the speaker.
With all this in mind, let me now explain the significance of these considerations to PNA.
As we said above, arbitrariness and nonarbitrariness concern the relationship between meanings
and perceptual contents. Consequently, the phonological discussion just concluded constitutes an
investigation into the nature of one half of the purportedly arbitrary relationship. What’s more,
now that we have seen that the objects of speech perception are phonological forms comprised of
phonemes, the idea that such contents might stand in non-arbitrary relationships to a word’s
meaning should no longer seem quite so outlandish. As I said above, one of the intuitive
foundations for rejecting PNA is the idea that if the contents of speech perception are physical
sounds, then a perceptual content cannot resemble an ordinary object like a cat or a balloon.
However, if the contents of perception are actually specialized mental symbols that play a
particular role in the speech production and comprehension process, then there’s no good reason
to say that what we hear when a word is uttered cannot resemble, or be otherwise nonarbitrarily
linked, to some semantic content. Thus, by arguing that the contents of speech perception are
phonological forms, I have opened the way to demonstrating pervasive nonarbitrariness in
language.
However, in order to demonstrate that there are words for which the contents of speech
perception are linked to a semantic content in a nonarbitrary ways, it’s necessary to know a bit
more about what these perceptual contents are like. I will now consider such matters.
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5. Feature Theory and its Relevance to Nonarbitrariness
The aim of this section is to take closer look at phonemes and discuss the ways in
phonemes are intrinsically linked to certain articulatory orientations. By the end of this section,
we will be in a position to see why the existence of nonarbitrary connections between a linguistic
signifier and signified is a genuine possibility.

5.1 What Phonemes are Like
Thus far, I have been treating phonemes as if they were atomic wholes. This isn’t the
case. Phonemes are really conjunctions of individual properties, each of which is a binary +/–
value with respect to one of a number of fundamental features. Thus, while it’s common to
denote an English phoneme using the IPA symbol for the phone that arises from that phoneme,
this is shorthand for the bundle of 18 binary feature values that, together, constitute that
phoneme. Thus, when a phoneme is inputted into the motor system or is presented to cognitive
awareness, what is actually inputted/presented is the conjunction of feature values.
It's worth taking a closer look at what these features are like because understanding the
features is crucial to appreciate the nonarbitrary connections that exist within natural language.
This is best done using examples. Generally speaking, each feature corresponds to one possible
element of an articulatory act, such as whether articulation involves a complete blocking of
airflow or whether the vocal folds are made to vibrate. Thus, one feature of English is +/- nasal,
which is responsible for determining whether the airflow out of the lungs is typically redirected
through the nasal passages during the articulatory process as opposed to out the mouth. It is
because the initial phoneme of “night” is +nasal, that one cannot utter “night” properly when
squeezing one’s nose—you can’t redirect airflow through the nasal passages when your nose is
blocked. Other noteworthy features of English include +/– round, which determines whether the
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articulatory action performed involves rounding one’s lips, +/– continuant, which determines
whether the articulatory action is one that can be drawn out or is must occur in a single instant,
and +/–voiced, which determines whether the vocal folds of the larynx are made to flap during
production.
It’s worth considering some of the theoretical benefits that feature theory provides.
The first thing to note is that it is common for speech sounds—and indeed entire words—
to be differentiated by just a single feature value. For instance, the only difference between the
phonological form of “fie” and that of “bye,” is that the initial/f/ of “fie” is +continuant and the
initial /b/ of “bye” is –continuant. Likewise, the only difference between “bop” and “pop” is that
that /b/ is +voiced and /p/ is –voiced. Thus, by employing feature theory, phonologists are able
to reduce phonemic descriptions to more basic elements.
Another theoretical benefit of feature theory is that it allows phonologists to neatly
characterize the phonological differences between languages. Phonologists have found that
languages differ with respect to which features, and the number of features, that they employ.
Not only that, surface-level differences with regard to how languages sound can often be
explained in terms of a difference in features. For instance, English’s list of 18 features does not
include +/– retroflex, which is the feature is responsible for determining whether the top or
underside of the tongue is touched to the place of articulation. However, this feature is prevalent
in the languages of the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, the fact that these languages include +/–
retroflex is largely responsible for the characteristic way that these languages sound to non-native
speakers. As we will see below, the fact that linguistic differences can be characterized in using
features also allows one to explain certain perceptual data that would otherwise be quite
mysterious.
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A final reason to accept feature theory is that it allows one to give the types of lawlike
characterizations that were completely lacking for the commonsense view. One of the major
flaws of the commonsense view is that it doesn’t allow us to capture the patterns within our
speech experience because there simply are not lawlike regularities between our experiences and
the physical soundwaves that exist in the world. By contrast, a phonological view supplemented
with feature theory allows one to give a lawlike characterization of our experience of speech. One
the core claims of the phonological view is that some differences in articulatory behavior are to
be explained, not in terms of the phoneme inputted into the motor system, but, rather, in terms
of how the motor system implements that symbol in context. Such variations should themselves
be rule-governed, since variations in behavior will be made in response to physical considerations
that follow physical laws. This is noteworthy because employing feature theory allows one to give
a neat, lawlike characterization of the manner in the articulatory behaviors that arise from
particular phonemes in various articulatory situations.
That the variations in behavior that result from a particular phoneme can be
characterized in lawlike ways is best demonstrated by example. In particular, it’s worth
considering the precise behavioral variations that can arise from a particular phoneme and then
considering how these variations can be neatly captured in terms of features. English speakers
experience “dogs” and “cats” as ending in the same sound /s/, and one of the fundamental
features of /s/ is –voiced. Indeed, a difference in voicing is all that distinguishes –voiced /s/ from
+voiced /z/. But while we experience both “dogs” and “cats” as containing /s/, the final
articulatory action that occurs when one utters “dogs” more closely resembles the phone z that
arises from /z/ than the phone s that arises from /s/. In particular, when one performs the end
of “dogs,” one’s vocal folds flap audibly. Thus, according to the phonological picture of speech
perception, the difference in articulation that occurs at the ends of “cats” and “dogs” must be the
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result of the motor system’s deciding to implement the phoneme /s/ differently in these two
cases.
Feature theory allows us to give a well-motivated, rule-governed explanation of this fact.
According to this explanation, one’s vocal folds vibrate when uttering the /s/ of “dogs” because
the consonant before the /s/, i.e., /g/ is, itself, +voiced. This means that when one goes to
produce the /s/ of “dogs” one’s vocal folds are already flapping. This matters because it’s nearly
impossible to get the vocal folds to stop flapping immediately after they have started doing. Thus,
the reason that the –voiced /s/ gives rise to an act with vocal fold flapping is that such an
implementation puts less strain on the articulatory organs. Not only that, this explanation applies
more generally. It is a general feature of English phonology that the level of vocal flap vibration
brought about by a final consonant is always to made to match with the voicing level of the
previous consonant whenever the word ends in two consonant phonemes. This is why +voiced
/d/ doesn’t give rise to vocal fold vibration at the end of “clapped” and why English contains
“contempt” but could never contain a word spelled C-O-N-T-E-M-B-T. In short, therefore,
combining feature theory with the general phonological picture allows us to give a well-motivated
explanation for a wide number of linguistic phenomena.
A final empirical observation that feature theory allows one to explain in a rule-governed
way concerns a somewhat mysterious fact about human speech perception. As anyone who has
tried to learn a language as an adult is familiar, it’s often impossible for non-native speakers to
hear pronunciational differences that native speakers claim are clear and obvious. For instance,
many English speakers are completely unable to hear a difference between the Korean word for
bang, phonological form /phaŋ/, and that for room, phonological form /paŋ/. From a
commonsense viewpoint, this makes no sense—how could two people with functioning ears hear
the same soundwaves differently. However, it’s easy to explain in terms of fundamental features.
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One feature of Korean, which is lacking in in English, is +/– aspirated. (Cho, Jun, and
Ladefoged 2002) Speaking theoretically, this feature governs whether an articulatory action gives
rise to “rushing air through the open glottis at the release of a consonant,” (Odden 2012, 323)
however it’s easier to think of +/– aspirated as the feature responsible for whether one utters a
consonant in a way that gives rise to a small puff of air. For instance, if you place your hand in
front of your mouth when you utter both the t-sound of “tick” and that of “stick,” you will feel a
puff of air when you say “tick” but not one when you say “stick.” The presence/absence of this
puff of air is what is what is governed by the feature +/– aspirated in Korean.
Because +/– aspirated is a feature of Korean, the presence or absence of this air puff
during articulation can indicate that the acts arose from two distinct phonological forms. This is
the case with /phaŋ/ and /paŋ/. However, because English phonology makes no use of +/–
aspirated, any articulatory difference with respect to air puffs can only be the result of
computations by the motor system that are designed to make speaking easier—they are never the
result of an underlying phonological difference. This is what we see with “tick” and “stick.” As
such, an English speaker lack the computational resources that are needed to reconstruct two
different phonological forms when presented with a Korean speaker uttering both /phaŋ/ and
/paŋ/—their English-calibrated motor system will treat any difference in air puffs as
phonologically incidental and output the same phonological form both times. Things are
different for the Korean speaker. Because their system is calibrated to treat differences in
articulatory air puffs as signaling a phonological distinction, the Korean speaker will reconstruct
the speaker’s phonological form differently in the two cases. And since this form is what serves as
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the content of their perception and gets presented to awareness, they will hear a difference that
the English speaker cannot.15
At this point, it should be clear what feature theory is committed to. The theoretical
motivations behind feature theory should also be clear; not only is feature theory intrinsically
coherent, incorporating it into the overall, phonological picture allows one to provide precisely
the sort of accurate, lawlike characterizations that a successful theory should provide. With all
this in mind, I will now discuss why an acceptance of feature theory is relevant to whether PNA is
true by making the possibility of widespread nonarbitrary connections between form and content
seem far more plausible.

5.2 Towards Pervasive NonArbitrariness
In essence, feature theory is relevant to PNA because as soon as one frames phonemes in
terms of features, it becomes plausible that there can be large numbers of genuinely, nonarbitrary
connetions between what we hear when a certain word is uttered and what that word means.
Because phonemes serve as the inputs to the articulatory process, our experience of a
phoneme is going to be fundamentally linked to certain articulatory orientation. This orientation
will, itself, have certain physical properties. For instance, because a +nasal phoneme just is a
computational symbol that can serve to cause the articulatory organs to redirect airflow through
the nose, the phoneme is by, its very nature, linked to an articulation that is related to the human

Incidentally, this sort of cross-linguistic difference in phonology also explains why Japanese speakers hear words
like “bean” as having three syllables. Japanese phonology does not allow for long vowels and dictates that words
cannot end in consonants. Thus, when a perceptual system that’s calibrated for Japanese is presented with an
utterance of the English word “bean,” it cannot represent the utterance in the way an English speaker would.
Instead, it is forced to represent the long vowel as two short vowels and to treat the word as really ending in a poorly
enunciated vowel. Consequently, what comes to the speaker’s awareness is something like be-eh-nuh, which does
indeed have three syllables.
For more on this and other cross-linguistic differences, see Odden 2012 ch. 2.
15
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nose. Likewise, because possessing the feature +round entails being a computational symbol that
can cause the mouth to round during the articulation process, a +round phoneme is
fundamentally linked to something that is itself round. This means that the contents we perceive
when we hear speech are, by their very nature, linked to properties like nose-relatedness and
roundness. If this is the case, then it is reasonable to think that these contents might be related to
a meaning associated with noses or a round object in a nonarbitrary way.
This idea can be presented even more clearly when framed in terms of Embodied
Cognition. According to advocates of the Embodied Cognition research program, (Johnson
2015, Lakoff 1999, Lakoff & Johnson 1980) mental contents are fundamentally embodied. That
is, a mental content is, by its nature, something that can only be entertained by a human mind
within a human body. For instance, while I might think of the content John is happy as
corresponding to some mind-independent entity, John, who is in a certain emotional state,
according to proponents of embodied cognition this isn’t correct. Rather, the content of my
concept happiness is actually a mental construct that was produced by metaphorically extending
an association between being upright and being positive that comes from an embodied
association between feeling healthy and standing tall. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) Only a being
that created the concept happy in this way can be said to possess the same happy concept I do. This
mean that only a human mind in a human body can possess a concept like my concept happy.
Embodied Cognition is relevant here because phonemes seem like especially good
candidates for being embodied, and thinking of them in this way makes it easier to see how there
could be a nonarbitrary connection between a phonological form and a semantic content. If the
computational role of phonemes is to bring about a certain articulatory action, then it is natural
to think of the content of a given phoneme is at least partly constituted by the articulatory action
it brings about. This means that to perceive a phoneme during speech perception is to become
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aware of something whose content is partly, constitutively determined by a particular articulatory
orientation. If this is correct, then it follows that part of what constitutively determines the
content of a phoneme is an articulatory orientation that includes such components as the shape
of the oral cavity and where airflow is redirected. Consequently, one’s perception of a phoneme
would be a perception whose content is partly constituted by something of a certain size and
shape. As such, the content of a speech perception can, quite literally, share properties with an
ordinary object of the sort that is typically denoted by a word’s meaning. Thus, on an embodied
view, the +round phoneme /u/ is partly constituted by the rounding of the lips, which means
that to perceive /u/ is to perceive something that shares properties with a round balloon. It is
therefore reasonable to think that phonological forms and semantic contents can be linked in
intrinsic ways.
Note that while treating phonemes as embodied makes it especially easy to see how a
phoneme might be linked to a meaning in a nonarbitrary way, a commitment to Embodied
Cognition is not necessary for this conclusion. Even if one does not accept an embodied view of
phonemes, it’s still true that a given phoneme will be fundamentally linked to a certain
articulatory orientation in virtue of the fact that that orientation is what the phoneme brings
about whenever it occurs in isolation. Consequently, one can still say that the phoneme that
characteristically gives rise to a rounded mouth shape in isolation is intrinsically tied to the
property of roundness. As such, it is still appropriate to say that a +round phoneme bears a
certain similarity to something like a round balloon.
Thus, feature theory is valuable to an investigation of PNA for two reasons. First, it
provides additional support for the phonology-based view of perceptual contents, which further
undermine the commonsense view of speech perception that makes PNA seem highly
implausible. Second, feature theory makes it plausible that there can be many nonarbitrary
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connections between phonological forms and semantic contents. This is because phonemes are
intrinsically linked to articulatory actions and these actions possess many of the same properties
as ordinary objects. Thus, seeing that phonemes are to be characterized in terms of features
moves us closer to the conclusion that PNA is correct.

6. Concluding Remarks
My main aim in this chapter was to show that the contents of speech perception are
phonological forms comprised of phonemes and to explain what these phonological forms are
like. Towards this end, I first examined the nature of perception in general and characterized
what is meant by a perceptual content. I then argued that in the case of speech perception, our
perceptual contents are not physical sounds but are rather phonological forms that are comprised
of phonemes. I also showed that these phonemes are themselves constitutively determined by
certain fundamental features. As such, phonological forms are intrinsically linked to certain
articulatory orientations and, therefore, have the potential to be nonarbitrarily associated with
the types of objects denoted by ordinary word meanings.
With these tasks accomplished, we are now in a position to turn to purported instances of
nonarbitrariness that have been discussed in the empirical literature and to assess whether any of
them really displays a nonarbitrary connection between a phonological form and a semantic
content. This will be my focus in the next two chapters. Chapter 3 will take a closer look at the
empirical literature and identify the various types of connections between phonological forms and
semantic contents that exist in natural language. Chapter 4 will, then, assess whether any such
connections are sufficient to qualify as nonarbitrary in nature. Both these tasks are now possible
because we possess an understanding of the contents of speech perception.
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Chapter 3: Sound/Meaning Connections in Natural Language

1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will argue that there are numerous natural language expressions that
display a connection between their phonological form and their meaning. I will look at the
various types of purportedly nonarbitrary expressions that have been discussed in the literature
and show that there are three different mechanisms by which a word’s phonological form can be
linked to its semantic content. While each of these mechanisms primarily operates at the level of
the individual speaker, I will show that they also have the power to shape the lexicon of a public
language.
The investigations in this chapter will draw heavily on the discussions of phonology from
Chapter 2. I will show that the various mechanisms that are responsible for connections between
signifier and signified exploit certain links between phonological forms and semantic contents,
similarities that are only possible because of the complex nature of phonological forms. Thus,
while this chapter will not look to establish whether the sound/meaning connections that exist
are sufficient to qualify as nonarbitrary—that will be the focus of Chapter 4—it will move us
towards the ultimate goal of demonstrating Pervasive NonArbitrariness (PNA) by highlighting
how complex the connections between perceptual signifiers and meaningful signifieds can be.
The chapter will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I will provide a taxonomy of the
purportedly nonarbitrary expressions that have been discussed in the literature. This will be
useful both because it will help us to see that no one mechanism can account for all purportedly
nonarbitrary expressions and because it provides the background needed to appreciate the
mechanisms by which a signifier and signified might be linked. Sections 3, 4, and 5 will then each
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discuss one of the three mechanisms by which a phonological form and semantic content can be
linked. Section 3 will discuss a mechanism that involves iconic representation, Section 4 will
consider one that involves analogical processing, and Section 5 will examine an associative
mechanism in which one’s prior lexical knowledge interacts with considerations from speech
processing to bias one towards learning new words that fit known patterns. Thus, by the end of
the chapter, I will have explained the sound/meaning connections displayed by each type of
purportedly nonarbitrary language and put us in a position to assess whether any of these
connections can be characterized as genuinely nonarbitrary.

2. A Taxonomy of Purportedly Nonarbitrary Expressions
At the start of Chapter 1, I briefly described some of the purportedly nonarbitrary
expressions that have been discussed in the empirical literature. As a reminder, these range from
onomatopoeias like “boom” and “bang” to expressions like “petite” and “mini,” which display a
sound/meaning correlation that can be found around the world.
As these examples demonstrate, the set of expressions that theorists have suggested are
nonarbitrary is quite heterogeneous. Consequently, it is useful to start with a taxonomy of
purportedly nonarbitrary expressions. This taxonomy will cover both the types of expressions
mentioned in Chapter 1 as well as some others. This taxonomy will be useful because it will both
give us a better understanding of the empirical landscape and lend structure to the investigations
that follow. I will argue that are four types of purportedly nonarbitrary expressions, each of
which has certain characteristic features. I will also discuss the class of genuinely arbitrary
expressions and explain what sets these apart from the four other classes.

69

2.1 Onomatopoeias
“Bam,” “boom,” “click,” “clack,” “meow,” and “moo”; each of these is an
onomatopoeia. An onomatopoeia is a word that both refers to a type of noise and is experienced
as sounding like the noise it refers to. For instance, “moo” refers to the noise characteristically
made by cows and utterances of “moo” sound like that noise. Likewise, “bam” and “boom” both
denote loud and sudden sounds, the main difference being the pitch of the sound referred to.
Onomatopoeias should be familiar to all readers because there are onomatopoeic
expressions in all natural languages. Onomatopoeias are especially common for certain classes of
expressions, such as animal noises. Note, however, that different languages contain different
onomatopoeias, even for the same referent. For instance, the phonological form of the word for a
cow’s noise is /mu/ in English, but /mo̞/ in Japanese.1 One reason for these differences is that
onomatopoeias adhere to the phonological rules of the language in which occur. Thus, /mu/
could not be the phonological form of any Japanese word because Japanese doesn’t contain long
vowels and /u/ is a long vowel. An adherence to phonological rules also differentiates
onomatopoeias from those cases in which a non-linguistic noise is inserted into an otherwise
linguistic utterance. For instance, I might ask after the cause of a certain high-pitched noise by
asking “what was that beep” or by asking “what was that **beep-noise**,” where “**beep-noise**” is
an imitation of the noise itself. Only the former of these counts as an onomatopoeia because the
latter doesn’t employ English phonemes.
It’s easy to see why onomatopoeias are often considered nonarbitrary. Because speakers
of a language generally experience onomatopoeias as sounding like the noises they denote, it’s
natural to think that onomatopoeias involve an intrinsic connection between sound and meaning.

The /o̞/sound is not one that is found in English; its closest English equivalent is the vowel sound found in the
American English pronunciation of the word “thought.” (Labrune 2012)
1
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Indeed, it seems quite likely that an onomatopoeia has the phonological form it does because that
form sounds like its referent. After all, if even a small child can recognize that the word for a moo
is “moo” because /mu/ sounds like a moo, then how could “moo” not involve some sort of
nonarbitrary connection?
The onomatopoeias considered thus far constitute the paradigm case in which the
referent of the onomatopoeia is itself a sound. But not everything that gets called onomatopoeic
falls into this group. In particular, there are some expressions that seem to combine
onomatopoeia with another linguistic phenomenon. In particular, it is quite common for a word
to combine onomatopoeia with something akin to synecdoche, which is linguistic phenomenon of
referring to a whole by making explicit reference to one of its parts.2 For instance, words like
“chickadee” and “whizz” seem to refer to a thing or action that makes a characteristic sound
using a phonological form that sounds like that characteristic sound—a chickadee’s call sounds
like “chickadee” and a ball whizzing by makes a sound like “whizz.”
As these examples demonstrate, the boundary between onomatopoeia and nononomatopoeic expressions is not always clear. But while this vagueness exists, the fact that there
are clear, paradigmatic cases of onomatopoeia means that onomatopoeias can be treated as a
distinct class of purportedly nonarbitrary expression.

2.2 Mimetics
The second type of so-called-iconic expressions are mimetics, also called ideophones. Like
onomatopoeias, speakers experience mimetics as sounding like their referents. However,

2

For instance, one might refer to one’s new car as one’s new wheels.
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mimetics refer, not to sounds, but to actions performed in a characteristic way or states defined
by a characteristic way of being.
To speakers of English, mimetics will be less familiar than onomatopoeia. This is
because, while mimetics are quite common worldwide, they are quite rare within Indo-European
languages, like English.3 One language in which mimetics are especially prominent is Japanese. It
is estimated that Japanese contains at least 5000 mimetic expressions (Imai and Kita 2014), and
mimetics are often considered a defining feature of the Japanese language—it’s often said that
someone has not truly mastered Japanese until one has mastered its mimetics and that Japanese
poetry cannot be properly translated into a language, like English, because the power of Japanese
poems relies so heavily on mimesis. (Noriko et al. 2007) There are, indeed, entire classes of action
that are expressed mimetically. For instance, in Japanese, different ways of walking are not
designated with unique words, but rather by combining the generic word for walk with a
mimetic, adverb modifier. Thus, to walk with short quick steps is to walk toko-toko, and to walk
wearily is to walk tobo-tobo. Likewise, to laugh to oneself is to laugh kusu-kusu while to laugh
loudly but without malice is to laugh kara-kara. (Kakehi et al 1996) Japanese also contains
mimetics for states of being; to be energetic is to be kibi-kibi.
For the sake of this taxonomy, it is important to stress that mimetics are recognized as
special by the speakers who use them. As was said already, speakers experience mimetics as
sounding like their referents—a Japanese speaker would say that “toko-toko” sounds like waking

This simply seems to be a quirk of Indo-European languages that lacks any real explanation. These sorts of
unexplained patterns are actually a common feature of language families. For instance, another atypical feature of
Indo-European languages is that they tend to possess different words for the definite and indefinite articles. For a
speaker of English—and an analytic philosopher—the idea that a language might not contain both a word for “a”
and a word for “the” can seem implausible, but there are in fact more languages worldwide that lack an indefinite
article entirely than there are languages that have a special word or affix to mark indefiniteness. (see Dryer 2013).
Thus, the lack of mimetics in Indo-European languages should not be taken to illustrate anything more substantial
than the simple fact they are statistically uncommon.
3
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with short quick steps. However, it’s worth noting that mimetics are also typically syntactically
marked. That is, mimetics generally employ a syntactic structure that is statistically uncommon in
the overall language. For instance, Japanese mimetics are typically marked using reduplication,
which is the phenomenon in which a part of a phonological form is repeated to form an entire
whole. This is why the Japanese lexicon contains mimetics like “toko-toko” as opposed to the
merely “toko.” Reduplication is a very common way in which mimetics are marked; in Kisi, a
Bantu language of Tanzania, the mimetic for being delicately balanced is “yengge-yengge.”
(Childs 1988)
Like with onomatopoeias, it’s easy to see why mimetics are often taken to be
nonarbitrary. It is generally assumed that the best explanation for the fact that speakers
experience the phonological form of a mimetic as similar to its meaning is that the two are linked
in some natural way. And, just like with onomatopoeias, it is natural to think that this similarity
in sound is somehow responsible for a language’s containing the mimetics that it does; it seems
that the fact that “tobo-tobo” sounds like walking wearily must somehow be responsible for the
existence of this Japanese word. And if a similarity between a word’s phonological form and
meaning is partly responsible for that word’s existence, then it seems appropriate to say that there
is an intrinsic and natural connection between the two.
The final thing about mimetics that is worth pointing out is that, just like with
onomatopoeia, the boundaries between mimetics and other expressions is not always clear. For
instance, it’s not always obvious whether an expression is a mimetic or an onomatopoeia. The
English expressions that seem most mimetic-like are informal words for types of laughter, like
“tee-hee” and “ho-ho-ho.” But when one uses such a word, it’s unclear whether the referent is
the manner of laughing or the sound of the laughter; as such, it’s unclear whether these terms are
onomatopoeic or mimetic. But, once again, the existence of these penumbral cases in no way
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changes the fact that there are paradigmatic cases and that, therefore, mimetics should be treated
as second class of purportedly nonarbitrary expression.

2.3 Cross-Familial Sound/Meaning Correlations
The third class of purportedly nonarbitrary expressions is the largest and most
heterogenous. This class is comprised of expressions that manifest a correlation between sound
and meaning that holds across unrelated languages. That is, this class consists of expressions in
which the signifier of a word contains certain phonemes, the signified meaning denotes a referent
with certain properties, and that same sound/meaning pairing is also found in other, completely
unrelated languages.4 As we will see, such correlations can exist at either within the lexical or can
be observed within mental processing.
It’s worth looking at some concrete examples.
The paradigm examples of cross-familial, sound meaning correlations are cases in which
there are words from different language families that both denote objects of a certain size or
shape and have phonological forms that contains phonemes with certain features. For instance,
Sapir 1929 noted that words associated with smallness tend to contain +high, +front vowels, like
/i/, and words associated with largeness tend to contain +low, –front vowels, like /u/. This
certainly holds for English; English has words like “tiny” and “petite” for small things and words
like “huge” and “gargantuan” for large ones. Other such associations have been found as well.

To say two languages are unrelated is to say that they are members of distinct language families. A language family
is simply a set of languages that share a distant ancestor. For instance, English, Russian, and Hindi are all members
of the Indo-European language family because the languages that exist today can be traced back to Proto-IndoEuropean, a language that is believed to have been spoken on the Eurasian steppe between 5 and 8 thousand years
ago. (Mallory & Adams 2006) Languages are, thus, much like biological species. And just like with species, languages
within a family can be more or less closely depending on how recent of an ancestor they share. For instance, English,
German, and Dutch are considered closely-related, Germanic languages because they share the ancestor ProtoGermanic.
4
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For instance, using computer technology to analyze vocabulary items from 4298 languages, Blasi
et al 2016 found that words with nose-related meanings tend to contain +nasal phonemes at rates
well above chance, and words with lip-related meanings tend to be associated with phonemes,
like /l/, that are linked to labial phones.
Similar correlations exist at the level of individual psychology. For instance, Sapir found
that subjects in an experimental setting tend to assign forms with +high, +front vowels to small
objects and +low, –front vowels to large ones. This aligns with the correlations at the lexical level.
A second instance of sound/meaning correlations at the psychological level comes from the
bouba/kiki paradigm. In instances of this paradigm—which was first developed by Köhler, 1927 but
given it’s contemporary form by Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001—subjects in an
experimental setting are presented with two shapes, one rounded and one spikey. They are then
asked which of two nonsense words, “bouba” or “kiki,” is to be assigned to each object. It’s been
found that as many as 95% of subjects assign “bouba” to the rounded shape and “kiki” to the
spikey one. These results hold across numerous, unrelated languages, including Swahili, (Davis
1961), Swedish (Ahlner & Zlatev, 2010), French (Fort et al 2015) and Himba, an unwritten
language of rural Nambia (Bremner et al. 2013). They also hold for both adults and children;
Maurer et al 2006 found that English speaking children as young as 2.5 years adhere to the
paradigm and Otzturk et al. 2013 found evidence of a sensitivity to the paradigm in infants as
young as 4 months.
Another body of work that is taken to illustrate the existence of cross-familial
sound/meaning correlation focuses on names. It has been observed that in cases where large
numbers of names are created to discuss entities with certain characteristic properties, there are
often correlations between the phonemes in the names and those properties. For instance, Shih et
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al. 2018 examined the names of Pokémon5 in both Japanese and English and found that the size
and power of an individual Pokémon species was strongly correlated with certain phonemes.
Larger more powerful Pokémon contained more low vowels, a fact that also aligns with the
observations made by Sapir. Shih and Rudin 2020 found something similar with respect to the
nicknames given to professional baseball players. In particular they found a positive correlation
between the height of baseball players and the number of voiced stops found in their nicknames.
A final body of evidence that has been taken to be indicative of a cross-familial
correlation concerns higher-order phonological properties. Lewis and Frank 2016 found a crosslinguistic correlation between the length of a word’s phonological form and the conceptual
complexity of its meaning; words for simple concepts, like “cat” tend to have few syllables, while
words for more complex concepts, like “apocalypse,” tend to have more syllables. They also
observed that when subjects were asked to apply nonsense words to various objects comprised of
different numbers of identifiable parts, subjects tended to apply words with longer phonological
forms to the words with more parts. Thus, at both an individual and lexical level, there seems to
be a correlation between the complexity of a phonological form and the conceptual complexity of
the associated meaning.
With these various examples of cross-familial correlations before us, it isn’t hard to see
why such correlations have been taken to be indicative of nonarbitrariness in language. Given
that the correlations described exist across the world’s languages, an inference to the best
explanation suggests that there is something about a phonological form with certain properties that
makes it an especially good for expressing certain semantic contents. That is, if large numbers of

Pokémon are a collection of fictional creatures created in Japan in the 1990’s. Since their creation, Pokémon have
appeared in numerous movies, tv shows, and video games, and are the main subjects of a popular trading card
game.
5
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expressions worldwide display the same sound/meaning correlations, then such connections are
unlikely to be coincidental and are, therefore, better explained by some inner connection
between signifier and signified. For example, it seems likely that words for small things tend to
contain +high, +front phonemes because there’s something about phonological forms that contain
+high, +front vowels that makes them especially good when referring to small objects. Likewise,
it seems likely that reason that the phonological forms used to refer to complex meanings tend to
contain more phonemes—even when those phonological forms are nonsense words that are not
comprised of any, smaller morphemes—is that there is something about long phonological forms
that makes them especially good for talking about complex meanings. If this line of reasoning is
correct, then it is appropriate to speak of an inner connection between signifier and signified.
The reason that words that manifest these correlations count as a third class of
purportedly nonarbitrary expression, distinct from the two already mentioned, is due to the
degree to which speakers are aware of the correlations that these expressions manifest. As we saw
above, speakers of a language are consciously aware of the fact that onomatopoeias and mimetics
sound like their meanings. By contrast, words that manifest these cross familial correlations
generally are not experienced as sounding like their meanings in the same way. For instance, a
speaker might have a gut feeling that “itty-bitty” is an especially good word for a small thing, but
they won’t say that “itty-bitty” sounds like an itty-bitty thing in the way that “boom” sounds like
a boom or “toko-toko” sounds like walking with short quick steps. Thus, while it is quite plausible
that there is an unconscious sensitivity to a connection between sound and meaning, the fact that
there is not a conscious experience of such a connection sets this class of expressions apart from
the other two classes already discussed.
In short, words that manifest a cross-familial sound/meaning correlation constitute a
third type of purportedly nonarbitrary expression.
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2.4 Phonesthemes
The fourth, and final, class of purportedly nonarbitrary are those that contain
phonesthemes. Phonesthemes, like cross-familial correlations, involve an association between
particular speech sounds and certain meanings. Also, like cross-familial correlations, speakers
seem consciously unaware of any connection between form and meaning in the case of
phonesthemes. However, there are two key differences that set the classes apart.
One difference is that phonesthemic associations only hold within a single language, or a
small number of closely related languages. For instance, while the correlation between +high,
+front vowels and smallness holds in languages as diverse as English and Mandarin Chinese, a
phonesthemic association might only be found in English and a handful of closely related
languages, like Dutch. The other key difference is that phonesthemes are linked to a particular
place in a phonological form. That is, while /i/ is linked with smallness regardless of its position
in a phonological form, a phonestheme will only be connected with a certain meaning when it
appears in a certain place, such as at the start of the phonological form.
To understand phonesthemes more closely, it’s worth considering some examples. The
phonestheme that is most commonly discussed in the literature is a correlation between the
phoneme pair /gl/ and light-related meanings that is found in English. This association holds
when the phoneme pair /gl/ occurs at the beginning of the phonological form. Thus, English
includes words like “glitter,” “glimmer,” “glow,” “glossy,” and “glint,” each of which has a
meaning linked to shininess and light. Another commonly discussed example from English is the
association between /sn/ and meanings associated with the nose and mouth, which also hold
phoneme pair occurs at the start of the whole phonological form. For instance, English includes
“sneeze,” “snot,” and “snack.” A final example from English, in which the phoneme sequence
occurs not at the beginning but the end, involves on the phoneme pair /ir/ and includes words
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like “sneer,” “leer,” and “jeer.” Each of these words denotes an action carried out with a derisive
attitude.6
With these examples in front of us, it’s easy to see how they differ from each of the other
three classes discussed above. Unlike onomatopoeias and mimetics, the gl-words above do not
clearly sound like their meaning—there’s nothing light-like or shiny about /gl/. And unlike the
association between +high, +front vowels and smallness, the association between /gl/ and light
only holds in English and a handful of other Germanic languages.
Another class of linguistic phenomenon from which phonesthemes must be kept distinct
are affixes, i.e., prefixes, suffixes, and infixes. Like phonesthemes, affixes involve an association
between a certain phonemic string and a certain meaning and always occur in a certain position
in a phonological form. And like phonesthemes, a particular prefix or suffix is generally only
found in a small number of related languages. However, phonesthemes and affixes are distinct
because affixes are morphemic units in a way that phonesthemes are not. That is, if one removes
an affix from a word, what one is left with is usually still a word; removing “a” from “atypical”
yields “typical.” This isn’t true for phonesthemes. If one removes /gl/ from the form of “glint”
one is left with “int,” which isn’t a word of English. Another way of putting this is that affixes can
be added to existing words to change their meaning in a rule governed way. “A” can be added to
“typical” to mean not typical and to “moral” to mean lacking morality. This doesn’t hold for
“gl”—one cannot apply “gl” to “typical” to mean typically shiny.
Once again, the main reason to think that words containing phonesthemes constitute a
type of nonarbitrary language involves an inference to the best explanation. The idea is that if a
certain speech sound is associated with a certain meaning at rates that are significantly above

6

See Bergen 2004 for more.
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chance, then this is unlikely to be coincidental. Indeed, if this is the case, then there’s likely
something about the properties of the phonological form that makes it especially good candidate
for denoting a certain semantic content, which means the relationship between the two is
nonarbitrary.
Additional evidence for the fact that phonesthemes involve a nonarbitrary connection
between form and content has been found in the lab. In particular, while speakers are not
consciously aware of phonesthemic connections, they do seem sensitive to them. Magnus 2000
conducted studies in which subjects were either presented with a meaning and asked to come up
with a novel word for that meaning, or were presented with a novel word and asked to come up
with a meaning. In both cases, the assignments given aligned with certain phonesthemic patterns
at rates above chance. This suggests phonesthemes involves sound/meaning connections that
speakers are sensitive to and that this sensitivity gets reflected in their sound/meaning pairings.
The final thing to say about phonesthemes is, like with the classes already, the boundaries
between the class of phonesthemic expressions and other words is often vague. The most notable
vagueness is between phonesthemes and the cross-familial correlations already discussed. Some
of the phonesthemes that get discussed in the literature seem to overlap with some of the crossfamilial correlations that have also been documented. For instance, the association between /sn/
and nose-relatedness found in English overlaps with the more general, cross-familial correlation
between +nasal phonemes and noses. Moreover, the fact that a certain sound/meaning
association has only been documented in one language doesn’t necessarily mean that it doesn’t
exist in others; it only means that its presence elsewhere hasn’t been recorded. Thus, it is possible
that some of the things that get called “phonesthemes” exist more generally. But, once again, one
should not allow this vagueness to conceal the fact that there are paradigm cases, like /gl/, and
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that, therefore, expressions that manifest phonesthemes constitute a fourth type of purportedly
nonarbitrary expression.

2.5 Genuinely Arbitrary Expressions
While I have now discussed all four classes of purportedly nonarbitrary language, I would
be remiss if I did not discuss a fifth class, namely, the genuinely arbitrary.
While more and more theorists are becoming open to the idea that nonarbitrariness is a
pervasive feature of the language, there are few who think that there are no arbitrary expressions
whatsoever. The main reason that nearly all theorists accept the existence of some completely
arbitrary expressions is that every language contains words like “dog.” “Dog” is one of the great
mysteries of the English language. Despite being so common, the origins and etymology of “dog”
remain completely unknown7; in other Germanic languages, the word for dog can be traced back
to the Proto-Germanic “hundaz,” e.g., Dutch “hond,” German “Hund,” and Yiddish “hunt,”
which is where the English word “hound” comes from. This mysterious origin goes hand-in-hand
with the fact that there is nothing intuitively dog-like about the phonological form of “dog.” Nor
does “dog” manifest any well-known phonesthemic or cross-familial correlation. In short, then,
even proponents of PNA accept that some words are completely arbitrary because there are
words that seem this way and which display no evidence to the contrary.

2.6 Summary and Next Steps
We now have before us a taxonomy of purportedly linguistic expressions, and, for each,
we’ve seen that the claim of nonarbitrariness is quite reasonable.

7

Oxford English Dictionary
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But, of course, the fact that some conclusion seems reasonable does not mean it is correct.
If one is to show that any purportedly nonarbitrary expressions are genuinely nonarbitrary, one
must take a closer look at the various types of purportedly nonarbitrary expressions and establish
the sound/meaning connections they actually display. This means that one must identify the
mechanisms by which these connections come about so that one can assess whether such
mechanisms are sufficient to qualify as genuinely nonarbitrary.
This will be my task in the remainder of this chapter. I will argue that there are, in fact,
three different mechanisms that underlie purportedly nonarbitrary expressions. In particular, I
will show that there is an iconic mechanism responsible for onomatopoeias and mimetics, an
analogical mechanism responsible for cross-familial correlations and some phonesthemes, and an
associative mechanism that is responsible for all other phonesthemes. Thus, by the end of this
chapter, we will have seen exactly what types of sound/meaning connections exist in natural
language. This will put us in a position to assess whether any of these connetions is nonarbitrary
and then to consider whether the amount of nonarbitrariness is sufficient to demonstrate PNA.

3. Iconic Representation
When looking for a mechanism that underlies purportedly nonarbitrary language, where
should one begin?
Perhaps the best place to start to remind ourselves of a term that is sometimes used to
denote purportedly nonarbitrary language. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, nonarbitrary
expressions are sometimes described as instances of iconic language. This locution is noteworthy
because iconicity, or more accurately iconic representation, is a topic that has received considerable
attention within the philosophical literature, especially within the philosophy of perception.
(Giardino & Greenberg 2014, Greenberg 2015, Quilty-Dunn 2020) Moreover, iconic
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representation is something that has a decidedly nonarbitrary flavor. The paradigmatic example
of an icon is a 2D picture that represents a 3D scene. This is noteworthy because there’s clearly a
sense in which a picture is naturally and intrinsically linked to the scene it depicts. Consequently,
if one takes this use of “iconic” seriously and can successfully show that some purportedly
nonarbitrary expressions are processed using genuine iconic representation, then one will have
demonstrated a connection between sound and meaning that would be an excellent candidate for
being nonarbitrary.
This section will look at the nature of iconicity representation and consider whether any
purportedly nonarbitrary expressions can be characterized in terms of iconic representation. I
argue show that both onomatopoeias and mimetics involve genuine iconic representation in the
human mind but that the other two classes of purportedly nonarbitrary language do not.

3.1. Iconicity—Spatial and Nonspatial
Generally speaking, a representation is said to be iconic when the representer represents
the represented in the way that an icon, or picture, represents the scene that it depicts. That is, A
represents B iconically when A relates to B in the same way that a picture of a brown bear relates
to the brown bear that’s depicted. Iconicity is, thus, a matter of representational format not
representation content—a picture of a brown bear and the phrase “a brown bear” share a
representational content, but they represent that content differently. We can say that the picture
represents the bear iconically while the phrase represents it discursively.
It’s worth fleshing this out.
It’s generally agreed that the defining feature of iconic representation is the high level of
isomorphism that holds between representer and represented. Strictly speaking, one thing is
isomorphic with another when there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two such that
83

making a change to one entails making a change to the other. For instance, a mercury
thermometer is isomorphic with temperature; a change in mercury level always indicates a
change in temperature. However, iconicity is taken to involve an especially high level of
isomorphism. In particular, it’s generally maintained that a representation is only iconic when
certain, additional criteria are met. A clear characterization of the additional principles that must
be met is provided by Quilty-Dunn 2020, who says that to be iconic, a representation must meet
the following two conditions:
PARTS: Parts of icons correspond to parts of what they represent.
HOLISM: Parts of icons represent multiple properties simultaneously.
While Quilty-Dunn does not believe that these additional principles constitute a definition of
iconicity, he maintains that a case of representation that meets these criteria is one that can be
safely assumed to be iconic in nature.
It’s worth looking at an example. In his discussions, Quilty-Dunn asks us to contrast a
drawing of a blue dotted cube with the inscription “there is a blue dotted cube.” He first points
out that no matter what part of the drawing one picks, that part will represent some part of the
original cube. This isn’t true for the inscription—no part of the blue spotted cube corresponds to
the part of the inscription “ed c”. This difference can be captured by saying that PARTS only
holds for the picture. He then asks us to consider the fact that any part of the drawing that one
picks will simultaneously represent the shape, color, surface pattern, etc., of the corresponding
part of the cube. This isn’t the case for the inscription. “Blue” only represents the color of the
cube; to know its shape, requires looking to another part of the inscription. This different is
captured by saying that only the picture satisfies HOLISM.
With this understanding in mind, it’s easy to see the relevance for considerations about
arbitrariness. Because iconic representation involves such a high degree of isomorphism, it’s
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appropriate to say that the connection between an iconic representer and represented is natural
and intrinsic. Indeed, in the paradigmatic case of iconicity, i.e., a 2D picture of a 3D scene, one
can mathematically calculate what a picture will look like so long as the 3D scene, the type of
perspective, and a focal point are specified (Greenberg 2013) Consequently, were one able to
show that there was an iconic, representational relationship between a word’s phonological form
and its meaning, this would be an exceptionally good candidate for being nonarbitrary in nature.
Note, however, that any attempt to apply iconicity to language faces a problem.
Discussions of iconicity tend to focus exclusively on spatially extended images that are visually
perceived. However, phonological forms aren’t the sorts of spatially extended objects. Therefore,
before we can assess whether there are any genuinely iconic expressions, we must first
understand how iconicity applies in non-picture cases.
The key to understanding non-pictorial iconicity is to recognize that spatially extended
images are not the only things that can be divided into parts that have the same types of
properties as the wholes they comprise: temporally-extended events can be divided into parts that
are, themselves, temporally-extended events. For instance, a race might be broken down into a
beginning, middle, and end, each of which will possess the same sorts of properties as the whole
race. A whole race and its first third will both have a temporal duration and contain a certain
number of racers.
These considerations are significant because they mean that two temporally-extended
events can stand in a very close isomorphic relationship. In particular, any part of one event can
correspond to a part of another and multiples properties of the respective parts can correspond to
one another simultaneously. In other words, so long as the two events are of the right type, it
should be possible for them to isomorphic in a way that meets PARTS and HOLISM.
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Therefore, while these isomorphic events would be temporally as opposed to spatially extended,
it would still be appropriate to say that one could represent the other in an iconic way.
This can be better demonstrated with an example. Consider the way in which a lit candle
might represent a human life. If this is done, each part of the burning process will correspond to
a particular part of the life: the ignition is birth, the luminous burning is the activity of adulthood,
and the extinguishing is death. Because things can be lined up in this way, it’s appropriate to say
that PARTS is fulfilled. What’s more, the properties of each part of the candle’s burning
correspond to the properties of the parts of a life in a holistic way. For instance, a candle that
burns down is much akin to a life that gradually ebbs away—in both cases there is a gradual loss
of energy until nothing is left that is accompanied by a gradual increase in the darkness of
everything nearby. Contrast this with the way in which a candle that is abruptly snuffed out
corresponds to a life that is unexpectedly cut short—in both cases, the loss of energy is abrupt
and unexpected. Because multiple properties correspond simultaneously, HOLISM is fulfilled.
We now have, before us, an account of iconic representation that can be applied outside
the visual domain. Thus, we can now turn to the various types of purportedly nonarbitrary
language and consider whether any of them can be shown to involve iconic representation.

3.2 Genuinely Iconic Language
To show that an expression involves genuine iconic representation requires one to show
two things.
First, one must show that the phonological form and meaning of an expression have the
potential to stand in the right type of isomorphic relationship. Put generally, this means showing
that the phonological form and meaning of a certain word are related to one another in a
manner that satisfies PARTS and HOLISM. More precisely, this means demonstrating that the
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meaning of the expression in question denotes a temporally extended event and that each part of
that event corresponds to a part of the expression’s phonological form in a holistic manner. The
reason that this is necessary stems from the nature of phonological forms. As we saw in chapter 2,
while phonological forms are best understood as comprised of mental symbols, such forms are
always presented to experience as of sounds unfolding in time. Consequently, the phonological
form of an expression only has the potential to stand in an iconic representational relationship
with a meaning if the meaning denotes a temporally extended event. But note that the idea a
phonological form might actually stand in the relevant type of relationship to a denoted event is
by no means implausible, given what was said about phonemes in Chapter 2. As we saw, the
phonemes that comprise phonological forms are complex symbols comprised of binary feature
values and are intrinsically linked to elements of the articulatory process. As such, it is by no
means unreasonable to think that each part of a phonological might correspond to a denoted
meaning in a holistic manner since both the form and the meaning are entities with many
complex properties.8
The second thing one must show in order to demonstrate that some word is processed
using iconic representation is that speakers are actually sensitive to whatever isomorphic
connections hold between the word’s phonological form and the denoted event. This is necessary
because representation only occurs when there is an individual for whom one thing serves to

It’s worth noting one dissimilarity between a linguistic and non-linguistic cases of iconic representation. As we said
above, the phonemes that comprise phonological are indivisible; while phonemes are defined in terms of certain
features, these features cannot be perceived except as a characteristic property of a whole phoneme. This means that
phonological forms are best characterized as digital in nature, i.e., there is a level at which their parts cannot be
divided into smaller parts. This differentiates phonological forms from most other events, for which it seems any part
can be divided into a smaller part. But while this differentiates phonological forms from events that are analog in this
intuitive sense, the fact that phonological forms are digital does not mean that they cannot represent iconically.
These days, the majority the things we use to represent have a digital format, including pictures. And yet, it seems
highly unlikely that one would want to say that a picture’s being digital prevents it from being able to represent
iconically. Thus, so long as one can show that each phoneme corresponds to some temporal part of an event and
represents that event part holistically, it is still appropriate to speak of iconicity.
8
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represent another; A must represent B to some individual C. In this particular case, that means
we must demonstrate that language users employ their knowledge of a word’s phonological form
to glean information about its meaning. This is necessary because the phonological form of a
word is what gets presented to awareness during speech perception, and an audience’s goal is to
identify a meaning on the basis of that perceptual content. Consequently, someone who exploits
a strong isomorphic connection between phonological form and meaning will use the features of
the former to infer things about the latter. If this can be demonstrated, then it would mean that
an expression not only has the potential for iconicity, but that it is processed in a way that makes
use genuine, iconic representation.
I will now turn to each of the four types of purportedly nonarbitrary expression and assess
which ones are actually processed in a manner that employs iconic representation.

Onomatopoeias
Of the four types of purportedly nonarbitrary language, onomatopoeias are the most
obvious candidates for being genuinely iconic. Because both the phonological form and meaning
associated with an onomatopoeia is experienced as a type of acoustic event, it’s easy to imagine
the two standing in a close, isomorphic relationship. However, demonstrating that
onomatopoeias really do involve iconic representation requires looking at some actual examples
in order to ensure that PARTS and HOLISM are satisfied.
The first example I want to consider is “moo.” “Moo” has the phonological form /mu/
and is used to denote the sound made by cows. The first thing to note about “moo” is that its
phonological form and its referent are experienced as events that have beginnings and ends. This
means that the two have the potential to stand in an isomorphic relationship. And when one
takes a closer look, it becomes clear that PARTS and HOLISM are satisfied as well.
88

With respect to PARTS, note that both /m/ and /u/ can be understood to correspond
to a particular part of a cow’s vocalization: /m/ corresponds to the start of the noise and /u/ to
the end. As such, every part of the phonological form corresponds to a part of the meaning.
PARTS is fulfilled.
HOLISM is fulfilled as well. To show this, I will focus on the onset /m/. In English, /m/
is a +sonorant consonant. This means that that a perception of /m/ is experienced as beginning
and ending gradually and, therefore, as something that can be dragged out over time. This
contrasts with a –sonorant phoneme, like /p/ or /d/, which is experienced as beginning and
ending suddenly. This level of sonorousness is a property that is shared with the onset of actual
moos. A cow’s moo begins deep in its chest, builds over time, and can be drawn out for however
long the cow desires.
/m/ is also +nasal, which means that it is associated with the act of closing the oral cavity
and redirecting airflow through the nose. This is noteworthy because the relationship between
/m/ and other nasal phonemes is also something reflective of the onset of a moo. There are three
+nasal phonemes in English: /m/, /n/, and /ŋ/. The main difference between them is where
the airflow out of the lungs gets stopped before being redirected through the nose. This matters
because the location of closure determines the size of the oral cavity within which air can vibrate
before its redirected. One consequence of this is that the +nasal phoneme are experienced as
having different pitches; the larger the space for vibration the deeper the phoneme is experienced
as being. And of the three /m/ is the one associated with the largest oral cavity because airflow is
stopped by closing one’s lips. Consequently, /m/ is be perceived as being an exceptionally deep
speech sound. This deepness mirrors the nature of a cow’s moo; cows are large animals and the
noises they make are deep in pitch. Thus, not only does /m/ correspond to the onset of a moo, it
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reflects both the sonorousness and the pitch of a characteristic cow sound at the same time. Thus,
HOLISM is satisfied as well.
The same sorts of observations can be made for other onomatopoeias. Consider “pop,”
whose phonological form both begins and ends with the –voiced, –sonorant phoneme /p/. That
/p/ is –sonorant means that it is perceived as occurring suddenly. Thus, having /p/ at the start
and end of the phonological form of “pop” reflects the fact that pops begin and end abruptly.
That /p/ is–voiced is significant because –voiced phonemes are experienced as quieter than
+voiced ones. This reflects the fact some pops, such as popping popcorns, are relatively quiet, at
least when compared to a necessarily loud sound like a boom, whose phonological form begins
with the +voiced /b/. Thus, just like with “moo,” the phonological form of “pop” corresponds to
a pop in a way that satisfies both PARTS and HOLISM.
In short, a look at actual onomatopoeias demonstrates that there is a high enough level of
isomorphism for iconic representation to occur. Thus, to show that onomatopoeias are genuinely
iconic expressions, we must now show that that speakers exploit this level of isomorphism to gain
information about an onomatopoeia’s meaning from its phonological forms.
There are two indications that language users do this. The most straightforward is simply
that we experience onomatopoeias as sounding like their meanings. Unless this experience of
alikeness is purely epiphenomenal—which seems unlikely—the fact that we experience “moo” as
sounding like a moo is good evidence that we are sensitive to the strong isomorphic connection
between /mu/ and a moo. Afterall, we have this same conscious experience of alikeness when a
2D picture iconically represents a 3D scene.
The second indication that we are sensitive to these isomorphic associations comes from
the work on language learning, described above. Onomatopoeias form a high percentage of a
child’s early vocabulary. Menn and Vihman 2011 found that in a population of 48, 20% of a
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baby’s first five words were onomatopoeias, and Tardiff et al. 2008 found that onomatopoeias
comprised 29.5% of the first 10 words for American English learners and 40.6% for Cantonese
learners. Putting this in context, Sugahara 2011 identified only 287 clear onomatopoeias in the
OED, even though most adult English speakers know around 60,000 words. (Bloom 2002) The
idea that speakers are sensitive to the isomorphic association between an onomatopoeia’s sound
and its meaning provides a neat explanation of this fact. As various theorists have pointed out,
word learning is no simple task. (Quine 1960) As Laing 2019 points out, a simplest explanation of
the high percentage of onomatopoeias in early lexica is that children find these words especially
easy to learn. In particular, children have an easier time learning words when they have
additional information to draw on during the learning process and an isomorphic connection
between form and content constitutes one potential scaffold. For instance, if the child draws on
the properties of the phonological form of “pop” or “moo” when attempted to identify its
meaning, it will be more likely to identify the meaning and use that word correct on future
occasions. This means that these types of words are more likely to be learned early and should
make up a high percentage of the early lexicon. The fact that onomatopoeias form a large part of
the childhood lexicon, therefore, provides additional evidence that we are sensitive to the
isomorphism that onomatopoeias display.
In short, onomatopoeias meet all the conditions needed to qualify as genuinely iconic. As
such they are prime candidates for being nonarbitrary in nature.

Mimetics
Mimetics are the second type of purportedly nonarbitrary language that can be shown to
be processed using genuine iconic representation. However, to demonstrate this requires dividing
mimetics into two subclasses: those that denote actions and those that denote states of being. I
91

will consider each of these classes in turn and discuss how each one can be shown to involve
genuine iconic representation.
As was the case above, demonstrating that action-denoting mimetics are iconic first
involves showing that they possess the level of isomorphism needed to satisfy PARTS and
HOLISM. The first thing to note with respect to this is that while action-denoting mimetics do
not correspond to types of sound events, they do correspond to types of events, more generally.
For instance, an act of walking with short quick steps—which is the manner of walking associated
with the Japanese “toko-toko”—gives rise to events of walking that unfold in time. Consequently,
this meaning has the potential to stand in an isomorphic relationship with the way we experience
a phonological form. Not only that, a closer look at this expression and its meaning demonstrates
that the level of isomorphism displayed by this expression also satisfies PARTS and HOLISM.
As we said, “toko-toko” has the phonological form /tokotoko/. The first thing to note is
that an event of moving in this manner can be broken down into smaller events—each step
consists of lifting, moving, and replacing one’s foot, and walking involves multiple steps. The
form /tokotoko/ can likewise be broken into smaller parts, such as the first syllable /to/ and the
initial phoneme /t/. Consequently, each part of /tokotoko/ can be made to correspond with
some part of an act of walking in a toko-toko manner. Furthermore, because the act of producing
a consonant brings the articulatory organs together in a way similar to how a walking foot comes
in contact with the ground, we can say that each consonant corresponds to a moment when a
foot touches the ground and each vowel corresponds to the point at which a foot is moving. This
means that PARTS is satisfied.
HOLISM is also satisfied. To see this, consider just the first /toko/. This string of
phonemes is associated with an act of touching the tip of one’s tongue to alveolar ridge to
produce/t/ and then touching the root of one’s tongue to the soft palate to produce /k/. Because
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these acts involve different parts of the tongue, they can be carried out in very quick succession.
This causes the /toko/ to sound fast-paced. This speed is akin to that displayed by two short,
quick steps. This contrasts with the first /tobo/ of /tobotobo/, which is the phonological form of
the Japanese word for walking wearily. /t/ and /b/ are both +front phonemes that correspond
to acts carried out at the front of the mouth—/t/ involves touching the tongue to the alveolar
ridge while /b/ involves closing one’s lips together. Because these actions are carried out in a
similar location, it is more difficult to perform them in quick succession. This means that /tobo/
is experienced as slower than /toko/, which reflects the fact that a wearily taken step is slower
than a short quick one.
Other properties of short quick steps are also reflected in the phonological sequence
/toko/. Both /t/ and /k/ are –voiced phonemes, and, as such, they are experienced as quieter
and less forceful than their +voiced counterparts, /b/ and /g/. This is experience results from
the fact that producing a +voiced phoneme generally takes more effort and causes more vigorous
air vibrations to occur. Thus, the –voiced nature of /t/ and /k/ perfectly parallels the relative
quietness and lack of force characteristic of a sequence of short, quick steps. Therefore, /toko/
simultaneously reflects both the speed and forcefulness of a sequence of two, short quick steps,
which means that HOLISM is satisfied.
In short, when we look at an actual, act-denoting mimetic, it’s clear that the relationship
between phonological form and semantic content is isomorphic enough to allow for iconic
representation. Therefore, the question now is whether there is any evidence that speakers are
sensitive to this isomorphism during the comprehension process.
Just like with onomatopoeias, there are several indications of this sensitivity. Once again,
the first indication is that individual speakers experience act-denoting mimetics as sounding like
the actions they denote. If a Japanese speaker says that “toko-toko” sounds like walking with
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short quick steps and “tobo-tobo” sounds like walking wearily, then the simplest explanation is
that speakers are sensitive to precisely the isomorphic connections just described. What’s more,
the fact that mimetics play such an important role in Japanese poetry suggests that this
isomorphism is sometimes exploited to carry information during the communicative process—
were such isomorphisms beyond human awareness, why would anyone say that the essence of a
Japanese poem cannot be translated into English?
The second indication that speakers exploit sound/meaning isomorphisms to glean
information about a mimetic’s meaning from its form from comes from experimental studies.
Perhaps the clearest such studies focus on what happens Japanese mimetics are presented to
subjects who do not speak Japanese. Both Imai et al 2008 and Nygaard et al 2009 presented
monolinguistic English speakers with the phonological forms of certain Japanese mimetics and
forced them to choose which of two possible meanings went with the form. Their two options
were the word’s actual meaning and its opposite. In both experiments, English speakers selected
the actual meaning at rates significantly above chance. This data strongly suggest that even nonnative speakers are sensitive to the structural isomorphism displayed by act-denoting mimetics
because the simplest explanation of the English speakers’ behaviors is that they are exploiting the
types of isomorphisms described above.
Another indication of a sensitivity to the iconic associations between mimetic forms and
their associated meanings comes from work on verb generalization. It has been observed that
verbs are harder for children to learn than nouns (Bloom 2002); not only do a child’s first verbs
tend to come after their first nouns, they tend not to generalize their use of verbs beyond the
precise situation in which they are first encountered. For instance, a child might only apply the
word “walk” when the same individual is walking in the same manner and in the same location
as when “walk” was first heard. However, Imai et al 2008 found that Japanese 3-year-olds are
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able to generalize verbs that are mimetic with the actions they denote. The best explanation for
this is that the children are sensitive to the iconic associations that these verbs display and exploit
these connections to correctly identify the precise meaning of the verb. This allows them to apply
the verb beyond the initially encountered situation.
For these reasons, it is safe to conclude that speakers are sensitive to the isomorphism
displayed by act-denoting mimetics and, therefore, that such expressions are processed iconically.
But what of those mimetics that denote states of being?
At first glance, it might seem impossible for these expressions to involve any iconic
representation. This is because the type of isomorphism under consideration involves the
structural similarity between two events, and the state denoted by a state-denoting mimetic is not
an event. However, these types of mimetics can be understood as being iconic in a more
expanded sense. In particular, it seems like these mimetics can be understood as combining
iconic representation with something akin to synecdoche.
To see this, let’s consider the Japanese word “kibi-kibi,” which means energetic and has
the phonological form /kibikibi/. The first thing to note is that while being energetic is not an
action, an energetic individual generally carries out their actions in a characteristic manner. In
particular, they typically move quickly from one action to the next and take no rest between.
Thus, while the state of being energetic action might not be able to be isomorphic with a
phonological form, the sequences of acts carried out by such an individual might be. And, when
we consider things more closely, “kibi-kibi” does seem to display the level of isomorphism
required for iconicity.
As was just said, an energetic person typically jumps into their tasks quickly and decisively
and takes no breaks in between. These features are paralleled in /kibikibi/. For one thing,
/kibikibi/contains four distinct syllables, each of which can be thought of as an individual
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articulatory act. Consequently, it is possible to say that this string of syllables to line up with a
sequence of four, individual actions of the sort that might be carried out by an energetic person.
Thus, it is reasonable to say that that PARTS is satisfied. It is also the case that the properties of
these syllables correspond to the properties of an energetic act in a holistic manner. Both /k/ and
/b/ are –sonorant phonemes, which means that they are associated with sudden articulatory
actions and are themselves perceived as beginning and ending quite suddenly. And as was the
case with “toko-toko,” these consonants are produced in different parts of the mouth, making the
transition from one syllable to the next extremely quick. Thus, both the suddenness and quick
transitions of actions carried out by an energetic person are simultaneously reflected in the form
/kibikibi/. Thus, HOLISM is also satisfied.
For these reasons, it’s reasonable to say that state-denoting mimetics do involve iconic
representation, they simply combine it with something else. Afterall, if “chickadee” can be used
for the bird that makes noises that are isomorphic with utterances of “chickadee,” why can’t
“kibi-kibi” be used for the state that causes one to act in a way that is isomorphic with utterances
of “kibi-kibi?” There is even some indirect evidence for this conclusion. Dingemanse 2012 notes
that the cross-linguistic distribution of mimetics is hierarchical; every language that contains
mimetics has some for actions carried out in a characteristic manner, but not every language with
mimetics has ones for denoting states. This suggests that the act-denoting mimetics are, in some
sense, primary and that the state-denoting mimetics derive from them. The account of statedenoting mimetics just given comports nicely with this hypothesis; the reason that state-denoting
mimetics only occur in languages in which act-denoting mimetics are already present, is that
state-denoting mimetics piggyback upon the act-denoting cases.
For all these reasons, it is safe to conclude that mimetic expressions involve genuine iconic
representation. As such, these expressions also involve a genuine connection between a
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phonological form and a meaning, which makes them excellent candidates for being genuinely
nonarbitrary.

Cross-Familial Correlations and Phonesthemes
While onomatopoeias and mimetics are genuinely iconic, the same cannot be said for
words that display cross-familial or phonesthemic connections. Because essentially the same,
straightforward reasoning accounts for both these failures, I will discuss both these types of
purportedly nonarbitrary language here.
In essence, the reason that neither type of expression can be genuinely iconic is that
neither corresponds to a particular type of action, even in an expanded, synecdochic sense. As
such, there is no way for PARTS or HOLISM to be satisfied and, thus, no way for the right type
of isomorphism to occur. This is best demonstrated by considering examples from each class.
As we saw above, examples of cross-familial correlations include associations between
+nasal phonemes and nose-related meanings, as in “nose” and “nasal”, and between +high,
+front vowels and smallness, as in “tiny” and “petite.” As these examples demonstrate, many of
the expressions that manifest these patterns are not events, and, as such, cannot stand in an
isomorphic relationship with a phonological form. While there is perhaps something intuitively,
nose-like about /n/, it isn’t the case that parts of the phonological form /noʊz/ correspond to
parts of a nose—the /n/ doesn’t correspond to the tip, or the bridge, or the nostrils. Likewise, the
phoneme /i/ in the phonological form of “petite” doesn’t correspond to some part of
petiteness—what would this even mean? Thus, while cross-linguistic correlations might exist,
such connections cannot be said to involve genuine iconic representation.
The same holds for phonesthemes. Just as in the cross-familial cases, many of the
expressions that instantiate these connections don’t refer to events or states that are associated
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with characteristic events. For instance, “glitz” and “glamor” both manifest the phonesthemic
connection between onset /gl/ and shininess. However, both expressions are nouns that pick out
properties unrelated to actions. And while there are some expressions that both fit this
phonesthemic pattern and denote actions, e.g., “glow” and “glitter,” there is no isomorphic
connection between form and content to be drawn in such cases; while /gl/ might be associated
with light, the /gl/ at the start of the phonological form of “glow” does not correspond to the
start of an act of glowing in the way /m/ corresponds to the start of an act of mooing.
Thus, while cross-familial correlations and phonesthemes are sometimes called “iconic,”
neither of them actually is. If either of them involves a genuine connection between sound and
meaning, there must be some other mechanism that’s responsible for this connection.

3.3 Summarizing Iconicity
I have now demonstrated that of the four types of purportedly nonarbitrary language,
only onomatopoeias and mimetics involve genuine iconic representation. However, while the
other purportedly nonarbitrary expressions don’t involve genuine iconicity, this does not
necessarily mean that there isn’t some connection between their phonological forms and
semantic contents. Indeed, I believe that such connections do exist. Thus, in the next two
sections, I will consider the ways that phonological forms are connected with meanings for the
remaining two classes of expression. Once again, I will leave open whether such connections are
sufficient to make these expressions genuinely nonarbitrary, but as we will see, the connections in
question have a decidedly, nonarbitrary flavor.
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4. Analogical Processing
In order to appreciate the second mechanisms by which a meaning might be linked to a
phonological form, it’s worth noting that while neither cross-familial correlations nor
phonesthemes are iconic, it can often feel like the phonological form in question is somehow
appropriate for what it denotes. While the average speaker isn’t consciously aware of the fact that
a correlation between +high, +front vowels and smallness exists worldwide, they might have the
intuition that a phonological form that contains vowels with these features is an especially good
fit for a small referent. This seems to be what we see in the case of the bouba/kiki paradigm—
when asked why they associated “bouba” with a rounded referent, subjects often say that that
referent just feels more like a bouba.
All this is to say that even if can’t quite put our finger on what makes a certain correlation
appropriate, we often feel that the phonological form is somehow analogous to the assigned
meaning. This suggests that the correlations in question might be explained in terms of a
mechanism that involves analogical, mental processing.
There are several reasons that this is a viable approach. First, when one thing is
analogous with another, there is a sense in which the association between them is nonarbitrary
and natural. When I say that the relationship between a cat and a kitten is analogous to that
between a dog and a puppy, I am asserting that there is some intrinsic similarity between the two
relationships. Thus, if we can show that cross-familial correlations or phonesthemes can be
explained in terms of analogical mental processing, this would make these expressions prime
candidates for being nonarbitrary. Second, as we will see shortly, analogies play an important
role in our mental lives. It is, therefore, plausible that analogical processing also plays a role in
linguistic processing, including in the case of cross-familial correlations and some phonesthemes.

99

This section will argue that all cross-familial correlations and some phonesthemic ones,
are, indeed, the result of analogical processing during language comprehension. Towards this
end, I will first describe the role that analogies play in cognition and perception more generally.
Then, I argue that there is good reason to think that analogical processing is responsible for the
cross-familial correlations we see at both the lexical level and within the psychology of individual
speakers.

4.1 Analogies and Mental Processing
To understand analogical processing, it’s first necessary to say something about analogies.
Roughly speaking, an analogy is a two-part relation in which two things share a structural
similarity amongst their respective parts or are similar with respect to a particular property.9 For
instance, a boot and Italy are analogous with respect to shape; both are longer than they are
wide, and the bottom of each can be characterized as having a heel and a toe. Note that this
means that an analogy is similar to iconicity but is limited to a single dimension. When
considering the analogous relationship between Italy and a boot one only considers their shape;
the facts that Italy has a population and that a boot is worn on the foot are ignored. This means
that an analogy differs from a genuinely iconic relationship in which a picture and a scene, or
two events, are isomorphic across multiple dimensions simultaneously.
Given this understanding, analogical processing is simply any type of mental computation
that utilizes an analogical relationship to acquire new information. This can occur at either a
cognitive or perceptual level. I will consider each.

9

See e.g. Gentner 1983, Markman 1997.
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In the case of analogical cognition, we can say that an individual who uses their
knowledge that Italy’s shape is analogous to that of a boot to infer that it takes longer to drive
from the north of Italy to the south than from the east to the west has engaged in analogical
reasoning. Analogical reasoning can, thus, be contrasted both with processing that utilizes an
iconic connection and that which relies on purely associative connections. A person who relies on
an iconic relationship between a picture and a scene can draw conclusions about many
dimensions of that scene; a person who processes analogically is limited to conclusions about the
single dimension that is analogous. Analogical processing also differs from processing that uses
associative connections because associative connections don’t derive from similarity; an
associative connection derives from past experience. For instance, when someone is classically
conditioned to associate a ringing bell with food, the expectation that forms does not stem from
any similarity between food and a bell. It simply reflects that two things have co-occurred in the
past. One consequence of this is that associative connections can be counter-conditioned away,
but the bases for analogically processing cannot. If the individual conditioned to associate food
with a bell stops being presented with food when they hear a bell, they will cease associating the
two. By contrast, one will remain able to recognize that Italy and a boot are analogous in shape
no matter how many times a discussion of Italy fails to accompany the presentation of footwear.10
Analogical reasoning plays a central role in our mental lives. For one thing, it plays an
important role in adult learning, a fact that should be clear to anyone who has seen the
pedagogical power of a well-placed analogy. This anecdotal evidence is backed up by
experimental support; Ugur et al. 2012 found that students taught about direct currents using
analogies between currents and other things, such as trains and pipes, performed better on a test

10

See Mandelbaum 2016.
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than those taught in a traditional, nonanalogical manner. Analogies are also useful when solving
novel problems. In a laboratory setting, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that subjects solve
novel problems better when they are told to treat them as them as analogous to a problem with
which they are already familiar. Pirolli 1991 found that the best way for programming students to
learn to code recursive functions way to present them with examples and tell them to design their
own programs to be analogous with the provided examples. Similarly, Catrambone & Carroll
1987 found that individuals were better at learning a complex word processing program when
they were first presented with a stripped-down version of the program that had the same
structure but had many of its additional features removed.11 It’s also been demonstrated that one
of the most effective ways to get subjects to solve a novel problem is simply to provide the hint the
problem is analogous to a problem with which they are familiar. (Gick and Holyoak 1980)
Finally, analogical reasoning is important to adult creativity. This is demonstrated by anecdotes
from the history of science. August Kekulé’s conclusion the benzene molecule is ring-shaped
came about by way of a dream in which he saw a snake devouring its own tail and his,
subsequent, reasoning that benzene must be structured in an analogous way. (Rocke, 2015).
Similarly, Ernest Rutherford came up model of the atom by analogy with the solar system; by
considering the way that the planets are held in place by the sun, Rutherford came to the
conclusion that electrons orbit the protons and neutrons.12
There is also strong evidence that analogical reasoning is important during childhood.
Crisafi & Brown 1986 presented children between 2 and 4 with two differently-shaped objects,
e.g., a gumball machine and a toy dump truck, each of which dispensed a gumball when a coin
was inserted into a coin slot. 4-year-old subjects who were familiar with the gumball machine
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For similar studies, see Catrambone & Holyoak 1986, Pirolli & Anderson 1985, Reed 1987, Ross, 1984)
For a fuller, narrative discussion of this anecdote see Gentner and Wolff 2000, 316-318.
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spontaneously employed the same technique to acquire a gumball from the dump truck.
Children as young as 2 were able to reason in this way as well, so long as they were provided with
the hint to that the various objects were related in some way.13 It has also even been argued that
analogical reasoning is crucial for acquiring new concepts. The reasoning behind this claim is
that if individuals were unable to draw analogies between new experiences and old ones, they
would be unable to recognize that the same type of thing was appearing again and again, and
therefore, wouldn’t know to produce the corresponding concept. (Gentner & Namy 1999) Much
the same reasoning has been used to argue that analogies are crucial for learning rules—if a child
cannot recognize that different situations are analogous, they would not be able to realize that
there are general rules that can be applied across these situations.
There is even evidence that analogical reasoning in non-human animals. In particular,
certain animals have been shown to employ the same/different relation in their reasoning in
much the same way that humans do. In relation-matching experiments, subjects are presented
with a string of symbols, e.g., AAA, and are asked which of two target strings, e.g., BBB and
CDE, goes with the initial string. Humans generally recognize that strings that display all the
same symbols go together, even when the symbols themselves are different. It has been found
that both baboons (Flemming et al. 2013) and crows (Smirnova et al. 2015) associate strings
together in exactly the same way. This indicates that they are able to recognize that the strings
are analogous with respect to the higher-order property of sameness.
In short, there is considerable evidence that analogies play a central role in cognition. As
such analogical reasoning can be said to be a vital cognitive process. However, there is nearly as
much evidence that analogical processing plays an important role in perception.
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See Goswami 1991 for a review of these types of studies.
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This evidence comes from work on cross-modal effects. Within perceptual science, a
cross-modal effect is any instance in which the information processing associated with one
modality, e.g., sight, impacts the processing associated with another, e.g., hearing. A classic case
is the McGurk Effect, in which one’s visual perception of a human mouth producing a speech
sound affects what phoneme one has the experience of hearing.14 However, other cross-modal
effects of been observed as well. For instance, Marks et al. 1987 observed a cross-modal
interaction between a visual perception of size and an acoustic experience of pitch; subjects who
were asked to estimate the size of a large object were slower and less accurate when their visual
perception was accompanied by an acoustic perception of high-pitched sound as opposed to a
low-pitched one. Similar associations have also been found for pitch and brightness, pitch and
elevation, and loudness and brightness.15
Cross-modal effects are relevant here because many of them are naturally characterized
in an analogical manner. For instance, both visual size and acoustic pitch are scalar in nature.
This makes it possible for the magnitude of one to be analogous to a magnitude of the other.
What’s more, it’s quite plausible that our perceptual systems evolved to be sensitive to such
analogies and exploit them during perceptual processing. For instance, the fact that our ancestors
evolved on earth means that one of the most common producers of deep pitched sounds were
large animals. A perceptual system that took this association into account during processing
would, therefore, have been beneficial to an organism. For instance, the difficulty of calculating
the visual size of an animal in a dense fog could be offset somewhat by a visual system that was
able to take into account the pitch of the sound that that animal produced. While this isn’t to say

For instance, McGurk and McDonald 1976 found that when a subject. was presented with an audio recording of
someone producing /b/ at the same time they saw a video of some performing a /g/, the subject’s experience was of
hearing /d/, which can be understood to have features between those of /b/ and /g/.
15 For a review, see Marks 2004, Spence 2011.
14

104

that all cross-modal effects are the result of analogical processing,16 the fact that some such effects
are naturally explained in terms of analogical processing strongly suggests that this processing
plays a role in perception as well as.
In short, analogical processing plays a crucial role in our mental lives, both cognitively
and perceptually. This makes it highly plausible that analogical processing is utilized in linguistic
comprehension as well. This, in turn, is significant to arbitrariness and nonarbitrariness because
when two things stand in an analogous relationship, it seems appropriate to speak of an intrinsic,
nonarbitrary connection holding between the two. When I say that Italy is analogous to a boot, I
seem to be pointing out that the two are linked in some natural way. Thus, putting all this
together, it is reasonable to think that speakers are programmed to exploit analogical connections
between phonological forms and semantic contents and that doing so is sufficient to render the
expressions processed in this way nonarbitrary.
I will now consider this possibility more closely. I will argue that all expressions that
display a cross-familial correlation—and perhaps some of those that manifest a phonesthemic
connection—are processed analogically.

4.2 Analogical Processing in Language.
As was the case for iconic representation, demonstrating that a certain expression is
processed analogically involves showing two things. First, one must show that there are
expressions for which an analogy could be drawn between the phonological form and the
meaning. Second, one must provide evidence that humans are actually sensitive to such
analogical connections by showing that they play some role in linguistic processing. This second
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Spence 2011 discusses several mechanisms by which cross-modal interactions might come about.
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point is crucial because a structural similarity between two things only becomes a genuine
connection if the analogical similarity is exploited in some way.
I will now consider the two remaining classes of purportedly nonarbitrary language and
assess the degree to which these two conditions are met.

Cross-Familial Correlations
Just about every one of the cross-familial sound/meaning correlations found in the
literature can be characterized in analogical terms. That is, someone properly aware of the
nature of phonemes and the features that comprise them can draw analogical associations
between the phonological form and semantic contents for each expression that manifests a
certain cross-familial correlation.
Consider, first, the associations between vowel features and physical size that was
described by Sapir. The articulatory act associated with a +high, +front vowel, e.g., /i/, requires
one to move one’s tongue forward and up. This reduces the size of the oral cavity. Consequently,
uttering an /i/ results in an articulatory space that is quite literally small. By contrast, consider
what it takes to produce a +low –front vowel, like /u/. When uttering this sound, one must pull
one’s tongue down and back. This causes the oral cavity to be large. Thus, it isn’t simply that
words for small things tend to have certain vowels and words for large things happen to have
others; rather, the size of the articulatory action associated with that vowel is analogous to the
size denoted by the meaning. There’s a sense in which “humungous” is itself humungous and
“tiny” is tiny.17

This connection is even clearer if one is willing to think of phonemes in the embodied way described at the end of
Chapter 2; if part of what constitutively determines /u/ is the low, back articulatory placement that it produces, then
to hear an utterance of “humungous” is to perceive a perceptual content that is, quite literally large.
17
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A similar analogy can be drawn between the +nasal phonemes and nose-related
meanings. When acting upon a +nasal phoneme, one must redirect the airflow through the nose,
which causes the nasal passage to vibrate. Consequently, a sound like /n/ is intrinsically linked to
the nose—indeed, the act of producing an /n/ will cause a tactile feeling of vibration in one’s
nasal passages that is lacking for a –nasal phoneme, like /b/. This means that when one hears a
+nasal phoneme, what is brought to one’s mind is something that is intrinsically linked to the
human nose and analogously tied to something with a nose-related meaning; to hear a word like
“nose” is, thus, to hear something that’s literally nosey.
These analogical associations don’t just hold at the level of individual phonemes. The
clearest demonstration of this comes from work on the bouba/kiki paradigm. When D’Onofrio
2014 sought to identify the phonological features that were most associated with the paradigm,
she found that there were actually a number of distinct features correlated with a subject’s
tendency to choose a rounded referent as opposed to a spikey one. These included such features
as +back and +round for vowels and +voiced and +labial for consonants. But perhaps most
interestingly, D’Onofrio found that the tendency to choose a rounded referent increased to a
degree that was more than simply additive whenever these features occurred together in a single
phonological form. This is noteworthy because a consideration of what it takes to produce a
phonological form comprised of phonemes with all these features demonstrates that producing
them together gives rise to an overall mouth shape that is, itself, extremely round. For instance,
while a single +round phoneme causes one to round one’s lips, uttering “bouba”—which has a
form containing phonemes with all the features just described—requires one to round one’s lips,
puff out one’s cheeks, and enlarge one’s oral cavity until it is incredibly round. Thus, when a
subject associates “bouba” with a rounded object, they are associating that object with an overall,
articulatory orientation that is nearly as round as the referent itself.
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Analogical connections can even be drawn for the higher-order associations described by
Lewis and Frank 2016. The fact that the length of a word’s phonological form and the
conceptual complexity of its meaning are directly correlated can be said to involve an analogous
relationship in which complex forms are matched with complex meanings. While this
relationship is higher order, there is nothing preventing an analogy from holding between
properties of this sort; the notions of sameness and difference seen in the relation-matching tasks
described above are themselves higher order properties.
These various considerations should be sufficient to show that analogies can be drawn
between the phonological forms and semantic contents of words that display cross-familial
correlations. Thus, we must now assess whether speakers are actually sensitive to these analogical
connections.
There are several indications that this is the case.
The first indication comes from EEG studies of the brainwaves accompanying the
bouba/kiki paradigm. As was said above, analogies play a role in both perception and cognition.
Consequently, it’s possible that the analogical processing associated with cross-familial
correlations involves a cross-modal, perceptual effect. This is especially plausible since speech
recognition clearly has a perceptual component. This is significant here because work has been
done on the brainwaves that accompany cross-modal interactions, and the types of waves seen
for other cross-modal effects are also associated with the bouba/kiki paradigm. In particular, it
has been found that cross-modal effects are correlated with a strong, negatively peaking ERP
wave that occurs between 140 and 180 ms after stimulus presentation, (Giard & Peronnet 1999)
and Kovic et al. 2010 observed waves with these same peaks when subjects were presented with
the stimuli from the bouba/kiki experiments. This suggests that the bouba/kiki paradigm
involves analogical processing at the perceptual level.
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The second indication that analogical processing underlies cross-familial correlations
comes from the fact that individuals are computationally biased towards sound/meaning pairings
that fit the types of analogical patterns already discussed. Such a bias is noteworthy here because
one can only show a bias towards something if one is sensitive to its existence. Consequently, if
we can show that a bias towards analogical matches exists, then this would be a clear indication
that there are natural language expressions that involve an analogical connection between form
and content.
There are several things that indicate the existence of this bias. The first comes the mere
fact that humans display the psychological tendencies characteristic of the bouba/kiki paradigm.
The simplest explanation for this is that humans are biased towards those possible pairings in
which the form is analogous with the meaning. Indeed, what is our tendency to associate
“bouba” with a round referent if it is not a cognitive bias?
However, additional work on the bouba/kiki paradigm provides even stronger evidence
for this.. Westbury 2004 presented subjects with strings of letters within rounded or spikey shapes
and asked them to identify whether the string formed a word. Westbury found that subjects were
reliably faster to identify that something was not a word when its phonological form was
analogous with the shape within which it appeared than when it was not. While these differences
weren’t massive—only around 100ms—the fact that subjects processed phonological forms faster
when they matched the pictured shape suggests that the analogy between form and content
played some automatic role in the information processing process, which allowed their processing
to occur more quickly.
Another indication of this computational bias comes from work on word learning.
Miyazaki et al 2013 examined whether a word’s adhering to the bouba/kiki paradigm had any
effect on how well that word was learned by 14-month-old Japanese language learners. In an
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initial training phase, the infants were presented with word/shape pairs, only some of which fit
the paradigm. At a later point, the infants were presented with those same pairs again in order to
see which pairs they remembered better. This was tested with using a fixed gaze paradigm—it
was assumed that infants would stare for a shorter time at those pairs that they remembered.
Miyazaki et al. found that infants did, indeed, stare longer at the non-analogous pairs. This
suggests that the matching pairs were processed more effectively and were stored better in lexical
memory. This again suggests that humans are sensitive to analogous connections and that these
connections play an active role in linguistic processing.
Another indication of this bias towards analogical pairings comes from a version of the
bouba/kiki paradigm in the context of human faces. In a series of ingenious studies, Barton and
Halberstadt 2017 sought to identify whether there is an affective foundation for the bouba/kiki
effect. They did this by considering whether the relationship between a person’s face and their
name affects one’s judgments about them. In one experiment, subjects were first asked to rate
how much they liked an individual based exclusively on a picture. They were then presented with
the individual’s name, and asked to rate them again. It was found that subjects were more likely
to increase their rating of an individual when they learned that their name matched their face.
For instance, their rating of a round faced person was more likely to increase when they learned
he was named “Bob,” and more likely to decrease when they learned he was named “Kevin.”
Barton and Halberstadt even found some evidence that this preference has practical
implications—they did a correlational analysis and found a small, positive correlation between
the degree to which a politician’s face matched their name and their likelihood to win elections.
Thus far, the evidence that speakers show a sensitivity to the analogical associations that
can be drawn for cross-familial correlations has been empirical in nature. However, there is also
a strong, theoretical reason to accept this claim. This is that positing a cognitive bias towards
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analogical sound/meaning pairings allows us to account for the cross-familial correlations that
exist at the level of the public language lexicon.
There are two ways in which a word comes to be a part of the lexicon at a given time.
The first is as a neologism. This is noteworthy because a bias towards analogous form/meaning
pairings is something that has the power to shape the word creation process. When a person
creates a new word—perhaps as a name for their new invention—their choice will be subject to
whatever computational biases they possess. Thus, if a person is biased towards the analogous
size pairings described by Sapir, then we would expect any new words they create to fit this
pattern. And as the work on Pokémon names indicates, this is actually the case. Thus, we can
now hypothesize that the reason the heaviest Pokémon is named “Snorlax” is that the people
responsible for this name were biased towards giving this large creature a name with multiple
–front, +low vowels. And if this holds for Pokémon, it presumably holds for other neologisms as
well. Consequently, we can say that the fact we see the cross-familial correlations we do is partly
to be explained by the fact that any neologisms that get added to the language
The second, more common, way that a word gets to be a part of the lexicon is by being
inherited from an earlier generation. Often times, these inherited expressions are identical to an
expression used by an earlier generation. However, the entries in the public language lexicon
often change from one generation to the next. This is significant because a cognitive bias towards
analogous sound/meaning pairings is something that has the power to influence the language
change process in ways that can be reflected in the lexicon itself.
To see this, it’s first necessary to say a bit about lexical change. When discussing lexical
changes, we typically say things like expression “E” used to mean X but it now means Y. This
way of putting things can make it sound like a particular set of individuals chose to change their
linguistic behavior. However, linguists today agree that this isn’t generally what happens. Rather,
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when we say that “E” changed its meaning, the state of affairs to which this corresponds is one in
which people alive today use “E” to mean Y but those in some earlier generation used an
expression with similar phonological and syntactic properties as our expression “E” to express
some other meaning, X. In other words, language change doesn’t involve a change within some
single population but rather a difference between two populations that exist at different times.
Linguistic change is, therefore, akin to a change within biological species—just as the giraffe's
neck got longer when a generation of shorter-necked individuals died off and left only longernecked individuals, “nauseous” stopped meaning nausea-inducing and came to mean nauseated
when the speakers who used it to mean the former died and those who remained used
“nauseous” with the latter meaning. This means that the main drivers of language change are
whatever factors cause the members of a new generation to acquire mental lexica different from
those possessed by an earlier generation. And, as we will now see, a cognitive bias towards
sound/meaning analogy is such a factor.
To see how a bias towards analogy could shape the lexicon of something like English, its
necessary to realize that one of the main ways that a new generation comes to possess a lexicon
distinct from that of an earlier one is for a large number of children to “mislearn” their parents’
language in exactly the same way. The nature of this process can be seen by considering the
phrase “begs the question.” Today, this phrase is mainly used as a synonym for “raises the
question that,” but as philosophers are well aware, this was not always the case. The most
plausible explanation for this change is that large numbers of individuals hearing this phrase for
the first time, misunderstood what it meant—this should seem eminently plausible to anyone
who has tried to teach the philosophical notion in class. In particular, because the logical notion
of begging the question is difficult for many to grasp, language learners incorrectly interpreted
“begging the question” as meaning that some question was being raised and stored this simpler
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meaning in memory. This was an easy mistake to make because one only ever assumes the
conclusion one is arguing for when some question has been raised. Thus, as time passed, more
people learned the “wrong” meaning, and those who knew the “right” meaning died off, the
“wrong” meaning became the dominant meaning within the population.
Note that the change just described ultimately rests on a computational bias: humans are
biased towards learning simpler concepts as opposed to hard ones. Thus, with this in mind, we
can now see how an alternative bias, namely a bias towards words with meanings analogous to
their phonological forms, could give rise to sound/meaning correlations across the world’s
languages. In order to learn a new word, a child mustn’t simply hear it; they must store that word
for use on a later occasion. Consequently, the easier a word is to remember, the more likely it is
to be learned correctly and the greater the chances that it will continue to be known by a large
number of individuals in the subsequent generation. By contrast, words that are harder to
remember will be more easily forgotten and will, over time, gradually fade from the lexicon.
Thus, if we are biased towards analogous sound/meaning pairings, words that manifest these
pairings are less likely to drop out of the language from one generation to the next because they
are easier for learners to remember. What’s more, this bias will make members of a new
generation more likely to assign a certain form an “incorrect,” but analogous meaning, than to
misremember things in the opposite way. Thus, over time, the percentage of lexical items that
are analogous in phonological form and semantic content should go up. And since the languages
in the world today possess large numbers of such lexical items, it’s safe to conclude that a bias
towards sound/meaning analogies really does exist.
Thus, when these considerations about language change are combined with the empirical
data about such things as the bouba/kiki effect, it becomes clear that cross-familial correlations
can be explained in terms of analogical processing. And if this is right, then the expressions that
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manifest cross-familial correlations display a genuine, analogical connection between
phonological form and semantic content.

Phonesthemes
Can phonesthemes also be explained analogically? The answer to this is both yes and no.
That is, some phonesthemes can be at least partly explained analogically but others cannot.
That some phonesthemes might be explained analogically is quite plausible because, as
we saw above, the line between phonesthemes and cross-familial correlations is not always clear.
As such, it is reasonable to think that certain phonesthemes are the result of the exact same
analogical processing mechanisms that are responsible for certain cross-familial correlations. For
instance, one English phonestheme that lends itself to an analogical explanation is that which
holds between the phoneme sequence /sn/ at the start of words and nose-related meanings. As
we said above, the phoneme /n/ is itself associated with nose-relatedness due to the fact that it is
+nasal in nature. Consequently, it seems likely that the connection between /sn/ and noserelatedness is also partly the result of this more general mechanism.
Another phonestheme that lends itself to an analogical explanation is that involving the
speech sounds /ir/ and a contemptuous manner when those sounds occur at the end of a word
like “jeer” and “sneer.” One piece of evidence for this conclusion comes from the fact that this
connection only seems to occur when the sounds occurring at the start of the word are
themselves +sonorant; the association with contemptuousness is not present in a word like “beer”
or “deer,” whose onset phonemes are –sonorant. This is noteworthy because when one produces
the sequence /ir/ after a +sonorant consonant like /n/ or /j/, one’s mouth actually forms the
shape of a sneer—try it for yourself and you’ll see what I mean. However, such a mouth shape
doesn’t occur when the onset phoneme is –sonorant, a fact explained by considerations about
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coarticulation. Thus, it is reasonable to think that the connection between /ir/ and a feeling of
contempt results from an analogical association between a sneering mouth shape and the feeling
of contempt that sneers express.
While this idea of an analogical explanation between mouth shape and valance differs
somewhat from the examples already considered, this is little reason to doubt it existence. As
D’onofrio’s work on the of the bouba/kiki paradigm shows, speakers can be sensitive to
analogical associations between meanings and overall mouth shapes. Furthermore, there is
independent evidence that the association between form and content can involve valance. In
particular, Aryani et al 2018 observed that there is a cross-familial correlation between hissing
sibilants, i.e., sounds like /s/ and /z/, and rudeness or vulgarity; the contrast between “piss” and
“pee” nicely illustrates this fact. For all these reasons, therefore, it seems likely that the
phonesthemic connection on display in words like “sneer” and “jeer” can also to be framed
analogically.
In short, there is evidence that some phonesthemic connections can be given the same
sort of analogical characterization that is given for cross-familial. And since these
characterizations are the same as those seen for cross-familial correlations, the same evidence
that we used to show humans are sensitive to the analogous pairings in the cross-familial cases
also apply here. In particular, we can point to the same bouba/kiki data that shows a bias
towards round/round pairings and hypothesize that the same sensitivity underlies the analogical
association between sneering and “sneer.” We can also give the same sort of theoretical
explanation as to how such associations came to be reflected at the level of the public language
lexicon; a bias towards analogous sound/meaning pairs helped these pairs proliferate the public
language lexicon. Thus, at least some phonesthemes seem to involve a genuine analogical
connection between form and content.
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However, not all phonesthemes can be accounted for in this way. For instance, the
paradigm phonesthemic association of onset /gl/ and light-relatedness seems to display no
analogical connection. Intuitively, there is nothing light-related or shiny about the /gl/, and a
closer investigation of the phonemes reveals no features that are related to shininess. Indeed,
because elements of the articulatory process orientation have properties like shape, size, and
movement, not properties like color and shininess, it’s unclear how there could be any
phonological feature of /gl/ that is analogous to shininess. Thus, not all phonesthemes can be
given an analogical explanation.
Just as importantly, even those phonesthemes that do lend themselves to an analogical
explanation cannot be completely accounted for in terms of analogical processing. Consider the
phonestheme /sn/. Thus far I have been focused on the association between /sn/ and noserelatedness but, as we saw above, /sn/ is sometimes associated with mouths, e.g., “snack.” This
element of the association cannot be accounted for in terms of the more general analogical
association between +nasal phonemes and noses. What’s more, the analogical account cannot
explain why the association between /sn/ and noses/mouths is exceptionally strong—a word
whose phonological form with /sn/ is more likely to be associated with a nose than a word that
simply starts with /n/. Thus, even if the phonestheme is partly explained in terms of analogy,
there are still features that remain unexplained.
In short, therefore, analogical processing seems to underlie some, but not all,
phonesthemic connections, and even those phonesthemes that have an analogical component
cannot be fully accounted for in an analogical manner.
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4.3 Summarizing Analogical Processing
We’ve now considered the role that both iconic representation and analogical processing
play in bringing about purportedly nonarbitrary expressions. In so doing, we’ve found that three
of the four classes of purportedly nonarbitrary language can be explained in terms of either iconic
representation or analogical processing and, as such, are prime candidates for being nonarbitrary
in nature.
This means that all that remains to be fully explained are phonesthemes. In the next
section I will argue that the remaining phonesthemic data can also be accounted for in terms of a
particular computational mechanism centered on the associative connections forged by one’s
prior linguistic knowledge. Thus, by the end or Section 5, we will be in a position to see that all
types of purportedly nonarbitrary expressions display a connection between phonological form
and semantic content.

5. Associative Connections
When looking for a mechanism that might account for the phonesthemes, the first thing
to note is that there seems to be a fundamental difference between those expressions that contain
paradigmatic phonesthemes and the types of purportedly nonarbitrary expressions that have
already been accounted for. For each of the other three classes—onomatopoeias, mimetics, and
expressions manifesting a cross-familial correlation—the phonological form and meaning of such
expressions are always experienced as similar or, at the very least, feel to be appropriate for one
another in some way; even if one cannot say why a certain object is a bouba, the feeling that it is
a bouba is often quite strong. By contrast, there is no feeling of light-relatedness with /gl/, and
one does not feel that there is something especially glinty about “glint.” These considerations are
significant because they indicate that if there is computational mechanism underlying
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phonesthemic correlations, then it must be one that fails to give rise to even the faintest feeling of
similarity.
What might such a mechanism be?
The key to answering this question was touched on above. In the discussion of analogical
processing, I highlighted the ways in which such processing is distinct from associative processing.
In particular, I said that what separates the two is that while analogies involve structural
similarity, associations come about because of past cooccurrence. This is significant because it
suggests that when an association is formed on the basis of cooccurrence, the two things that are
associated together are not experienced as similar or even appropriate for one another. Rather,
an associative connection entails a mechanical sort of link that derives from the fact that two
things occurred together in the past. This means that associative connections have the potential
to be the type of link that are responsible for paradigmatic phonesthemes; because associative
connections rely on past experience, not similarity, we would not expect them to give rise to a
feeling of similarity or appropriateness of fit.
If one takes this idea seriously, then the picture that emerges is this. One can say that the
reason that a novel gl-word gets assigned a light related meaning is that for one who is already
familiar with some words that fit the /gl/ and shininess pattern, there will be an associative
connection between /gl/ and shininess. This, of course, needs to be fleshed out. However, if this
can be accomplished, then it would seem that one’s tendency to form an associative connection
between a certain sound and a certain meaning because of one’s prior lexical knowledge can
provide the mechanism that explains the remaining phonesthemic data.
It does seem one can provide a more detailed explanation of such a mechanism. In the
remainder of this section, I will outline what this mechanism might be. In particular, I will show
that, during the course of word learning, one’s prior linguistic knowledge interacts with the word
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recognition process in a way that biases one towards learning new words that are similar in both
form and meaning to words that are already known. As such, an individual with some prior
lexical knowledge will automatically treat a certain sequence of speech sounds as associatively
linked to a certain class of meaning even when there is nothing intuitively similar about the two.
However, if I am to describe this mechanism properly, there are certain background
considerations that must, first, be addressed.
The first of these concerns the way that individual words are picked out of fluent speech.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are generally no pauses within a physical sound stream; indeed,
considerations about coarticulation mean that the same physical sound often corresponds to both
the end of one word and the start of the next. As such, identifying where one words ends and the
next begins is actually a complex, computational task. Linguists today generally believe that this
task is made possible by the processing system’s tendency to actively draw on the mental lexicon
in order to anticipate where the next word break will occur. In particular, as soon as the system
perceives the first phoneme, the system begins to predict the word that is being said. It does this
by assuming that this first word is one with which it is already familiar—a statistically sound
assumption for adult speech—and then activating all the entries in the mental lexicon that could
possibly be the one being uttered. More precisely, it activates all the lexical entries that both
begin with the phoneme that is deemed to have been uttered and which is compatible with the
syntactic position in which the word appears. There is empirical evidence for this hypothesis of
mass activation in the form of phonological priming; it’s been found that hearing a word that
begins with particular phonemes makes one quicker to identify other words that begin with the
same phonemes.18 This type of mass priming is a useful way to predict where a word will end
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because each word has a distinct endpoint. As such, the activated entries can serve as a list of
hypotheses as to where the first word of the sentence will end.
As more phonemes are perceived, the system can then eliminate whatever hypotheses are
incompatible with the new data. If, for instance, a system that activated all the noun-entries
beginning with /d/ then hears an /i/, it will eliminate all the /d/ nouns whose second phoneme
is not /i/. By proceeding in this way, the system is able to anticipate where a word might end
before the entire word has even been uttered. Indeed, since the number of words that begin with
the same few phonemes is generally quite small, identifying which word has been uttered, and
thus where this word ends and the next begins, simply requires a rejection of a handful of the
remaining hypotheses. In this way, the speech perception system is able to pick individual words
out of fluent speech by relying on mass activation within the mental lexicon.19
The second background factor that must be discussed concerns the nature of lexical
activation. One of the more widely demonstrated facts about lexical activation is that activating
one word activates other words that are related to it in meaning. The evidence for this fact comes
from work on semantic priming. Semantic priming is a process wherein someone presented with
one word are then faster to identify other words that are related in meaning to the first; an
utterance or inscription of “doctor” makes a subject faster at identifying that that “nurse” is a
word. (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) Thus, whenever a lexical entry is activated, it is safe to
assume entries with related meanings will be activated as well.
Combining these two pieces of background together allows one to explain how associative
links can be forged in word learning process and give rise to phonesthemic connections like that
between /gl/ and light.

There are various different models on how, exactly, this is carried out. For an overview of some of these models
see Cutler 1995.
19
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The best way to illustrate the process is by using an example.
Imagine that a language learner who already knows “glitter” and “glow” encounters
“gloss” for the first time. Because this utterance will almost certainly occur as part of fluent
speech, the first task facing the learner—who is not yet aware of the fact that they are being
presented with something new—is to identify where this as-yet-incomplete word will end. To do
this, they will engage in the predictive process described above. This means that they will activate
all the entries that begin with /g/ and then, when the second phoneme appears, eliminate those
that do not begin with /gl/. Thus, by at the time the second phoneme is recognized, two of the
few entries that remain active will be “glitter” and “glow.” Indeed, if the learner is young, these
might be the only entries that remain active. But because of the nature of activation, it is not just
the forms of “glitter” and “glow” that will be activated; their meanings will be activated as well.
Consequently, before the learner has even realized they are hearing the word “gloss” the form
and meaning of “glitter” and “glow” will be activated.
But of course, “gloss” is neither “glitter” nor “glow” Consequently, as soon as the system
perceives the third phoneme, the task will shift from one of identifying what known word is being
uttered to one of identifying the form of this novel word and learning its meaning. How the
system identifies the correct phonological form need not concern us here; what matters for our
purposes is that the system is now on the lookout for a meaning to assign to this novel word. It is
also is already primed by “glitter” and “glow” because were activated during the perceptual
process. This means that the system will be biased towards meanings related to light, and such
meanings will likely both be the first ones considered and take less effort to store in memory.
Thus, even though there is no analogy to be drawn between /gl/ and shininess, the subject will
be biased towards assigning “gloss” a light-related meaning simply because of how their prior
lexical knowledge was activated during the perception process. And because this association is
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the result of prior cooccurrence—as opposed to iconic isomorphism or analogical similarity—it
follows that the link that is forged is associative in nature and will not give rise to a feeling of
similarity between shininess and /gl/.
This, then, is the way in which an associative connection can be drawn for non-analogical
phonesthemes. It’s important to note that while the mechanism operates at the level of an
individual person, it is also one that has the power to shape the lexicon of an entire language. If
everyone displays this tendency to remember words that are similar to already known words,
then everyone should be biased towards acquiring a mental lexicon in which the entries cluster
together. And since the lexicon of a public language ultimately derives from the mental lexica of
its speakers, if enough people start using a particular phonological form to express a particular
meaning, then there comes to be a word with that form and meaning. This means that one can
explain the presence of phonesthemic patterns in a language like English in terms of the
associative links between certain sounds and certain meanings that come about during the word
learning process.
The direct evidence for the mechanism just described is rather tentative; while the
considerations about both word recognition and semantic priming are both well documented, I
know of no empirical work that has focused on the question of how prior knowledge affects the
learning process. That said, the account just provided does account for certain other data that
would t otherwise be left unexplained. For one thing, it explains why subjects in Magnus 2000
were more likely to give words that shared a form with a phonesthemic pattern a meaning that fit
the pattern as well; if linguistic processing makes individuals biased towards new words that fit
old patterns, then it would make sense that they give novel words meanings that fit those patterns
at rates higher than chance. My account also explains why phonesthemes seem to mainly occur
at the start of words. The idea is that since non-analogical phonesthemes are partly a product of
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the way that words get activated during speech recognition, the only phonemes that are able to
influence this process are those that occur at the start of words. This is because these are the
phonemes that the audience encounters first and which, therefore, determine what lexical entries
will be activated. Thus, not only does my explanation of phonesthemes explain our linguistic
behaviors, it also accounts for why a natural language lexicon displays the phonesthemic patterns
that it does.
Thus, while these discussions are not wholly conclusive, the account I have given is well
motivated and accounts for the relevant data. As such, it seems appropriate to say that
phonesthemes also display a connection between phonological form and semantic content and
this connection is the result of a principled, and lawlike mechanism. As such, these expressions
are also good candidates for being nonarbitrary.

6. Concluding Remarks
I have now laid out the three mechanisms by which a word’s phonological form might
linked to its meaning. In particular, I showed that a form can be linked to a meaning by way of
iconic representation, by way of analogical processing, or by way of an associative link forged
during the word learning process. I also showed which of the four classes of purportedly
nonarbitrary expressions involve connections of each type: onomatopoeias and mimetics are
products of iconic representation, cross-familial correlations and some phonesthemes result from
analogical processing, and the remaining phonesthemes involve associative connections that arise
from an interaction between word recognition and semantic priming.
Where then does this leave us?
We have now seen that all purportedly nonarbitrary expressions display some connection
between phonological form and meanings. However, we have not yet established whether these
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connections are sufficient enough to make such expressions genuinely nonarbitrary. This is
because the fact that there is a connection between a form and a content doesn’t necessarily
mean that there is a nonarbitrary connection. To establish that a connection is nonarbitrary
requires returning to the question of what it is to be nonarbitrary and assessing which of the
connections just discussed satisfy the necessary criteria.
Thus, in the next chapter I will consider whether any of the three mechanisms just
discussed is sufficient to be called nonarbitrary. I will then show that the level of nonarbitrariness
that is displayed is sufficient to qualify as pervasive. In so doing, I will demonstrate that PNA is
correct.
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Chapter 4: Pervasive NonArbitrariness and its Implications.

1. Introduction
This chapter is a culmination of what has come thus far. In it, I will argue that Pervasive
NonArbitrariness (PNA) is true. I will do this by considering which of the sound/meaning
connections discussed in Chapter 3 are nonarbitrary and then showing that these nonarbitrary
connections are widespread enough to be characterized as pervasive. In so doing, I will
demonstrate that instances of nonarbitrariness cannot be dismissed as of little theoretical
importance.
My precise argument will be that iconic and analogical expressions are nonarbitrary
while associative expressions are not. The set of nonarbitrary expressions is, nonetheless, large
enough, and nonarbitrary connections are theoretically important enough, to conclude that
nonarbitrariness is a pervasive feature of natural language. Having demonstrated PNA, I will
then consider two debates for which my conclusions seem relevant. The first concerns the
purpose of human language. The second concerns what out intuitive judgments about linguistic
expressions—perhaps even the intuitive “that’s true” and “that’s false” judgments we form when
presented with sentences—actually track. I will argue that the data that supports PNA also
indicates that there is a certain sense in which language is for communication and provides some
indirect support for the idea that intuitive judgments can track the intrinsic properties of
linguistic expressions.
But before we can get to these matters, it is necessary to return to something discussed in
Chapter 1, namely how nonarbitrariness can be demonstrated in practice. This question arises
because the notion of a nonarbitrary connection is quite vague. Thus, before assessing which of
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the classes of expression discussed in Chapter 3 can be accurately classified as nonarbitrary, I
wish to discuss how nonarbitrariness might be established without having to come up with a set
of necessary and sufficient conditions for what a nonarbitrary connection actually is.

2. Paradigms of Arbitrariness and Nonarbitrariness
As I have stressed throughout this thesis, the notions of arbitrariness and nonarbitrariness
with which I am concerned are those put forward by Saussure. For Saussure, an arbitrary
expression is one for which there is no natural or inner bond between a perceptual signifier and
meaningful signified and something counts as nonarbitrary when there is such a connection. The
scales of justice are a nonarbitrary symbol because there is “the rudiment of a natural bond”
between the image of scales and the concept of justice.
But while this definition neatly captures paradigm cases, it is not always easy to say
whether a connection between signifier and signified is intrinsic and natural. If a formal
semanticist uses “O” as the symbol for the set of round things because the shape of “O” is itself
round, there is a sense in which this is a natural connection. However, from the perspective of
one using this language, this connection hardly seems to qualify as an inner one because any
similarity between signifier and signified get ignored; knowing what “O” denotes is entirely a
matter of looking at the relevant assignment functions.
How then is one to identify the extent to which nonarbitrariness is found in natural
language?
One approach would be to try to come up with a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for nonarbitrariness that allows us to sort these penumbral cases. However, this
approach is extremely unlikely to succeed; outside mathematics, satisfactory definitions are
almost never possible. Fortunately, there is a viable alternative. Because Saussure gives us a
126

paradigm example of a nonarbitrary symbol, it is also possible to characterize a paradigm
example of an arbitrary sign. With these paradigms in hand, one can identify their key
characteristics and assess the degree to which potentially nonarbitrary expressions are similar to
each paradigm. If it can be shown that a class of expression associated with one of the three
mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3 diverges considerably from the arbitrary paradigm, or aligns
closely with the nonarbitrary one, this will be sufficient to characterize that class as nonarbitrary.
With this in mind, I will now consider paradigm instances of arbitrariness and
nonarbitrariness. I will also identify the key features of these paradigms so that the types of
expressions discussed in Chapter 3 can be compared to them.

2.1 Paradigms
We’ve already seen that the paradigm instance of a nonarbitrary symbol is the scales of
justice. But what does a paradigmatic case of arbitrariness look like?
Intuitively, a clear instance of an arbitrary relationship is one in which two things are
linked together by random assignment. Imagine that you have ten guests for a potluck, each of
whom is to bring one of ten, specified food items. If you decide who will bring which dish by
having each guest pick a slip of paper out of a bowl, then it’s appropriate to call the relationship
between dish and guest completely arbitrary. This same sort of process could also be used when
designing a formal language. If a semanticist has five letters to use as the signifiers for five
meanings, and they assign a meaning to a letter using a random number generator, then the
relationship between symbol and extension can be characterized as completely arbitrary.
These considerations might make it seem that being arbitrary is synonymous with being
randomly assigned. However, this isn’t quite right. This fact is best demonstrated by considering
other situations in which “arbitrary” gets used.
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Outside of language, the domain in which “arbitrary” is most commonly employed is that
of crime and punishment. A judicial authority is said to have behaved arbitrarily when their
choice of punishment is the result of their personal whims as opposed to the nature of the crime.
For instance, a monarch who decides to behead one common thief but pardon his equally
culpable accomplice has behaved in an arbitrary manner. This example is noteworthy because
the monarch’s choice of punishment was not random in the manner that a random number
generator is. From the monarch’s perspective, the choice of punishment may have been
reasonable—one criminal might have had a “more delinquent look.” Thus, in saying that justice
was arbitrary, one does not seem to be claiming that the punishment was random but, rather, to
be highlighting the fact that the punishment could not be predicted from the crime Justice was
arbitrary because it resulted from the unpredictable whims of the monarch.
This suggests that our ordinary notion of arbitrariness is tied to inferability; for A and B to
stand in an arbitrary relationship is for it to be impossible for one to infer something about the
nature of A from one’s knowledge of B. This lack of inferability is certainly on display in the cases
of random assignment described above. When I know that the assignment of a potluck dish to a
guest was completely random, I know that I cannot infer anything about a guest from their dish
or about a dish from the assigned guest. Likewise, when I know that the extension of a formal
sign was assigned randomly, I cannot glean any information about the letter from its referent or
about the referent from the letter.
Thus, when one takes a broader look at the things that we are willing to call arbitrary, the
best conclusion seems to be that arbitrariness is a type of epistemic relationship between two
things. This comports well with what is said by Saussure. One feature of a nonarbitrary symbol
that Saussure highlights is the degree to which information about the signifier can be gleaned
from the signified. Saussure says that the reason that the scales of justice are nonarbitrary is that
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another image, “such as that of a chariot,” would not have “served just as well” as a signifier for
justice. The best way to interpret this is that the image of scales can carry information about the
nature of justice that the image of a chariot cannot. For this reason, Saussure should also be
understood to be conceiving of arbitrariness in a fundamentally epistemic way.
Recognizing that arbitrariness is largely epistemic also helps explain why using “O” for
the set of round things in a formal language is a borderline case. As we said, there is something of
a natural connection between “O” and roundness. However, given the conventions surrounding
how a formal language is supposed to work, we know not to infer anything about the meaning of
“O” from its shape. Thus, we have a case in which aspects of the notion of nonarbitrariness
discussed by Saussure pull in different directions; there is something that might be called a
natural connection, but inferability is blocked. This causes our judgments to be unclear.
We now have before us characterizations of both an arbitrary and nonarbitrary
relationship. This means that we can now assess the degree to which the classes of expressions
discussed in Chapter 3 align with these paradigms. However, before doing this, I want to discuss
one further implication of arbitrariness being epistemic, namely, that there is a sense in which
arbitrariness is a relative notion. This is worth investigating because it can help us better assess
the degree to which some expression diverges from the arbitrary or nonarbitrary paradigm.

2.2 Arbitrariness is Relative
Because being arbitrary has to do with what can be inferred about one thing from
something else, there is a sense in which being arbitrary is relative. This is because
what can be inferred from something else depends on what background information one
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possesses and one’s inferential abilities. To someone familiar with tigers, a flash of orange in the
undergrowth is sufficient to indicate danger; to an unexperienced child, it is not. Similarly, what
is inferable to Sherlock Holmes might not be inferable to Dr. Watson.
Thus, when one says that a paradigm case of an arbitrary expression is one for which
information about its meaning cannot be inferred from its associated shape or phonological form,
there must be some individual, or set of individuals, to whom this statement applies. This is
significant because it means that one way in which we can assess how much a certain relationship
diverges from the arbitrary paradigm is by comparing the sets of individuals who could
successfully glean information about one thing from another in the two cases. Towards this end,
it’s worth considering who would—and would not—be able to glean information about A from B
when A and B are the components of a paradigmatically arbitrary or paradigmatically
nonarbitrary relationship.
Imagine that a semanticist assigns meanings to certain letters in a completely random way
and wmongst the various expressions they produce is one in which the letter “A” is assigned to
the meaning ⟦sleeps⟧, which denotes the set of things that sleep. Intuitively, this is clearly
a paradigm case of an arbitrary expression. Who would be able to glean information about the
nature of sleeping from an experience of the letter “A”?
It seems obvious that no ordinary human would be able to make such an inference—even
Sherlock Holmes with Google would be unable to infer anything about sleeping from the
shape of “A.” Indeed, it’s hard to think of any mortal being who could make this type of
inference. Just about the only being that could possibly be said to be able to infer something
about the nature of sleep or the set of sleeping things from the letter “A” would be an omniscient
god who was aware of all things that have existed in the history of the universe at all times. One
could argue that because this god would experience “A” as something that would necessarily be
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assigned to a certain meaning in a certain metasemantic task, their experience of “A” is sufficient
to learn something about sleep. However, it is unclear whether it would be appropriate to say
that this deity would be making an inference at all—if an omniscient deity already knows
everything, are they actually capable of making an inference?
This can be contrasted with a paradigmatically nonarbitrary relationship. In the case of
the scales of justice, anyone who has a functioning visual system and knows what scales look like
would be able to glean information about the nature of justice from the image of scales. As such,
it seems appropriate to say that anyone who is capable of perceiving what the signifier
component of a paradigmatically nonarbitrary symbol is a depiction of will be capable of
gleaning information about the signified concept from the signifier. The number of individuals
who are capable of inferring something about the meaning from the associated perceptual
content will, therefore, be considerably higher than in the paradigmatically arbitrary case.
Thus, for a paradigmatically arbitrary expression, there is no mere mortal who could
infer something about the meaning of the term from its associated perceptual form. By contrast,
for a paradigmatically nonarbitrary expression, any individual who is able to properly recognize
the signifier as of a particular type will be able to infer something about the signified content from
that perceptual signifier.
We now have two clear baselines against which we can compare the types of expressions
discussed in Chapter 3, and we have the means to assess how far some relationship diverges from
these paradigms. I will now turn to the expressions discussed in Chapter 3 and determine which
qualify as nonarbitrary in nature.
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3. Nonarbitrary Expressions
My aim in this section is to assess which of the expressions discussed in Chapter 3—
iconic, analogical, and associative—can be classified as nonarbitrary. My conclusion will be that
iconic and analogical expressions are nonarbitrary while associative expressions are arbitrary, but
in an interestingly nonparadigmatic way. This conclusion will allow me to demonstrate, in the
next section, that nonarbitrariness is widespread enough to qualify as a pervasive feature of
natural language.

3.1 Iconic Expressions are Nonarbitrary
It should come as no surprise that iconically processed expressions are nonarbitrary.
Onomatopoeias are one type of iconic expression, and nearly all theorists accept that
onomatopoeias are nonarbitrary on Saussure’s definition. Nonetheless, it is worth considering
just how nonarbitrary these expressions are; as we will soon see, iconic expressions display a level
of nonarbitrariness that goes beyond Saussure’s own example of a paradigmatically nonarbitrary
symbol.
It's first worth noting that speakers of a language experience iconically processed
expressions as sounding like their meanings. This indicates that such expressions display a high
level of sound/meaning isomorphism and that speakers are consciously aware of this. And this is
significant because as soon as one is aware some isomorphic connection between two things, one
is aware that one can infer something about one thing from the other. For instance, knowing that
a picture of a bear iconically represents an actual bear is sufficient to know that I can infer the
actual bear’s color from the color of the bear-shaped part of the picture. In other words,
recognizing that some relationship displays a high level of isomorphism is sufficient to allow the
types of inferences that are characteristic of a paradigmatically nonarbitrary symbol.
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The empirical data associated with onomatopoeias and mimetics further supports this
conclusion. When we consider the empirical facts discussed in Chapter 3, it is clear that speakers
do glean information about iconic expressions’ meanings from their forms. As we saw,
onomatopoeias make up a high percentage of a child’s early lexicon and the best explanation for
this fact is that the isomorphic, sound/meaning connections that onomatopoeias display make
these expressions especially easy to learn. In particular, an iconic connection between
phonological form and semantic meaning allows information about the latter to be gleaned from
the former. Evidence that speakers exploit iconic connections also comes from mimetics. As was
discussed, when English speakers are placed in a forced choice setting, they consistently associate
the phonological form of a Japanese mimetic with its actual meaning more often than the
opposite meaning (Imai et al 2008, Nygaard et al 2009). This suggests that these even nonnative
speakers use information from the words’ phonological form when deciding which meaning to
assign.
Thus, the way we process iconic expressions is in line with the way we process
paradigmatically, nonarbitrary symbols; in both cases, ordinary individuals glean information
about a signified content from the intrinsic properties of a perceptual signifier. This also means
iconic expressions are decidedly unlike paradigmatically arbitrary signs where only an omniscient
god might be said to be able to glean information about a signified meaning from an arbitrary
expression’s perceptual, signifier component.
These considerations alone are sufficient to show that iconically processed expressions
are, indeed, genuine instances of nonarbitrariness in the lexicon. However, it is worth
highlighting that the dissimilarities between iconic expressions and paradigmatically arbitrary
signs go even further. In particular, an individual can infer things about an iconic expression’s

133

meaning even when their perception of a speaker’s utterance is not a faithful representation of the
phonological form that caused a speaker to speak.
As we saw in Chapter 2, what gets presented to an audience’s awareness when they hear
speech is their own mind’s best reconstruction of the phonological form that was in the mind of
the speaker; the audience’s mind takes a particular proximal stimulation to their eardrums and
calculates what strings of symbols in the speaker’s mind must have caused them to perform
whatever speech action they performed. One byproduct of this is that the same proximal
stimulation can cause different perceptual contents in audiences whose language faculties are
calibrated differently; an English speaker cannot perceive a difference between /phaŋ/ and
/paŋ/ that is obvious to a Korean speaker because English speakers are not sensitive to +/–
aspirated.
These considerations open up the possibility that in the case of genuinely iconic
expressions, an audience might be able to glean information about a word’s meaning even when
the content they perceive is not a perfect replica of the phonological form that was in the mind of
the speaker. For instance, even if I cannot perceive the phonological form /phaŋ/—because I am
not sensitive to the feature +/–aspirated—what I do perceive, /paŋ/, will itself be isomorphic
with a bang sound. Thus, even though I cannot correctly perceive the content that was in the
mind of the speaker, I can nonetheless glean information about the word’s meaning because
what I do perceive is, itself, isomorphic with the relevant denotation. This means that while for a
paradigmatically arbitrary expression, a normal individual cannot glean information about a
meaning from the correct perceptual signifier, for a genuinely iconic expression, one can
sometimes glean information about a meaning from the incorrect phonological form.
But the contrast is even more stark; it seems possible for an audience to glean information
about an iconic expression’s meaning from what they perceive even when the perceptual content
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brought about by a speaker’s utterance is not linguistic at all. As we saw in Chapter 2, an
individual is only able to perceive a phonological form if they possess the type of specialized
linguistic system that can turn acoustic stimulation into specialized phonological symbols;
anything that lacks this system will only be able to turn a particular proximal stimulation into a
general acoustic experience, not a specifically linguistic one. Yet, in cases of onomatopoeia and
mimesis, it seems possible for an organism that is only capable of acoustic perception to,
nonetheless, glean information about what is being expressed from the nonlinguistic content that
they perceive.
Imagine an alien who possessed an acoustic perceptual system roughly akin to that of a
human but who lacked a human language faculty. If this alien encountered an utterance of
“bang” or “moo,” what it hears will be purely acoustic; it lacks the resources needed to perceive
phonemes. Nonetheless, the alien might be able to recognize an iconic isomorphism between the
sound it perceives and the type of sound that the speaker was referring to. That is, what the alien
hears when I say “moo” might sound enough like a moo to gain information about moos, even
though what it is perceiving is not the phonological form /mu/. After all, my dog perks up when
I utter “woof,” presumably because what comes to her awareness is similar enough to the
perceptual content brought to her awareness by an actual woof.
Given these considerations, it is clear that genuinely iconic expressions differ considerably
from paradigmatically arbitrary signs. Indeed, the difference seems to be even larger than that
between a paradigmatic arbitrary sign and paradigmatic nonarbitrary symbol. This clearly
demonstrates that our ordinary intuitions are correct; iconically processed expressions are
genuine instances of nonarbitrariness in natural language.
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3.2 Analogical Expressions are Nonarbitrary
Having shown that iconic expressions are nonarbitrary, I will now show that analogically
processed expressions are nonarbitrary as well.
Once again, the clearest indication of this fact comes from the sorts of empirical
considerations discussed in Chapter 3. Just as with iconic expressions, it is possible to gain
information about an analogical expression’s meaning from its phonological form. Consider the
association between +nasal phonemes and nose-related meanings. Because a phoneme, like /n/,
is intrinsically linked with an articulatory act in which air flows out of the nose, one’s experience
of an utterance of “nose” causes the nasal passages to be especially salient. This, in turn, makes it
easy to infer nose-relatedness from the phonological form of “nose.” The same considerations
hold for the bouba/kiki paradigm; because the phonological form of “bouba” is associated with
the rounding of the mouth, the roundness of a certain meaning can be inferred from the
phonological form itself. Thus, for any word for which the phonological form and meaning are
analogous, it is possible to glean information about the signified meaning from the signifier
sound.
The empirical evidence shows that speakers really do make these inferences. The simple
fact that most speakers associate “bouba” with a rounded referent is best explained by the fact
that speakers are exploiting the analogical connection between phonological form and meaning;
they are taking the phonological form of “bouba” and using its intrinsic features to infer what the
meaning associated with that form must be. The same conclusion is indicated by the fact that
subjects are faster to identify that something is a word when it adheres to the bouba/kiki
paradigm than when it does not. Once again, the simplest explanation for this is that the
roundness of the form plays some automatic, processing role in the meaning identification
process. And as we saw in Chapter 3, a tendency to infer things about a word’s meaning from its
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phonological form also explains the sound/meaning correlations that hold at the level of the
public language lexicon. Because speakers can gain information about analogical expressions’
meanings from their form, these words are easier to process and remember. This makes these
words more likely to get passed from one generation to the next, thereby shaping the lexicon
itself. In short, the same tendencies to gain information about a meaning from a form that appear
in a laboratory setting also shape the lexica of public languages.
Analogical expressions, thus, differ markedly from the arbitrary paradigm. Unlike
someone presented with a paradigmatically arbitrary expression whose meaning was assigned at
random, someone who is presented with an expression whose form and content are analogically
linked can—and often does—glean information about the expression’s meaning from the
intrinsic properties of its form. And these connections even play a role in explaining what words
exist; if the used for referring to noses did not begin with a +nasal phoneme, it likely would have
died out and been replaced by one that did because this alternative was easier for children to
learn and remember. This is also like the nonarbitrary paradigm; presumably, the scales of justice
exist as a symbol because the image of scales is an especially good signifier for the concept of
justice.
It is worth noting, however, that analogical expressions do not differ from the arbitrary
paradigm quite as much as iconic expressions do. For an analogical expression, an individual is
not able to glean information from what they perceive unless their perception is an accurate
reproduction of the particular phonological form that was in the mind of the speaker. This is
because an analogical link depends upon similarities between particular phonological features
and semantic contents that can only be recognized by someone with a properly calibrated
language faculty. Someone whose language does not use the feature +/–nasalwWill be unable to
perceive the phonological form of “nose” properly. Therefore, they would be unable glean
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information about nose-relatedness from an utterance of “nose.” This differs from the iconic case
of /phaŋ/, for which one can gain information about the meaning bang even without the ability to
perceive the feature +/–aspirated.
Note, however, that this does not make analogical expressions any less nonarbitrary. One
might be tempted to think that analogical expressions are less than fully nonarbitrary because
one’s ability to gain information about a meaning from a form depends, in a certain way, on
one’s prior experience. That is, since the phonological features that one can perceive is
determined what one was exposed to as a child—I am not sensitive to +/–aspirated because my
parents spoke English—one might suggest that that this does not counts as an intrinsic connection
between signifier and signified. After all, if I learn to associate a ringing bell with food because
the two have co-occurred in the past, it seems inappropriate to say that my inference turns on an
intrinsic connection.
However, this line of reasoning fails to appreciate the role that experience actually plays
in one’s ability to exploit analogical connections. When one is considering whether some
relationship is arbitrary, the members of the relationship are already fixed; one first stipulates
what the two, related entities are and then assesses the level of connection between the two. In
the case of an analogical expression, the only role that experience plays is to put one in a position
to perceive the correct phonological form in the first place. I do not infer that /n/ is a +nasal
phoneme because the two went together in the past; it is simply that I am only able to perceive
the nasal phoneme /n/ because my childhood experience provided me with the perceptual tools
needed to perceive +nasal phonemes. The role of experience is, therefore, akin to the role that
prenatal nutrition plays in my ability to visually perceive shapes; had I not received the right
nutrition, my eyes would not have developed and I would not be able to see today. However, it
would be wrong to say that there isn’t an intrinsic connection between a picture of a bear and a
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bear because my ability to recognize shapes depended on my prenatal experience. In the same
way, it would be wrong to say that there isn’t an intrinsic connection between the feature +nasal
and nose-relatedness because I needed childhood experience to perceive the phoneme /n/.
Thus, analogically processed expressions are like nonarbitrary symbols and unlike
arbitrary signs. As such, they constitute another class of genuinely, nonarbitrary expression.

3.3 Associative Expressions are Non-Paradigmatically Arbitrary
I will now consider the class of expressions whose processing makes use of associative
connections. As we saw in Chapter 3, this class consists of those expressions that contain
phonesthemes which cannot be given an analogical characterization. These connections come
about by way of a mechanism in which one’s prior linguistic knowledge primes one to learn
words that similar in both phonological form and semantic content to words one already knows.
My main conclusion will be that these expressions differ notably from both paradigmatic
arbitrary signs and paradigmatic nonarbitrary symbols. As such, they are difficult to classify, but
are best characterized as arbitrary in a nonparadigmatic way.
To begin, I want to compare associatively processed expressions to the arbitrary
paradigm. The first thing to note is that when one encounters one’s very first instance of a word
containing some nonanalogical phonestheme, one’s position is very much like of someone
encountering a paradigmatic arbitrary sign. For example, if the first gl-word I ever encounter is
“glitter,” I can infer nothing at all about the meaning of “glitter” from its phonological form.
This is akin to the fact that nothing can be inferred about the set of sleepy things from the shape
of “A” when A is assigned to ⟦sleeps⟧ using a random number generator. The situation is,
therefore, considerably different from that of encountering a paradigmatically arbitrary symbol;
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someone who has never before encountered the scales of justice can, nonetheless, gain
information about its meanings its signifier shape.
Note, however, that once one knows several words that fit a certain phonesthemic
pattern, one’s situation does share features with that of someone encountering a nonarbitrary
symbol. For example, imagine that someone already familiar with “glitter,” “gloss,” and “glow”
is now encountering “glitz” for the first time. Because this individual is already familiar with
several gl-words with light-related meanings, they will be primed to treat the /gl/ in the
phonological form of “glitz” as indicating a light related meaning. This individual will, therefore,
be able to learn the meaning of “glitz” more quickly than they otherwise would have and this is
because of the properties of the phonological form of “glitz”. Thus, for this person, encountering
“glitz” is quite like encountering “moo” or “nose”; in all three cases, the individual is able to gain
accurate information about the meaning of the word from its phonological form and this assists
in the word learning process.
Another way in which nonanalogical, phonesthemic expressions seem more similar to
nonarbitrary symbols concerns the way in which associative connections can shape the public
language lexicon. As I’ve said, words that are easier to learn and remember are more likely to get
passed from one generation to the next. As such, if a connection makes a word easier to learn,
there is a sense in which the existence of an expression is partly to be explained in terms of the
sound/meaning connections it displays. This is significant because fitting a certain phonesthemic
pattern is one thing that makes a word easier to learn; if I know “glimmer,” “glitter,” and “glow,”
it is easier for me to learn “glitz,” and this is because “glitz” also begins with /gl/. Therefore, the
phonological form of a word like “glitz” is partly responsible for its having the meaning it does; if
“glitz” did not begin with /gl/ it might not have been passed down to the current generation of
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English speakers; it would likely have been replaced by an alternative expression that did contain
/gl/ because the existence of other gl-words would have made this alternative easier to learn.
In short, associatively processed expressions share some similarities with paradigmatically
arbitrary expressions and some similarities with paradigmatically nonarbitrary symbols. How,
then, should they be classified?
Given that Saussure stresses that nonarbitrary connections require an “intrinsic” or
“natural” connection between signifier and signified, it seems to me that one must classify
associative expressions as arbitrary. In a genuinely nonarbitrary symbol or expression, one’s
ability to glean information about the signified comes from the intrinsic properties of the signifier;
it is the intrinsic properties of /mu/ that allows one to glean information about moos and the
nature of the phoneme /n/ that allows one to better identify a nose related meaning. By contrast,
one’s ability to gain information about the meaning of “glow” or “glitz” comes from the fact that
the form of this word bears some resemblance to words that one already knows, not from the
intrinsic features of the form. Thus, despite their similarities to nonarbitrary symbols and
dissimilarities to arbitrary signs, words that contain associative phonesthemes are best classified as
arbitrary in nature.
But while this is the case, there are two things worth noting. First, classifying
phonesthemes as arbitrary constitutes a departure from certain methodological practices within
some cognitive science. In particular, it is not uncommon for theorists to classify all instances of
systematicity together as instances of nonarbitrariness without specifying whether this
systematicity is limited to cross familial correlations or intrafamilial ones. (e.g., Dingemanse et al.
2015) However, it seems clear to me that if one wishes to do justice to Saussure’s notion of
arbitrariness, then one must keep these two classes separate and treat only those correlations that
result from analogical connections as truly nonarbitrary.
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Second, even though associative phonesthemes are properly characterized as arbitrary,
there is an important lesson to be learned from those who characterize them as nonarbitrary. As
we saw in the discussion of Bromberger and Halle 2000 in Chapter 1, one of the main reasons
that philosophers can be characterized as thinking that nonarbitrariness is of little theoretical
importance is that they show little interest in phonology; because an appreciation of nonarbitrary
connections requires a knowledge of phonology, a lack of interest in phonology effectively
renders nonarbitrary connections to the role of theoretical unimportance. But, note, that the
types of systematicity displayed by associative phonesthemes also requires some knowledge of
phonology. It is only by understanding the role individual phonemes play in speech processing
that one can hope to identify and understand associative, phonesthemic connections. Thus, even
though words that display associative connections cannot be classified as nonarbitrary,
appreciating their nature nonetheless helps demonstrate a more general point: if one is to have a
proper understanding of what natural languages are like and how language works, one cannot
simply ignore phonology.
Thus, while words containing nonanalogical phonesthemes are best classified as arbitrary,
calling them arbitrary is somewhat misleading. This is because this implies that nonanalogical
phonesthemes are akin to paradigmatically arbitrary signs in all ways; this simply is not the case.
Not only does the processing of a new expression that fits some already known associative pattern
resemble the processing of a paradigmatically nonarbitrary symbol in certain ways, the
phonological form of a word that contains an associative phonestheme is partly responsible for its
existence in a way paradigmatically arbitrary sign’s signifier component is not. Thus, the more
useful conclusion to draw is that someone who wishes to have a proper understanding of how
language works must classify expressions into more categories than just arbitrary and
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nonarbitrary. Relying on only two categories prevents one from appreciating the various levels of
systematicity that human language actually displays.

3.4 Summarizing and Transitioning
I have now considered the expressions associated with each of the three mechanisms
discussed in Chapter 3 and identified those that are nonarbitrary; iconic and analogical
expressions are genuine instances of nonarbitrary language while associative expressions are not.
But while these investigations are sufficient to show that nonarbitrary expressions exist, it remains
an open question as to whether nonarbitrariness can be said to be a persuasive feature of natural
language.
I will now argue that the extent of nonarbitrariness in natural language is sufficient to say
that nonarbitrariness is pervasive and, therefore, that PNA is correct.

4. Nonarbitrariness is Pervasive
As I said in Chapter 1, to claim that nonarbitrariness is pervasive is simply to deny the
widely held view that nonarbitrary connections are of little theoretical importance when it comes
to understanding how language works. Nowhere is this sentiment more clearly stated than in
Pinker 1999’s claim that nonarbitrary expressions are asterisks to linguistic theorizing. For this
reason, showing that nonarbitrariness is pervasive requires showing that nonarbitrary
connections are of real, theoretical importance.
Towards this end, I will now argue that nonarbitrary expressions are large in number,
include many ordinary expressions, and play important explanatory roles. I will focus on these
three conditions because, as I discussed in Chapter 1, each is a denial of a motivations underlying
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the claim that nonarbitrariness is unimportant. Thus, by showing that all three of claims are true,
I will demonstrate that PNA is true.

4.1 Nonarbitrariness is Common
One reason that theorists are quick to dismiss nonarbitrary expressions is that they are
generally assumed to be small in number. This conviction is reflected in both Pinker’s decision to
call nonarbitrary expressions mere asterisks and in Saussure’s claim that the number of
onomatopoeias—which are the only class of nonarbitrary expressions that he discusses— is “far
smaller than typically supposed.” (Saussure 1917, 69) Thus, if one were to show that nonarbitrary
expressions are quite common, this would partly justify the claim that they are pervasive.
The evidence shows that nonarbitrary expressions are, indeed, quite ubiquitous.
First consider onomatopoeias. While Saussure is right that onomatopoeias are rare in
certain languages— Sugahara 2011 identified only 287 clear onomatopoeias in the OED—this is
not necessarily true for all languages. For instance, Leyew 2011 argues that in Amharic and other
Ethiopian languages, the majority of animal names are derived from the sound that the relevant
animal makes in much the same way that the English word “chickadee” derives from the sound
made by chickadees. Thus, even though these expressions cannot be called pure onomatopoeias,
they cast doubt on the claim that onomatopoeias are rare.
And once one considers other, nonarbitrary expressions, the claim that nonarbitrariness is
uncommon becomes entirely untenable.
Consider mimetics. As was said in Chapter 3, Japanese contains approximately 5000
mimetic expressions (Imai and Kita 2014) and entire classes of action—such as ways of walking
and manners of laughing—are expressed using mimetic adverbs. Indeed, it is often said that one
is not fully fluent in Japanese until one has a mastery of the mimetics because they are such a
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prevalent feature of the language. Thus, while it might be reasonable to say that onomatopoeias
are rare, the same cannot be said for the equally nonarbitrary class of mimetics; within languages
in which they exist, mimetics are numerous.
Now consider those expressions whose nonarbitrariness is manifested in an analogical,
sound/meaning connection. Such expressions are even more numerous than mimetics. Limiting
myself just to adjectives that adhere to Sapir’s observations about vowels and object size, I was
able to come up with the following list of nonarbitrary English words: “broad,” “colossal,”
“daunting,” “diminutive,” “enormous,” “gargantuan,” “huge,” humongous,” “jumbo,”
“mammoth,” “mini,” “monstrous,” “monumental,” “petite,” “prodigious,” “shrimpy,” “slight,”
“teensy,” “tiny,” “trifling,” and “wee.” While this list is hardly exhaustive, the fact that I was able
to construct it without the aid of a dictionary, indicates just how common analogical expressions
actually are. Indeed, when one recognizes that similar lists can be constructed for expressions of
other syntactic categories (e.g., “elephant” vs. “mite”) and for other analogical pairings
(“balloon” and “pricker” align with the bouba/kiki paradigm) one is forced to conclude that the
number of analogical expressions is incredibly large. This means that even in a language like
English, for which the number of onomatopoieas is arguably low and there are no clear
mimetics, there are large numbers of expressions that qualify as nonarbitrary.
Thus, contrary to what is often claimed, words that display a nonarbitrary
sound/meaning connection are common in natural language.

4.2 Nonarbitrariness is Normal
A second reason that many theorists conclude that nonarbitrary expressions are of little
importance is that they assume such expressions are always abnormal in ways other than their
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nonarbitrariness. This conclusion seems justified by the fact that the most common examples of
nonarbitrariness do, indeed, have other abnormal features.
As was said in Chapter 1, onomatopoeias are generally syntactically abnormal; I can
express that the gun fired twice by saying “the gun went bang bang,” but I cannot express that I
went running twice by saying “I went running running.” This syntactic abnormality also holds
for mimetics. For instance, the Japanese word for energetic is “kibi-kibi” not simply “kibi.” Thus,
there is something to the claim that nonarbitrary expressions are abnormal. Indeed, being
syntactically marked is often said to be a characteristic feature of mimetics (Thompson and Do
2019), and all the examples used in this thesis certainly fit this pattern. Because these clear
examples of nonarbitrariness are abnormal in these ways, it is reasonable to think that all
nonarbitrary expressions can be put to the side as failing to capture how language usually works.
It is important to note, however, that while iconic expressions are abnormal in other ways,
analogical expressions are not. Consider, again, the list of adjectives above. While some of these
expressions, such as “teensy” and “wee” might be said to be abnormally informal—though note
that informality is not a clearly defined notion like syntactic markedness—most of the expressions
in the above list are not. “Huge” and “tiny” are perfectly ordinary English words that occur in
the same syntactic positions as other ordinary adjectives. Indeed, the only noteworthy feature of
most of the words above is that they display an analogical sound/meaning connection, and this is
something of which most speakers would not be consciously aware. Thus, it is simply not true that
all nonarbitrary expressions can be put to the side as abnormal in some other way.
Therefore, the second motivation for the claim that nonarbitrary expressions are of little
theoretical importance is also misguided; many nonarbitrary expressions are perfectly normal in
all other ways.
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4.3 Nonarbitrariness is Theoretically Important
A third motivation for the idea that nonarbitrariness is a mere asterisk to theorizing stems
from the conviction that nonarbitrary connections cannot play a central role in how languages
work. This conviction derives from the state of affairs, observed by Bromberger and Halle 2000,
that philosophers of language are generally uninterested in phonology. As we saw, this general
lack of interest seems to derive from the fact that philosophers are members of an intellectual
tradition that tends to see little theoretical difference between natural languages and formal ones.
If Bromberger and Halle are correct, then it follows that few philosophers will be interested in
nonarbitrary connections because there is nothing akin to nonarbitrary connections in formal
languages play a theoretically important role. Therefore, if all the theoretically important
elements of a natural language tend to be those also found in formal systems, then it follows that
nonarbitrary connections can be of little theoretical importance.
However, when one considers the empirical data discussed in the previous chapter, it
becomes clear that nonarbitrary connections do play central roles in areas of linguistic research
that are of undeniable theoretical importance.
Consider language learning. How children learn a language is undoubtedly an interesting
and theoretically important question. Within cognitive science, there is considerable interest both
about how children learn individual words and in how they develop knowledge of their first
language’s syntactic systems. (Pinker 1989, Bloom 2002) Indeed, some theorists make the fact
that natural languages can be learned through exposure, a defining feature of them. (Pietroski
2018) Certain aspects of the learning process also make appearances in other areas of
philosophical theorizing. For instance, Quine 1960’s notion of the inscrutability of reference is
concerned with how a linguistic expression corresponds to some part of the external world.
Getting clear of which parts of the world can, and cannot, be definitely said to correspond with
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some linguistic expression is also an integral part of childrens’ word learning process. And the
empirical data discussed throughout this thesis strongly suggest that nonarbitrary connections
play important roles in language learning.
Iconic connections help children learn onomatopoeias more quickly than other words;
the simplest explanation of this fact is that they exploit the nonarbitrary sound/meaning
connections during the learning process. (Laing 2019) Much the same is true for mimetics;
children are better able to learn verbs that are mimetic than those that are not, and, again, the
simplest explanation is that children are exploiting iconic sound/meaning connections. (Imai et
al 2008) Analogical connections also make words easier to learn—children have an easier time
learning words that fit the bouba/kiki paradigm (Miyazaki et al 2013)—which indicates that
analogical expressions play a role in learning as well.
It has even been argued that nonarbitrary connections play a more general role in
language learning process. In particular it has been suggested that they provide the scaffolding
needed to learn a language’s syntactic categories. This idea has been put forward by Imai and
Kita 2014 who argue for what they call the sound symbolism bootstrapping hypothesis.
One way Imai and Kita motivate this claim is by using considerations about verb
learning. It has long been observed that it is harder for children to learn verbs than concrete
nouns. One reason for this is that actions can generally be characterized in different ways—an
act of fleeing is also an act of chasing. Furthermore, different languages encode actions
differently. For instance, while English verbs tend to encode the manner of movement, e.g.,
“roll,” “jump,” verbs of Atsugewi1 tend to encode the nature of the thing that’s moving; in
Atsugewi, the same verb is used for the expulsion of snot from the nose and for a jumping frog

1

Atsugewi is a Native American language of northern California.
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because both snot and frogs both are “slimy lumpish objects.” (Talmy 1985, 73). Thus, a child
mustn’t simply learn to associate a certain verb with some aspect of the environment, they must
learn to frame that action in the correct way. One result of this is that children are very hesitant to
generalizing verbs beyond the precise context in which they are first encountered—a child might
only use “walk” in to refer to the same person and in the same situation as that in which “walk”
was first encountered. Imai and Kita hypothesize that one way in which children can get around
these difficulties is by exploiting nonarbitrary sound/meaning connections within verbs. And
there is empirical evidence to back this up; Japanese children are more willing and able to
generalize verbs when those verbs are mimetic with the actions that they denote.
In short, nonarbitrary connections clearly play an important role in language learning,
and language learning is a topic that is undoubtedly of theoretical importance.
Another pair of theoretically important issues for which nonarbitrary connections are
relevant is language processing and the way this processing shapes the lexicon. As we saw, people
are faster to identify expressions that fit the bouba/kiki paradigm, and speakers show a
computational preference for those expressions in which sound and meaning are analogically
linked. And, as I have stressed repeatedly, these computational biases have the power to shape
the lexicon by determining which lexical entries get passed from one generation to the next.
Given that these matters are relevant to such considerations as how we form the judgments that
serve as the primary data in linguistic theorizing and how words should be individuated, these
matters cannot be dismissed as of little importance any more than language learning can.
Thus, when it comes to the questions are of theoretical importance, nonarbitrary
connections also have an important role to play and cannot be dismissed as mere asterisks.
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4.4 Pervasive NonArbitrariness is True
I have now shown that nonarbitrary sound/meaning connections are numerous, occur in
many ordinary words, and help explain phenomena that have considerable significance within
linguistic theorizing. Together, these considerations indicate that nonarbitrariness is a pervasive
feature of natural language and, as such, that PNA is true.
I have now accomplished the main goal of this thesis—I have demonstrated that,
contrary to the dominant trend within linguistic theorizing, nonarbitrary sound/meaning
connections are central to understanding how natural language works. However, I do not wish to
conclude my discussions here. Rather, I want to briefly consider two debates for which
considerations about nonarbitrariness seem especially relevant. These debates concern what
language is for and what the intuitive judgments we form when presented with linguistic
expressions actually track.
In next two sections, I will discuss the ways in which considerations about
nonarbitrariness seem relevant to these debates.

5. What is Language For?
The first debate for which considerations about PNA are relevant concerns what
language is far. In particular, the same data used to demonstrate PNA show that there is a certain
sense in which language is designed for communication.
The idea that language is for communication is a popular view within the theoretical
literature. On this view, natural languages and the human ability to use them came about as a
means for individuals to exchange meanings with one another. Intuitively, this makes sense;
communication is the most salient type of language use there is. Indeed, given its intuitive appeal
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and widespread acceptance, it is reasonable to say that the view that language is for
communication constitutes something of an orthodoxy within linguistic theorizing.
Because the view that language is for communication is dominant, it’s unsurprising that
there are, in fact, several, distinct ways in which this notion has been fleshed out. One such
account, most famously presented by Pinker and Bloom 1990, argues that the human language
faculty evolved gradually in response to evolutionary pressures and that these pressures stemmed
from the need to communicate. That is, each element of the Universal Grammar (UG) that
humans possess today—i.e., the innate mental structures we are born with and out of which adult
linguistic competence develops—was evolutionarily selected for because each individual element
of UG provided a communicative benefit that gave the organism that possessed that element a
reproductive advantage. For instance, the reason that all languages differentiate adjectives and
verbs is that humans evolved to have a UG that prepared them to divide things in this way.
An alternative explanation of how language developed for communication comes from
theorists, like Origi & Sperber 2000 and Scott-Phillips 2015, who argue that language developed
as an extension of our capacity for mind reading and the role that mind reading plays in
ostensive-inferential communication. On this view, speakers mainly communicate to their
audience by getting that audience to recognize that they are intending to get across some
meaning. Language simply provides a way to make this system more powerful. For instance,
rather than indicating a charging elephant by flapping one’s arms—which could easily be
misinterpreted—one can instead shout “Watch out, a charging elephant!” In other words, our
ability to use language developed as a means to turn an already existing form of communication
into something more precise and powerful.
However, while most theorists believe that language is for communication, this view is not
universal. Most famously, Chomsky has argued that “language evolved, and is designed,
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primarily as an instrument of thought.” (Chomsky, 2007, p 22) On this view, language’s use in
communication is secondary. In particular, Chomsky believes that there was a single mutation
which enabled homo sapiens to merge individual mental symbols together into larger syntactic
structures. The computational power that this mutation provided then caused it to be
evolutionarily selected for and to eventually pervade the population. Once enough people
possessed this mental ability, it could then be exploited for communication. However, this was a
purely secondary benefit—communication was not what drove the development of the language
faculty and does not explain how language came about.
With these views laid out before us, we are now in a position to see how the data used to
argue for PNA provides support for the idea that language is, in a certain sense, for
communication. My argument is that since nonarbitrary connections between form and meaning
shape the lexicon by making certain words easier to learn, thereby increasing the likelihood of
being passed from one generation to the next, and the same considerations that make a language
easier to learn also facilitate communication, there is a sense in which language is for
communication.
The evidence that nonarbitrary connections shape the lexicon is something that has
already been discussed above. As we saw, it is easier for a person to learn a word if there is an
iconic or analogical link between form and content; children are better able to learn verbs that
are mimetic and have an especially easy time learning words that fit the bouba/kiki paradigm.
This is significant because words that are easier to learn will be more likely to be stored in
memory by each new generation of speakers. They are, therefore, less likely to die out. For
instance, part of the reason that the word for noses contains a +nasal phoneme is that earlier
generations found it easier to learn a word for nose whose phonological form began with /n/,
which allowed “nose” to survive to the present day. One consequence of this is that, over time,
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the lexicon comes to contain more and more words that display nonarbitrary sound/meaning
connections. And, because, these words come about due to considerations about word learning,
there is a sense in which the lexicon is, itself, designed to be learned through exposure. Thus, in
much the same way that an elephant’s trunk evolved to pick things up, the lexicon evolved to be
learned; in both cases, what we see today is a product of what was more likely to be passed along
by earlier generations.
The fact that the lexicon is designed to be learned through exposure also means that there
is a sense in which the lexicon is designed for communication. For one thing, language learning
just is a special instance of linguistic communication. The problem facing a child language learner
is structurally similar to that facing a fluent, adult audience; in both cases, an individual is tasked
with identifying the content expressed by some speaker by means of the perceptual content they
brought about. The main difference is that the task of the child contains an additional
component; instead of simply identifying what the speaker means, they must also identify which
parts of the speaker’s utterance must be associated with which component of their meaning so
that the child can store the associated lexical item for use on some subsequent occasion. Thus,
the fact that learning can be construed as a special sort of communication means there is one
sense in which language is for communication.
There is also a second sense in which language is for communication. This stems from the
fact that the same considerations that make a language easier to learn also facilitate
communication easier. As we saw above, the same analogical connections that make words that
adhere to the bouba/kiki paradigm easy to learn also cause fluent adults to recognize that
something is a word more quickly when it is presented inside a shape that aligns with respect to
the bouba/kiki paradigm than one that does not. And since a word that is processed more
quickly will be able to communicate a content more quickly, it follows that words that display
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form/content matching will enable more efficient communication. As such, any words that came
to be a part of a language because of their ease of learnability can also be said to have shaped the
lexicon of that language in a way that makes it designed for communication.
Thus, the roles that form/content matches play in learning and speech processing entail
that there is a sense in which a language is designed for communication. To be clear, these
considerations apply to the lexicon of a language. Therefore, it is not clear how much they tell
against a view like Chomsky’s. This is because Chomsky’s claims about the purpose of language
seems primarily concerned with syntax and the evolution of our syntactic abilities; he seems less
concerned with the evolution of the lexicon. Moreover, Chomsky seems primarily concerned
with biological evolution, and since the lexical evolution currently under consideration is primarily
concerned with how one generation learns something from the previous, the lexical development
currently under consideration seems somewhat more like a type of cultural evolution as opposed
to evolution of a purely Darwinian type.
But despite these considerations, the fact remains that the data used to demonstrate PNA
mean that the lexicon is shaped by communicative pressures in ways far more interesting than
that we simply have words for the things we want to talk about. Furthermore, since the lexicon is
undoubtedly part of a language, the fact that the nature of form/content means that the lexicon
is designed for communication means that there is a clear sense in which language is shaped this
way as well. Thus, even if this conclusion does not directly address Chomsky’s own views, it does
address the larger question of what human language is designed to do and shows that there is a
sense in which language is for communication.
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6. What do our Intuitive Judgments Track?
The second debate for which considerations about nonarbitrariness are relevant concerns
what is tracked by the intuitive judgments we form when presented with sentential expressions in
certain contexts. While everyone agrees that forming the intuitive judgment that’s true when
presented with “Aristotle was Greek” constitutes an important piece of theoretical data, there is
disagreement about what such judgments are actually of. In particular, theorists dispute whether
these judgments track a truth-evaluable, semantically-expressed meaning that is distinct from the
expression used to express that meaning or whether what our judgments track is partly,
constitutively determined by the intrinsic properties of these linguistic expressions themselves.
The data associated with PNA is relevant to this debate because it provides some support—albeit
of an indirect and tentative variety—to the idea that ordinary judgments do track the intrinsic
properties of linguistic expressions.
To begin, I want to get clearer about what is actually at issue.
Within the philosophy of language, it is often assumed that a metaphysical distinction can
be drawn between linguistic expressions and the meanings that they express when used literally.
Nowhere is the idea more stated more clearly than in the following passage from Quine 1940:
In the literature on the logic of statements…confusion and controversy have
resulted from failure to distinguish clearly between an object and its
name…Consider these three statements:
(1) Boston is populous,
(2) Boston is disyllabic,
(3) ‘Boston' is disyllabic.
The first two are incompatible, and indeed (1) is true and (2) false. Boston is a city
rather than a word, and whereas a city may be populous, only a word is disyllabic.
To say that the place-name in question is disyllabic we must use, not that name
itself, but a name of it. (Quine 1940, 24)
In this passage, Quine nicely illustrates the idea that what a linguistic expression is used to
express is metaphysically distinct from the linguistic expression itself. On his view, meanings are
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about things in the world and the way those things, are while linguistic expressions are simply
tools for expressing these meanings. Thus, the intrinsic properties of sentences and the
expressions that comprise them can in no way constitutively determine the meaning that is
expressed. In this sense, meanings are language independent.
This picture of the language/meaning relationship has a lot going for it. First, it offers a
neat explanation for the intuitive idea that the same content can be expressed as the meaning of
some sentence and be the content of a seemingly nonlinguistic attitude, like a belief or hope. If
the meaning expressed by a literal utterance of “the sky is blue” is distinct from the sentence
itself, then there is no issue with saying that the sky is blue can both be the meaning of this sentence
and the content of my belief that the sky is blue. This view also provides a nice explanation of
communication; to successfully communicate with a literal use of a declarative sentence simply
requires that audience entertain whatever content was expressed by that sentence. The view is
also compatible with the intuition that speakers of different languages are able to express the
same meanings—if the meaning of a sentence is distinct from the vehicle used to express that
meaning, then there is no reason English, French, and Spanish speakers cannot all express that the
sky is blue in their own unique ways. But, most importantly for our purposes, the view provides a
straightforward explanation of why we form that’s true and that’s false judgments when presented
with sentences in context.
If sentences express truth-evaluable meanings, then the presentation of a sentence
combined with the audience’s mastery of the language will be sufficient for this truth-evaluable
content to be brought to mind. For example, hearing “Aristotle was Greek,” automatically causes
me to entertain the truth evaluable content that Aristotle was Greek. And once I have this content in
mind, I can easily use my world knowledge to assess this content’s truth and form an intuitive,
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that’s true judgment. While such judgments might sometimes be led astray,2 this picture gives a
neat explanation for why one can easily form a clear that’s true or that’s false judgment in most
cases in which we are presented with a declarative sentence.
In short, there is a well-established tradition according to which the object of an ordinary,
that’s true or that’s false judgments is the truth-evaluable, language-independent that is literally
express by that sentence. This stems from a more general understanding of the relationship
between language and meaning. However, there is also an alternative view in the literature.
According to Chomsky and others sympathetic to his program (Chomsky 2000, 2015;
Pietroski 2005, 2018), our intuitive that’s true and that’s false judgements are the result of “a massive
interaction effect due to the meaning of [sentence] S and many factors not indicated by elements
of S.” (Pietrowski 2005, 253-254). On this view, an ordinary that’s true judgment can be as much
the product of one’s practical interests or the non-linguistic norms of one’s society as it is a
product of what might be called the meaning expressed by the sentence itself. For these theorists,
one cannot draw a sharp distinction between the linguistic expressions used to express meanings
and the meaning that is expressed. This is because literal uses of sentences do not themselves
have language-independent truth-evaluable meanings. As Pietroski writes:
Expressions have semantic properties; but these are intrinsic properties of expressions that
constrain without determining the truth-conditions of utterances. One can say that
semantics is a species of syntax on this view. (Pietroski 2003, 293)
In other words, the only thing that can accurately be called the meaning of a sentence consists in
certain intrinsic properties of the sentence and the expressions that comprise it; the meaning of the

This semantic meaning should be kept distinct from the further meaning a speaker is able to communicate to an
audience by exploiting certain pragmatic principles; see Grice 1989. Note that it is generally believed that our
intuitive judgments do sometimes track this speaker meaning as opposed to the literally expressed semantic meaning;
see Kripke 1977. However, it is generally assumed that this tracking of speaker meanings only occurs in atypical sets
of circumstances and that, in default cases, our judgments track the literal semantic content.
2
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sentence is not some truth-evaluable, language-independent content that gets expressed when that
sentence is literally used. This constitutes a significant departure from a view like Quine’s
according to which the meaning of a sentence must be kept distinct from the sentence itself; for
Chomsky, the meaning of a sentence must always be understood in terms of the intrinsic
properties of the expression itself.
Thus, Chomsky has a very different understanding of what our intuitive judgments track.
If sentences do not have truth-evaluable meanings, then our that’s true and that’s false judgments
cannot track such contents. It is, therefore, necessary to give another account of where these
judgments come from, which is what the notion of a massive interaction effect is meant to
provide.
The contrast between the two views of what our judgments track has implications for the
further conclusions their proponents are willing to draw on the basis of our intuitive judgments.
Thus, in order to make the distinction between the two positions even clearer, I wish to briefly
consider how one’s view about what intuitive judgments track affect the conclusions one is willing
to draw on the basis of some of the intuitive data that Kripke 1980 uses to motivate his claim that
names and natural kind terms (NKTs) are rigid designators.
On Kripke’s characterization, “something is a rigid designator if in every possible world it
designates the same object.”3 (Kripke 1980, 48) Thus, if “Nixon” is a linguistic expression that
denotes the same man relative to every possible world, “Nixon” is a rigid designator. One way
that Kripke motivates his claim names and NKTs are rigid designators is by asking us to consider
the nature of the intuitive judgments we form when presented with sentences that contain these
types of expressions. He writes:

3

Provided that object exists in the relevant world.
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Consider:
(1) Aristotle was fond of dogs.
A proper understanding of this statement involves an understanding both of the
(extensionally correct) conditions under which it is in fact true, and of the conditions
under which a counterfactual course of history, resembling the actual course in
some respects but not in others, would be correctly (partially) described by (1).
Presumably everyone agrees that there is a certain man—the philosopher we call
‘Aristotle’—such that, as a matter of fact, (1) is true if and only if he was fond of
dogs. The thesis of rigid designation is simply—subtle points aside—that the same
paradigm applies to the truth conditions of (1) as it describes counterfactual
situations. (6)
Thus, for Kripke, the notion of a rigid designator can be understood as providing an explanation
of why we have the sorts of intuitive judgments that we do; that “Aristotle” is a rigid designator
explains why assessing the truth of (1) seems to involve tracking the same individual regardless of
the possible world with respect to which this assessment takes place. To put this another way,
because assessing (1) relative to both the actual world and counterfactual worlds seems to involve
first thinking about a particular man and then assessing whether that very man was a certain way
in the relevant world, we can should conclude that the semantics of “Aristotle” serve to denote
the very same individual in any world where he exists. As Kripke puts it, “we have a direct
intuition of the rigidity of names, exhibited in our understanding of the truth conditions of
particular sentences.” (14)
Much the same applies for NKTs. To form a judgment about “Gold is valuable,” I seem
to first think about a particular substance and, then, to consider what would be true of that very
same substance were it to exist in some counterfactual world. When assessing a counterfactual
situation, I do not begin with a set of properties that gold has in actuality, consider what
substance satisfies those properties in the counterfactual world, and then assess whether that
substance was valuable. Rather, I begin by fixing my thought upon the substance gold that exists
in this world, and I then assess whether that very substance is valuable given some counterfactual
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set of circumstances. And, like with names, Kripke’s explanation of this is that I have these
judgments because NKTs are rigid designators that serve to pick out the same substance in all
possible worlds.
It’s worth highlighting how Kripke’s reasoning builds on the idea that ordinary intuitive
judgments track some language-independent, truth-evaluable content. Kripke’s main evidence
for the fact that “Aristotle” denotes the same individual in every world where that individual
exists is that “Aristotle” seems to denote the same individual in any world where he exists. That is,
he goes from fact that forming an intuitive judgment about a sentence containing “Aristotle”
seems to track the same individual to the conclusion that “Aristotle” has a meaning that serves to
designate Aristotle in a rigid way. This line of reasoning is perfectly natural so long as one accepts
that what our intuitions track are truth-evaluable semantic contents. For someone like Chomsky,
this Kripke’s line of reasoning cannot go through; because our intuitive judgments are massive
interaction effects, one cannot go from the fact that our judgments seem to designate a single
individual in all possible worlds to the conclusion that names and NKTs are rigid designators
because the part of the interaction effect that is responsible for this intuition might have nothing
to do with designstion. Indeed, since what might be called the semantic meaning of an expression
is a set of its intrinsic properties, names and NKTs cannot be rigid designators because they are
not designators at all.
How, then, do theorists like Chomsky seek to explain Kripke’s data?
According to Chomsky, Kripke’s observations are to be explained in terms of the intrinsic
properties of names and NKTs. The intrinsic properties of these expressions are such that they
simply cause audiences to have precisely the sorts of judgments that Kripke identifies. Chomsky
expresses this idea in the following passage:
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Doubtless there is an intuitive difference between the judgment that Nixon would
be the same person if he had not been elected president of the USA in 1968, while he
would not be the same person if he were not a person at all (say, if he were a siliconbased person replica), but what follows is the fact that Nixon is a personal name,
offering a way of referring to Nixon as a person; it has no metaphysical significance.
(Chomsky 2000, 41-42)
Thus, for Chomsky, it is the intrinsic properties of the expression “Nixon”—not social facts about
conventions or the linguistic community—that causes “Nixon” to give rise to certain intuitions.
Judgments formed on the basis of sentences containing “Nixon” seem to be about the same man
relative to every possible world, not because “Nixon” or uses of “Nixon” denote the same man in
every possible world, but, rather, because the intrinsic properties of “Nixon” are such that
encountering a use of “Nixon” simply causes one to entertain a content that seems to be about a
particular man. In other words, it is the intrinsic nature of a name or NKT that accounts for
judgments we have.
Thus, for Chomsky, Kripke’s intuitive data is explained without any reference to things in
the external world or language’s ability to designate them. According to Chomsky, this is a strength
of the view. Chomsky believes that we should look to explain Kripke’s data in terms of intrinsic,
linguistic facts and not facts about expression/world relations because he believes that the world
lacks the metaphysical properties needed for Kripke’s theory to be correct. Chomsky motivates
this claim with considerations like the following. He argues that if Kripke is right, then the
semantic content of “water” must rigidly denote the substance H2O. Therefore, we should only
have a that’s true judgment about a sentence containing “water” when the liquid denoted using
“water” contains a suitably high percentage of H2O; at the very least, it should be impossible for
“They are drinking water” to seem true when the percentage of H2O being consumed is lower
than in a case for which “they are drinking water” seems false. However, according to Chomsky,
there are times when this occurs. If someone is drinking a cup of pond water, “They are drinking
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water” seems true, but if some are drinking a cup of tea, “they are drinking water” seems false.
However, the number of algae in pond water means that it often contains less H2O than tea.
According to Chomsky, Kripke cannot successfully explain why we seem to think of pond water
as water even when it’s percentage of H2O is low. Thus, we should, instead, explain our
judgments in terms of the intrinsic properties of NKTs like “water.” In other words, we cannot
explain Kripke’s intuitions in terms of designational relationships between language and realworld substances because there the patterns we see in language use are not matched by patterns
in reality.
I do not wish to adjudicate this disagreement between Chomsky and Kripke here. My
purpose in bringing up this debate has simply been to show how one’s views about what our
intuitive judgments track can influence one’s other theoretical conclusions. In so doing, I hoped
to provide a fuller picture of what the views about what our judgments track actually entail.
Nothing I have said shows that either Kripke or Chomsky provides a superior account of the data
discussed. Indeed, it is worth noting that Chomsky is entirely silent about some of the
considerations that motivated Kripke’s conclusions about rigid designation, and it is not clear
how Chomsky might account for these additional motivations.4 But while my discussions are
incomplete, they should be sufficient to provide a better understanding of what the two views
about what our judgments track actually are. And this is important because I now wish to argue
For example, Kripke (p.c.) has pointed out that judgments akin to those evoked by sentences containing names and
NKTs can occur in thought. As such, these judgments seem unable to be accounted for in terms of the intrinsic
properties of linguistic expressions. For example, I might have the thought that a certain pot on the table would have
been the very same pot even if it had been painted a different color paint. This judgment is very similar to the
judgment that the truth of “Nixon was president” depends on the very same man relative to any world in which
Nixon exists. However, since my judgment about the pot does not involve forming a judgment about a sentence
containing a name or NKT, it cannot be explained in terms of the intrinsic features of these properties.
4

This casts doubt on whether Chomsky’s explanation of our intuitions about names and NKTs is actually satisfactory.
Since the judgments in thought seem similar to our judgments formed on the basis of sentences, it would be
preferable to have a single explanation for both. It is difficult to see how Chomsky could provide a unified account
given his attempt to explain the intuitive data in terms of intrinsic, linguistic properties.
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that that considerations about PNA provide some indirect, though limited, support for the view
that our intuitive judgments can track the intrinsic properties of linguistic expressions.
My argument for will go as follows. I will first argue that the phonological properties of
the signifier component of a word is typically taken to be part of what constitutes “the expression
itself.” I will then show that there is some evidence that our intuitive judgments do track
phonological properties. If these considerations are correct, then our judgments do sometimes
track the intrinsic properties of linguistic expressions. Consequently, Chomsky is correct that
there is not a sharp distinction between the truth-evaluable contents our judgments track and the
intrinsic properties of linguistic expressions.
Why should one think that phonological properties are part of what comprise the intrinsic
properties of some expression? The reason for this is that proponents of the common conception
of what our judgments track, say as much. For instance, in his discussion of Boston and “Boston,”
Quine presents the property of being disyllabic as one which applies only to “Boston.” Note that
being disyllabic is a phonological property. For this reason, it seems safe to conclude that, on the
traditional conception, the phonological properties of an expression are not part of what
constitutes the propositional content expressed by a literal use of some sentence.
I will now consider the evidence that our intuitive judgments sometimes track
phonological properties.
The first data for this come from considerations about mimetics. As we saw in Chapter 3,
there are many who feel that Japanese poetry cannot be properly translated into a language that
lacks mimetics and that one cannot speak fluent Japanese until one has full mastery of its
mimetics. These considerations suggest that the communicative power of certain Japanese
expressions depends, at least in part, on their phonological properties because of the iconic
connection between a mimetic’s form and its meaning. And since it is traditionally thought that
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what gets typically communicated in speech just is what our intuitive judgments track, this would
seem to suggest that our judgments can sometimes track the intrinsic properties of linguistic
expressions.
Perhaps clearer evidence comes from considerations about vulgarness and offensiveness
and their connections to certain phonological properties. As we saw, Aryani et al 2018 found that
when there are two words with meanings that only differs in terms of vulgarness, e.g., “piss” and
“pee,” it’s common for the mor vulgar alternative to contain certain speech sounds. For instance,
the hissing sibilant /s/ that is found in “piss” is commonly found in vulgar words. There are
other, similar observations that have not yet been mentioned. For instance, various theorists have
noted that it is exceptionally common for swear words to contain sounds like /k/ and /g/
(Wajnryb 2005, Pinker 2007); indeed, when one considers English’s most offensive words, such as
“fuck” and the N-word, it is striking how many contain either /k/ or /g/.5
These considerations are significant because one can give an analogical characterization
of each of them that is similar to those given for such things as Sapir’s observations about size
and vowels and the bouba/kiki paradigm. When one considers the phonemes commonly found
in swear words, one finds that these phonemes are intrinsically linked to articulatory actions that
are similar to acts of rejection. For instance, producing the sounds /k/ and /g/ in isolation is
quite similar to the act of clearing one’s throat in anticipation of spitting something out of one’s
mouth, which is perhaps the most primal form of rejection —a newborn will spit out a nipple
when is no longer hungry. Likewise, the sound /s/ is quite similar to the hissing or growling that
many animals make prior to a physical altercation. Thus, it is not unreasonable to think that the
negative valence of swear words is partly explained by the fact that these words literally sound

Note that /k/ and /g/ are closely related sounds. The only phonological difference between them is that /k/ is –
voiced and /g/ is +voiced.
5
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harsh and offensive. That is, hearing a swear word is jarring because that experience literally
causes one to be in an unpleasant mental state due to the similarity between producing that word
and another negatively valanced or rejective behavior.6
Lest one think that this idea is farfetched, there is some independent evidence that a
similarity of an articulatory action to some other behavior can give rise to mental states of a
particular level of pleasantness. This evidence comes from what is called the in/out effect. Theorists
have observed that when subjects are presented with nonsense words containing three
consonants, subjects prefer those in which the place of articulation for each subsequent
consonant is further back than ones in which the place of articulation is subsequently further
forward. For instance, subjects tend to find “patago” more pleasant than “gatapo.” The main
hypothesis for this is that it results from an analogy between inward moving speech and the
pleasant act of ingesting food and an analogy between outward speech and rejective acts like
vomiting. (Topolinski et al 2014; Gorido et al 2019) While this hypothesis has not gone
unchallenged (Maschmann et al 2020), the fact that the dominant explanation draws on an
analogical association between a certain articulatory act and a physical activity with a certain
valence suggests that our experience of something as positive or negative can be accounted for in
terms of the resemblance between characteristic articulatory acts and other bodily behaviors.
There is, thus, some reason to think that differences in vulgarness or offensiveness can be
partly explained in terms of phonological facts. I will now suggest that these differences are also
something to which our intuitive judgments are sensitive.
The first thing to note is that there is an intuitive sense in which valance constitutes part
of a word’s meaning. For instance, if I fail to realize that “cool” picks out something positive and

6

This line of reasoning is put forth by Young and Mandelbaum, forthcoming.
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“he’s a weenie” is an insult, I cannot be said to know what the meanings of “cool” and “weenie.”
Likewise, a child who uses a swear word without realizing it is offensive or vulgar can hardly be
said to know what the word means.
Another indication of the fact that offensiveness and vulgarness have the potential to
impact our intuitive judgments comes from work on slurs. One observation within the literature
on slurs is that a slur cannot always be substituted salva veritate with an unoffensive word for the
same group of people.7 For instance, while I might be happy to say that “John is an X” is true
when “X” is an unoffensive term for members of some group, I can be just as adamant that
“John is a Y” is false when “Y” is a slur for members of the same group. This suggests that a
difference in vulgarity and offensiveness between is something that can be tracked by our
ordinary judgments.
Given all these considerations, it seems reasonable to conclude that our intuitive
judgments do sometimes track phonological properties; our intuitive judgments seem sensitive to
valanced properties and there is some reason to think that phonological properties contribute to a
word’s valence. To be clear, this is not to say that the data just considered are primarily to be
explained phonologically; there are undoubted many factors that contribute to a word’s valence
or offensiveness and some of these are likely far, more important than phonological properties.
However, the data does suggest that phonological properties are a component of what our intuitive
judgments track. And if this is correct, then it is perhaps possible that our intuitive judgments
formed on the basis of sentences are often partly to be explained in terms of phonological
features. For instance, perhaps part of the reason that I am so quick to say that balloons are
round or am inclined to say “there are cubical balloons” is false has less to do with balloons and

7

See Hom 2008.
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more to do with the round features of the phonological form of “balloon.” Likewise, perhaps the
reason that a possible world in which mites are gigantic seems so different from our own is partly
explained by the fact that “mite” contains a vowel that is analogically linked to smallness. Given
the data just considered, these must be taken as genuine possibilities.
In short, the considerations just discussed provide some tentative and independent
support for Chomsky’s idea that our intuitive judgments can track the intrinsic properties of
linguistic expressions. And if this is correct, the fact that nonarbitrary sound/meaning
connections are a pervasive part of language means that it is quite common for phonological
properties to contribute to what our intuitive judgments track. At the very least, this is a
possibility that cannot simply be dismissed.

7. The Conclusion
This thesis began with the observation that few theorists consider nonarbitrary
expressions to be of much theoretical interest. In light of what has been said in this thesis, it
should now be clear that this simply is not the case. Nonarbitrariness is a pervasive and
theoretically significant feature of natural language and cannot simply be ignored. Not only do
nonarbitrary connections play an important role in comprehension and word learning, they have
the power to shape the lexicon itself.
It is time to give nonarbitrariness an important place within theorizing and consider the
implications that Pervasive NonArbitrariness has for our understanding of language.
I hope to investigate such implications in future research.
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